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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The commercial incentives to re-regulate the power industry, to promote competition among 
companies, provides many research opportunities. One of these opportunities is studying how the regulated 
power industry should re-strategize itself to operate in a re-regulated, competitive environment. Given the need 
of business to make a profit, companies in the power industry should leam to transform their business practice 
to benefit from the re-regulation, should it become a reality. These factors focus this research, to investigate the 
operational planning of an energy service company (ESCO). In addition, this research emphasizes the contract 
flexibility needed at the point of delivery (with the customers and the suppliers). 
1.1 RE-REGULATION AND THE ESCO MODEL 
Calls for change in regulation, to allow more competition in the power industry, have spurred 
numerous proposals as to what needs to be changed. Most of these proposals favor breaking up the vertically 
integrated industry. Vernon Smith of the University of Arizona and Gerald Sheble of Iowa State University 
(ISU), for instance, proposed that double auctions be used to conduct business in the new market structure [I, 
2]. Previous work by Jayant Kumar and Somgiat Dekrajangpetch of ISU emphasized the feasibility, economics, 
and structure of auction markets, from the perspective of the independent system operator (ISO) and Energy 
Mercantile Association (EMA) [3,4]. While these studies are important in encouraging the regulated industries 
to step into the fi-ee market, investigating how utilities under re-regulation should transform themselves to 
remain in business is also critical. In one proposed energy market fi:amework [3], shown in Figure 1-1, the 
conventional utilities are segmented into generation, transmission, and distribution to encourage competition. 
In addition, energy service companies (ESCOs) are encouraged to provide energy, security, and reliability 
services to customers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the State Public Utility 
Commissions (SPUCs), and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) are regulatory bodies that determine 
the basic framework of a re-regulated energy market. The ISO, the Regional Transmission Organization 
(RTO), the independent contract administrator (ICA), and the EMA are companies that facilitate the buyers and 
sellers of electric energy in the re-regulated market. Generation companies (GENCOs), transmission companies 
(TRANSCOs), distribution companies (DISTCOs), broker companies (BROCOs), and ESCOs provide 
facilities, information, and services. 
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Figure l-l. Framework of the energy market. 
Based on the proposed framework, an ESCO is defined as the only entity that will have direct 
dealership w'th the end-users. An ESCO collects its revenue from distribution customers for the energy and 
ancillary services it has provided and acts as a wholesaler, purchasing the electric energy through the auction 
market and reselling it to the other market participants. To obtain the desired electric energy, an ESCO may 
purchase energy contracts through an auction market, utilize the reserves through the load management 
programs, or own the distributed generation. Finally, to keep the company operational, the ESCO incurs the 
cost of hiring staff to carry out the daily tasks. Figure 1-2 shows this interaction among customers, an ESCO, 
and other market participants. 
An ESCO distinguishes itself by having direct contact with retail, wholesale and industrial customers. 
Since an ESCO is not required to provide facilities that generate, transmit, and distribute electricity, it incurs 
low capital requirement in serving customer demand. This low capital requirement allows companies easy 
entry into and easy exit out of the business of serving customer energy. These characteristics will increase 
competition among ESCOs to provide both better and cost effective service. 
To provide better service at a lower cost, this dissertation focuses on three aspects of ESCO 
operational planning. 
• How to relax customer demand using load management programs. Load management programs defer 
customer demand at high price periods to low price periods. These programs are important in improving 
the profitability of an ESCO serving customer energy and services. In this research, the load management 
program is modeled and used for scheduling customer demand. 
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• How to serve customer demand using energy contracts purchased through a re-regulated auction market. 
When energy is traded in an auction market where contract specifications define the details of delivered 
energy, learning to buy the right amount of contracts, with- the right prices and the right contract 
specifications, is important. In this research, some aspects of energy contract specifications are modeled 
and incorporated into the scheduling of customer demand. 
• How to manage the risks of operation and management. When information about the business environment 
is uncertain, risk arises. Since risk brings uncertainty as to how much profit a company can earn, it needs 
to be managed. To manage risk, various risk management tools are introduced, reviewed and applied. 
To address the three aspects of ESCO operational planning, three factors are categorized and classified. 
They are market factors, customer factors, and supplementary energy factors. Market factors refer to factors 
that influence the cost of capital of an ESCO and purchasing strategies in the energy market to serve customer 
demand. Customer factors refer to factors that influence how an ESCO can attract customers purchasing energy 
services through the company. Finally, supplementary energy factors refer to factors that influence how 
controllable a customer demand is to an ESCO. Supplementary energy is equivalent to the controllable demand 
under the load management programs. The term "supplementary energy" is used because load management 
programs are not necessities, although important in improving the profitability, in serving customer demand. In 
this research, factors influencing an ESCO operation are classified based upon the dependency, variability, and 
uncertainty of the factors that influence an ESCO operation in a particular time horizon. Dependency classifies 
if a factor should be considered independent of other factors in a particular time horizon. Variability classifies 
if a factor can be influenced by an ESCO decision. Finally, uncertainty classifies if a factor is fully informed in 
a particular time horizon. 
Purchasing 
energy 
contracts , ESCO Auction 
market 
Serving 
customers 
(retails and 
wholesales) 
Regolated by EERC. 
SPITCs, and ERO 
Coordinated by ICA. 
ISO, RTG, and EMA 
Other market 
participants, including, 
GENCOs, BROCOs, 
TRANSCOs, 
DISTCOs, and other 
ESCOs 
Bujnng and 
selling energy 
> f contracts 
Figure 1-2. Interaction among customers, an ESCO, and other market participants. 
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1.2 LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
Load management programs, introduced in the 1970s, aim to increase reliability and reduce the 
production cost of electric power systems. They have primarily three components: direct load control (DLC), 
energy storage system (ESS), and indirect load control (DDLC). Accounting for 5% to 10% of the total 
electrical demand, the controllable demand under load management programs allows utilities to have some 
degree of control over electric demand patterns. Direct load control, in general, allows utilities to shed remote 
customer demand unilaterally while ESS allows both utilities and customers to store and consume electric 
energy during scheduled duration. Because of their controllability by utilities, DLC and ESS receive the most 
attention when a scheduling algorithm is investigated. Indirect load control, which allows customers to control 
their demand independently in response to the price signals sent by the utilities, has received less attention. In 
this research, DLC and ESS are emphasized. 
Load management programs flourished in the early 1980s. However, with the passage of time, these 
programs subsided. Except in states like Florida and California with insufficient generating capacity to handle 
the peak demand, the programs are generally not a popular option. The lack of interest in the programs is due to 
concern on the maturity of technologies used in the programs, lack of desirability by the utilities, and fear of 
utilities cross-subsidizing some customers using the programs. 
Today, the advent of re-regulation sheds some light on the prospect of using load management 
programs. When an ESCO is driven by profitability to use load management programs, the three concerns that 
impede the growth of the load management program will be eliminated. If there should be any reason that load 
management programs were to be forfeited, it should be the unprofitable nature of the programs - nothing else! 
In this research, load management programs are used extensively. First, the programs help an ESCO 
to develop a flexible customer demand and strengthen their purchasing power in an energy auction market. 
Second, scheduling customer demand using load management programs enhances the profitability of serving 
customer demand. Third, an ESCO with load management programs increases the service options to the 
customers. Fourth, load management programs also improve an ESCO cash flow by reducing the cost of 
purchasing energy. Finally, load management programs serve as an alternative source for ancillary services 
stated in the customer contracts and the system requirements. 
1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT 
In this research, risk management refers to decision making under uncertainty. Uncertainty in 
information used in decision-making results in uncertainty in profitability, which is a business risk. To an 
ESCO facing uncertainties in the business environment, it is important that the ESCO respond to business risk 
appropriately. However, appropriate response requires appropriate interpretation of risks. In this research. 
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risks are defined as fiizziness (fuzzy linear programming), variance (mean-variance analysis and stochastic 
linear programming), and confidence level (value at risk analysis.) Various mathematical programming 
approaches are introduced to include the risks in decision-making. These approaches include sensitivity 
analysis, parametric analysis, stochastic linear programming, mean-variance analysis, fuzzy linear 
programming, and value at risk analysis. 
Appropriate response depends on the approaches used. As future chapters will suggest, each of these 
mathematical programming approaches proposes different responses with a similar set of uncertain factors. The 
difference in their strengths and weaknesses causes different responses. Chapter 5 further discusses the 
applicability, technical requirements, and time requirements of these approaches. 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF TfflS RESEARCH 
During my Master's thesis work in electrical engineering, the economics and modeling of load 
management programs were investigated. Improved mathematical models for load management programs 
using linear constraints were introduced. In addition, three economic models of load management programs 
were evaluated. They were: a load-based model that minimized the peak demand; a cost-based model that 
minimized the cost of generation; and a profit-based model that improved profitability of serving customer 
energy. In this research, the functions of load management programs will be further enhanced to assist an 
ESCO operation and management. 
This research contributes toward the economics, modeling, and applications of load management 
programs and risk management in an ESCO operation and management. The main contributions of this 
research include: 
• Classifying and categorizing the factors influencing an ESCO operation at various operational levels. 
(Chapter 2 and Chapter 7.) 
— In this research, the factors influencing an ESCO operation are categorized into market factors, 
customer factors, and supplementary energy factors, and classified on their dependency, variability, 
and uncertainty at a particular time horizon. 
• Developing various mathematical models to represent load management programs (direct load control 
program and energy storage system in particular) - mainly my Master's thesis work. (Chapter 3.) 
— In this research, the battery energy storage developed during my Master program is generalized. In 
addition, the pumped-hydro storage model presented in [5] is generalized and introduced. 
• Showing why and how an ESCO may utilize load management programs to service customer energy. 
(Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.) 
— In this research, various economic models of scheduling customer demand are presented. These 
include load-based, cost-based, modified cost-based, profit-based, modified profit-based, and cash 
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management models. The models developed for the load management programs are then included in 
the customer demands scheduling models. 
• Developing mathematical models to meet contract specifications of the energy contracts purchased through 
a re-regulated energy market while servicing customer energy. (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.) 
— In this research, the impacts of various contract specifications on scheduling and contract purchasing 
schemes are considered. The considered contract specifications include reliability and variability. 
Reliability determines the reliability of delivered energy. Variability determines how much customer 
energy may fluctuate during a specified duration. 
• Investigating various risk management tools and introducing these tools in the ESCO operation and 
management. (Chapter 5 and Chapter 8.) 
— In this research, various mathematical programming models that handle uncertainties are reviewed and 
considered in the ESCO operation and management. They include sensitivity analysis and parametric 
analysis, stochastic linear programming, mean-variance analysis, fkzzy linear programming and value 
at risk analysis. 
1.5 CONTENTS OF THIS DISSERTATION 
Chapter 2 reviews a business structure for an ESCO in a re-regulated power industry. The factors 
influencing an ESCO operation and management also are identified and classified. Chapter 3 presents 
mathematical models for load management programs. A thorough literature review of mathematical models 
that represent load management programs is also included. Chapter 4 presents the economic models of serving 
customer energy using load management programs and energy contracts purchased through an auction market. 
Chapter 5 reviews various risk management tools that can be used in the ESCO operation and management. 
These tools include sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis, stochastic linear programming, fuzzy linear 
programming, and value at risk analysis. The pros and cons of these risk management tools are also discussed. 
Chapter 6 provides examples to show how load management programs may be utilized in a regulated power 
industry, the differences and economic implications of using various economic models, and how load 
management programs influence the way energy contracts are purchased to serve customer energy demand. 
Chapter 7 provides examples to show the different focus of ESCO operation at various time horizons. Chapter 8 
provides examples to show how the risk management tools presented in Chapter 5 may be used in the ESCO 
operation. Chapter 9 concludes this research and proposes fumre work. Appendix A is included to provide 
information about the data used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and some detailed results computed in Chapter 6. 
Appendix B is included to provide information about the data used in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2 ESCO MODEL 
Regulation has nurtured the power industry for almost a hundred years. However, with more and more 
regulations being imposed on the utilities, these requirements are constraining the power industry corporate 
leaders in their decision making. Calls for competition, from the wholesale level to the retail level, has made re-
regulation an attractive option around the world. New market structures were studied to search for a good 
alternative that would ultimately satisfy the regulatory bodies, customers, and suppliers. 
The energy service company (ESCO), of the potential players in a new market structure, will be held 
responsible for providing energy, security, and reliability services to the distribution customers. In this chapter, 
the basic structure of an ESCO is reviewed. Section 2.1 siunmarizes the list of acronyms to be used. Section 
2.2 provides a brief overview of the key players in one possible market structure [3]. The assumptions about 
the marlcet are based upon Dekrajangpetch's dissertation work [4], Section 2.3 discusses the competitions an 
ESCO may face in the assumed energy market framework and the factors influencing an ESCO's profitability in 
serving customer demand. Section 2.4 details how operational and managerial problems may be tackled by 
characterizing the factors influencing the ESCO operation. 
2.1 NOMENCLATURE 
BROCO: Brokerage company. 
CDCA: Centralized daily commitment auction. 
DEP: Dependent factor. 
DET: Deterministic factor. 
DISTCO: Distribution company. 
EMA: Energy Mercantile Association. 
ERO: Electric Reliability Organization. 
ESCO: Energy service company. 
FFO: Forward/future/options. 
GENCO: Generation company. 
ICA: Independent contract administrator. 
IND: Independent factor. 
ISO: Independent system operator. 
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LRP: Long-range planning. 
MRP: Middle-range planning. 
NERC: National Electric Reliability Council. 
PAR: Parametric factor. 
PJM: Peimsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland. 
PX: Power Exchange. 
RS/C: Reactive scheduling/control. 
RTO: Regional transmission organization. 
SCH: Scheduling. 
SPUC: State Public Utility Commissions. 
SPCA: Single period commodity auction. 
SPR: Short-range plaiming. 
TRANSCO: Transmission company. 
UNC: Uncertain factor. 
VRB; Variable factor. 
2.2 BROKERAGE SYSTEM AND NEW MARKET STRUCTURE 
Applying the brokerage system to the power industry to encourage competition can be traced back to 
1978, when Matthew Cohen and William Beny of MIT proposed several brokerage prototypes [5]. Vernon 
Smith has pioneered the use of experimental economics for auction markets [1, 6]. Gerald Sheble and his 
students at Iowa State University have recently facilitated optimal power flow technology into the brokerage 
system. References [2, 7] describe the administration of a complete auction institution in the electric power 
industry. Figure 2-1 shows a recent proposal [2] that describes the interplay among all players. The vertically 
integrated power industry is broken up into several entities, with each playing a different but prominent role. 
The industry consists of several companies. The vertically integrated power industry has been divided 
into several entities [7]. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the State Public Utility 
Commissions (SPUCs) are governmental bodies that regulate the industry. The Electric Reliability 
Organization (ERO) is a regulatory body that establishes the procedures and standards for the reliability and 
security of the power system operation [8]. The independent system operator (ISO) and the Regional 
Transmission Organization (RTO) are non-profit organizations to coordinate market participants in the present 
and future markets. These organizations provide surveillance to enforce all standards established by ERO on 
security and reliability. An energy mercantile association (EMA) may be established to provide an organized 
way of interchanging transaction contracts. The EMA: ensures no price distortion or market manipulation; 
spots illegal trading; and ensures minimal capital requirement for all members. An example is the Power 
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Exchanges (PXs) established in the state of California. Even though the EMA may develop contract 
specifications to allow the market participants to trade, the ISO and the RTO need to give approval before any 
transaction can be acknowledged. For this reason, the three entities, ISO, RTO and EMA, may exist as one to 
provide all the required services to create a good market for all market participants. The Independent Contract 
Administrator (ICA) represents a combined ISO, RTO and EMA. 
Conventional utilities have been segmented into generation companies (GENCOs), transmission 
companies (TRANSCOs), and distribution companies (DISTCOs). GENCOs provide the electricity and 
associated ancillary services. TRANSCOs are regulated companies that provide long distance transportation of 
electricity over high voltage transmission lines. DISTCOs are also regulated companies that provide 
transportation of electricity over low voltage distribution lines. In the new structure, two additional types of 
companies are encouraged: broker companies (BROCOs), that provide information and negotiate contracts; and 
energy service companies (ESCOs), that provide energy, security, and reliability services to customers. Of all 
the players, the role of the ESCO in the new market structure will be the focus of this research. 
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Figure 2-1. Framework of the energy market. 
In Somgiat Dekrajangpetch's dissertation [4], the brokerage system can be categorized by how the 
auction market is implemented. First is centralized daily commitment auction (CDCA) versus single period 
commodity auction (SPCA). CDCA requires all involved market participants to submit their aggregated 
demand and cost function for a specific duration, 24 hours or 168 hours for instance. SPCA requires all 
involved participants to submit their incremental demand and price for a particular period, 15 minutes or an 
EM.4. 
Market 
(cash, future, & planning 
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hour for instance. Second is single-sided auction versus double-sided auction. In a single-sided auction, only 
the buyers or the sellers can subim't their offer price. In a double-sided auction, all participants, buyers or 
sellers, are allowed to submit their offer price. Third is uniform pricing versus discriminating pricing. Uniform 
pricing assures all buyers pay and all sellers receive the same price. Discriminating pricing means each seller 
gets paid and each buyer pays according to their bids. Fourth is heterogeneous product versus homogeneous 
product. In a heterogeneous product, the quality of the product differentiates the contracts. For example, in the 
energy market, ancillary services can be one feature that will differentiate the energy contract. In a 
homogeneous product, all contracts contain product of equal quality. In the energy market, the ancillary 
services specified in all energy contracts will be the same. In this research, the auction mechanism is assumed 
to be a heterogeneous, discriminating, and double-sided SPCA. 
2.2.1 Regulation, Deregulation, and Re-regulation 
Regulation stresses govenunental control. Deregulation refers to the de-emphasis of government 
oversight in the private sector [9]. 
Regulation limits the freedom to conduct business. However, the freedom to conduct business is 
paramount to industrial leaders. Safety and quality are of great interest to the public. However, deregulation 
that frees industrial leaders of any government regulation does not require the industrial leaders to act in the 
interests of the public. To balance the interests of the public and the industrial leaders, government regulation is 
still needed. 
Since the early 1900s, the ability of regulation in the power industry to maximize social welfare has 
been questioned. Advanced technology, a desire to lower electricity prices, and increased demand for 
electricity, among other forces, have driven the movement to restructure the power industry. In the process to 
restructure the power industry, some existing government regulation will be lifted while some new government 
regulation will be added. For this reason, re-regulation is a more appropriate terminology to refer to the 
regulatory reformation in the power industry nowadays. 
2.3 ESCO 
The only entity that has direct dealership with the end-users under the new market structure is the 
ESCO. The ESCO collects its revenue from the distribution customers for the energy and ancillary services it 
has provided. It also acts as a wholesaler, purchasing the electric energy through the auction market and 
reselling it to other ESCOs, GENCOs, etc. To obtain the desired electric energy, an ESCO may purchase energy 
contracts through an auction market, utilize the reserves through the load management programs, or own the 
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distributed generation. In addition, to keep the company operational, the ESCO incurs the cost of hiring staff to 
carry out the daily tasks. Figure 2-2 shows the simplified diagram of an ESCO model. 
The changed business structure will offer an opportunity to the ESCO. The company will be allowed 
to purchase the electric energy through the auction market where all GENCOs compete to sell at their best offer 
price. Also, the ESCO will be able to compete with the other energy service providers for business. Of course, 
the changed environment also means competition to the ESCO. To retain existing customers and attract new 
customers, the ESCO has to provide reliable services and options to the customers at competitive prices. Yet, to 
satisfy the investors, the ESCO has to maintain a profitable account. To provide reliable service at a 
competitive price while maintaining profitability for meeting customer demand, the ESCO needs to know the 
new market structure and takes the steps to learn the tools to manage the risk and dynamics of the auction 
mechanism and the customer response. More importantly, the ESCO needs to utilize fully the tools that may 
influence the customer demand, i.e., the load management programs, especially when the ESCO has little or no 
generation capability. The importance of the load management programs will be discussed further in section 
2.2.3 and later chapters. Figure 2-3 relates the market, customers, and load management programs to the 
ESCO. 
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Figure 2-2. ESCO model. 
The challenges ahead of the ESCO can be further explored by looking at the factors influencing the 
ESCO operation. These factors can be external or internal. Internal factors determine the strength, weakness, 
and internal cost of the firm. They include factors like leadership, productivity, marketing strength, and agility. 
The internal factors can be collectively called the corporate strucmre. The external factors can be classified into 
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Figure 2-3. Associating the ESCO with the market, customers, and load management programs. 
three components. These components are the market factors, customer factors, and supplementary energy 
factors. They collectively measure how well the ESCO manages the demand and supply side equation of the 
electric energy. Even though the corporate structure is an important, yet interesting, topic, it is not the focus of 
this research. Rather, it is the external factors that trigger this research. Further elaboration about these external 
factors follows. Figure 2-4 shows the factors that influence the ESCO operation. 
2.3.1 Market Factors 
This research concentrates on two distinct markets. The first is the capital market where the ESCO 
may raise capital to subsidize its operation or invest excess capital. The second is the auction market where the 
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electric energy is traded. There are, as shown in Figure 2-4, three market factors that are considered in this 
research: the interest rate factor, the price factor, and the reliability factor. 
There are two principal sources of funds when the ESCO needs to raise capital to subsidize its 
operation. These sources are debt and equity. The ESCO may raise debt capital by borrowing from banks and 
other financial institutions. The ESCO may raise equity capital by retaining part of its earning or by selling new 
common stock. When the ESCO accrues excess capital, it may choose, among other things, to purchase 
treasury bills or bonds, save in banks or similar financial institutions [10]. Whether it is raising or investing 
capital in debt or equity, the interest rate of the investment is what the ESCO is trying to evaluate. These equity 
or debt interest rates can be collectively called the interest rate factor. 
In section 2.2, the auction mechanism is assumed to be a heterogeneous, discriminating, and double-
sided SPCA. However, three important aspects remain to be considered in defining the factors influencing the 
ESCO operation in the auction market. First is how heterogeneous product is defined in this research work. 
Second is how the ESCO may trade in the auction market. Third is how the traded energy contract is defined. 
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Figure 2-4. Factors influencing an ESCO operation. 
There are six ancillary services that are outlined in Kumar's dissertation [3]. However, only the 
reliability aspect will be addressed, i.e., how reliable is the energy that is delivered to a buyer. 95% reliable 
energy for example, means that all the purchased energy will be delivered to the ESCO 95% of the time while 
no energy will be delivered 5% of the time. In addition, buyers, especially ESCOs, need to be aware of the 
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volatility in customer demand. Volatility refers to the percentage change allowed in the demand during a 
specific duration. For instance, if an ESCO purchases an energy contract allowing 5% volatility, the customer 
demand can flucmate within the 5% range when energy is delivered. Additional discussion on the volatility in 
the customer demand is presented in Chapter 4. 
In the assimied auction mechanism, market participants may trade energy through four different 
markets. These are the spot market, the forward market, the futures market, and the options market. In the spot 
market, the energy for next-day delivery is traded. In the futures, forward, and options markets, the contracted 
energy is to be delivered in the future, ranging fi-om within one month to several years from the date the 
contract is issued. The existence of the futures, forward, and options markets is to allow both buyers and sellers 
of energy to lock in energy prices in order to reduce the risk of business operation. A forward market is less 
liquid than a fumre market. Specifications in a forward contract are tailored to meet the needs of both the 
contract seller and buyer. The bilateral contract that has been used in the power industry for the past few 
decades is synonymous to the forward contract. A futures contract, however, is tailored to meet the needs of 
most players in the market. It often ends up with a cash settlement instead of actual delivery of the contracted 
product. In the options market, the ESCO is given the right to sell or buy energy (of which the contract 
specifications are similar to those in the future market) in the future. 
There are four risks associated with trading in the forward, future, and option markets. They are 
quality risk, price risk, basis risk, and credit risk. Quality risk is the difference between contracted electric 
energy quality and the actually delivered electric energy quality. Since the ancillary service defines the quality 
of the energy, and the volatility is more of a demand-side problem, the reliability risk is equivalent to the quality 
risk in this research. Price risk is the adverse price movements in the spot market [11]. Basis risk is the 
difference between the energy spot price and the future/forward/option (FFO) energy price. This difference is a 
function of location, quality, and supply/demand for each [11]. In this research, no difference is assumed 
between the spot and FFO price, or equivalently no basis risk. Credit risk is the ability of the participants in a 
transaction to keep their contractual obligati'ons. Assuming that the auction mechanism has taken great care to 
reduce the credit risk for all participants, the credit risk can be assumed to be minimal and ignored. Thus, the 
two remaining market factors that are considered in this research are the market price factor and reliability 
factor. Since the FFO price reflects the price and risk of the electric energy in the future, spot price and FFO 
price may not always be equivalent. In addition, as the next paragraph will suggest, there will be a difference in 
the spot and FFO markets. Thus, the market price factor is further classified Jis the spot price factor and the 
FFO price factor. 
To purchase the energy, the ESCO needs to decide (1) the price of energy, (2) the quality of the 
energy, (3) the time of delivery, and (4) the duration for which the energy is to be delivered. The price of 
energy is determined based upon the demand and supply of the market Assuming that the auction market is 
perfect, the price of energy will reflect the cost of generation. Again, the quality of energy is equivalent to how 
reliable the energy is in this research. The time of delivery is equivalent to when the energy will be delivered to 
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the destination requested by the contract buyer. Figure 2-5 shows a sample of an ESCO demand and the 
different energy delivery duration the ESCO could have purchased. Type 1 duration lasts less than an hour. It 
is particularly useful when the peak demand is far shorter than an hour. Type 2 duration lasts for an hour. Type 
3 duration lasts for a day. Type 4 duration lasts for a month. Type 5 duration lasts for more than a month. In 
the existing energy markets, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) and California PX for instance. Type 2 
2uid Type 4 duration are most common, where Type 2 duration is traded in the spot market while Type 4 
duration is traded in the futures and options market. In existing markets. Type 4 duration refers to delivery 
during peak hours of the day only. Because of the difference in the delivery duration between the spot market 
and the FFO market, the FFO price is the combinatorial effect of the spot prices in multiple periods. 
Demand 
Tjme 4 
Type 5 
47^ ' 
January 1 January 2 January 3 Ifebniaryl 
5 pjtt. 
Figure 2-5. Customer demand and type of contract duration. 
Time 
After a contract is agreed upon, there will be occasions when the contracts may be broken. It is 
assumed that the following policies will be agreed upon among all participants in the market. 
• When a namral disaster occurs, the contract buyer will not receive any compensation from any party. 
• When a contract is defaulted and no energy is delivered because of a system delivery problem or generation 
failure, the contract buyer will receive a payment from the party at fault equivalent to the contracted 
compensation agreement, if any. 
• When the quality of energy is less than the agreed upon minimum requirement, the contract buyer will 
receive compensation as written in the contract. For instance, a contract seller required to deliver a 99% 
reliable energy delivers has to pay the contract buyer every 1% of the reliability level lower than the 99% 
specified. 
• When a contract is broken for reasons other than physical delivery problems, ICA/ISO/RTO will purchase 
energy of equivalent quality and quantity and deliver it to the location specified within the contract at the 
expense of the party at fault. To achieve that, a clearinghouse is established to guarantee that the financial 
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duties of the parties involved in each transaction are fulfilled. Requiring the market participants to 
maintain margin accounts helps reduce the credit risk, i.e., improves the ability of the parties involved in a 
transaction to keep their contractual obligations. 
• When a contract buyer fails to consume the energy purchased at any time, the buyer will still have to bear 
the cost of energy, even when the energy is not delivered for such reason. 
Examples of the different contracts are presented in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. Examples of contracts in the auction market. 
Market Spot Future Option Forward 
Position 
Number of contract 
Size/contract 
Premium 
Delivery price 
Delivery Begin 
duration End 
Reliability level 
Volatility level 
Penalty per 1% reliability 
not meeting contract 
Buy Long Long call Long 
5 10 2 5 
5 MW/hr 5 MW/hr 5 MW/hr 12MW/hr 
S5.00 
S25.00 S23.00 S20.00 S25.00 
1/1/2000 9:00 a.m. 1/1/2000 9:00 a.m. 1/1/2000 9:00 a.m. 1/1/2000 8:00 a.m. 
1/1/2000 11:00 a.m. 1/31/2000 9:00 a.m. 1/31/2000 9:00 a.m. 1/15/2000 6:00 p.m. 
95 % 90 % 95 % 97 % 
5% 10% 5% 10% 
S300.00 S25000.00 $20000.00 SI 2000.00 
2.3.2 Customer Factors 
There are, as shown in Figure 2-4, five customer factors that are considered in this research: the 
demand per customer factor, the size of customer factor, the fixed tariff factor, the variable tariff factor, and the 
energy reliability factor. 
Prior to re-regulation, the customer demand needed to be forecasted before scheduling the electric 
generation. With re-regulation, a similar situation still persists. Thus, the first customer factor that the ESCO 
will face is the demand per customer factor. In the new business environment, the customers are fi-ee to choose 
their own energy service provider. Thus, the second customer factor that the ESCO will face in the advent of 
re-regulation is the size of customer factor. 
Since the customers are the primary source of income, the ability to keep existing customers and attract 
new ones is important. To meet this challenge, the ESCO needs to provide competitive services at competitive 
rates. The terms of a service agreement between the ESCO and a customer can be viewed as a contract. Within 
the contract with the customer, the ESCO will specify contractual terms like: the rate strucmre, the quality of 
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services, and the contract duration. A discussion follows about certain components of the contract between the 
customer and the ESCO, namely: the rate structure, the energy services, and the time requirement before a 
customer switches to another energy service provider. 
In this research, the rate structure (tariff) that an ESCO may offer consists of two parts, the fixed tariff 
and the variable tariff. The fixed tariff is somewhat equivalent to the access fee in the telecommunication 
industry. It can be used to compensate the ESCO for expenses other than energy costs. It may also be used to 
compensate the ESCO if the ESCO decides to lower its variable tariff as the competition increases. Thus, the 
fixed tariff factor is the third customer factor. The variable tariff reflects the energy cost and the ancillary 
services that the customers have requested. Thus, the variable tariff is the fourth customer factor. 
The variable tariff may come in several forms. The first form is a fixed per kWh variable tariff, 
regardless of the amoimt of energy consumed or the time of use. The second form is a time-of-use kWh 
variable tariff, where the electric energy consumed during the peak demand periods is charged at a higher rate. 
The third form is a time-varying kWh variable tariff, where the variable tariff is a function of the market price 
when the hour where the energy is consumed. The fourth form is a peak demand variable tariff, where the 
variable tariff is a fimction of the peak demand during a specific duration. These four forms of variable tariffs ' 
not only represent customer choices, but also offer the customers options to share the uncertainty in the market 
price at different degree of financial risk. 
Another customer factor, the energy reliability factor, is tied to the energy service. The energy service 
is composed of two parts. The first is the service on the quality of energy and the second is the exotic service 
options. 
The quality of energy is equivalent to the level of ancillary service that a customer requests. Since the 
reliability is the only one that will be addressed in this research, reliability is defined as the quality of energy at 
the present time. Depending on the nature of use, different customers may request that energy be delivered at 
different reliability levels. Once the customer and the ESCO have agreed on the reliability level, the ESCO is 
responsible to keep its promises. When the reliability level is not delivered as requested, the ESCO bears the 
risk of losing the customer to another company. In addition, the contract term may specify how the ESCO 
should compensate the customer if the reliability level is not met. The ESCO will then bear additional financial 
cost if the compensation were to be paid to the customers Thus, the energy reliability is the fifth customer 
factor. 
There is an enormous number of exotic service options available. Only three distinct options are 
presented. First is the load management option. In general, the load management programs improve the 
flexibility of the customer demand. From the customer perspective, the program allows customers to exchange 
' The time-of-use variable tariff and time-varying variable tariff are used in load management programs to indirectly control 
the customer demand. 
^ It is assiuned that when natural disaster occurs and the contract is defaulted, the ESCO will not need to pay any 
compensation to the customers. 
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their energy demand for monetary compensation. Second is the cost-control option. In the cost-control 
program, the ESCO offers to provide conservation program and load management programs to minimize the 
customer cost of energy. For example, the ESCO may offer advice in determining the best space heating or 
cooling appliances to be installed at the customers' end. The ESCO receives consultation fee and possibly some 
percentages of savings that the customer enjoys. Third is the integration of energy, telecommunication, water, 
and sewage service option. This bundled service provides one stop shopping for the customers. In this 
research, it is assumed that the exotic service options have been reflected in the tariff and not considered as a 
customer factor that influences the ESCO operation. 
The minimum time requirement before a customer can switch to a different energy service provider is 
an important aspect. The time requirement can be defined as the time needed by the ESCO to readjust its 
contractual positions in the auction market. For example, in PJM service territory, customers need to notify 
PJM a month before changing service provider. There is a possibility that the time requirement may be reduced 
in the future. However, this is more of a regulatory issue, which is outside the scope of this research. Despite 
the time requirement, the number of customers under the ESCO service will vary from one time to another. 
Thus, the size of customer factor will remain in the ESCO operation. 
2.3.3 Supplementary Energy Factors 
Supplementary energy is synonymous to the load management programs. The reason for using the 
term "supplementary energy" is that load management programs are not a necessity, even though they are 
important to improving the profitability of serving customer demand. The structure of the supplementary 
energy factor is similar to that of the customer factor. There are, as shown in Figure 2-4, five supplementary 
energy factors that are considered in this research: the supply per participation factor, the size of participation 
factor, the fixed rebate factor, the variable rebate factor, and the reliability factor. 
The supply per participation factor refers to the amount of energy per customer participation that can 
be controlled by the ESCO. The size of participation factor refers to the number of customers participating in 
the load management programs. The fixed rebate factor and variable rebate factor refer to the rebate structure 
that the ESCO used to attract customer participation. The reliability factor refers to the reliability of the load 
management energy. The reliability of the load management energy largely depends on the reliability of the 
load management devices that controlled the electric energy. In addition, the trustworthiness of the customers is 
important in assessing the reliability of the load management devices. 
Despite the similarities in their structure, the supplementary energy factors have some complexities 
that are not found in the customer factors. The discussion on supplementary energy is divided into the 
following: ownership and participation. To end the discussion, the effect of marketing and operational 
efficiency will be discussed. 
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Ownership refers to physical ownership and operational ownership. While the concern about the 
ownership issue has been addressed in previous work, fiuther elaboration will be presented [12]. A physical 
ownership refers to who owns and is responsible for the maintenance of the appliance used for the load 
management programs. An operational ownership refers to who will be responsible for the daily operation of 
the appliance. The two parties involved in the ownership aspect are the customers and the ESCO. The two 
ownership aspect dictates how each of the two parties may benefit or be compensated from the load 
management programs. Any combination is possible. For instance, an ESCO-owned, customer-operated load 
management device may be loaned to a customer who doesn't have the capital to invest in the device, but 
wishes to benefit from the load management programs. The ESCO, on the other hand, may believe that the 
return on investment on the loan is so favorable that the business deserves a try. A customer-owned, ESCO-
operated simation can also occur when the customer with the capital to invest in the load management device 
believes that the return on investment, by loaning the appliance to the utility for load management purposes, is 
more profitable than operating the load management device him/herself. The ESCO, on the other hand, may 
believe that by renting the load management devices from the customers it will reduce the capital needs while 
improving the flexibility of customer demand and improving the profitability of serving customers. 
Participation refers to how the customers may be attracted to the load management programs. There 
are different ways to attract the customer. For example, the ESCO may offer the customer special treatment 
when there is a shortage in the energy supply. In this research, it is assumed that in attracting the customers, the 
potential customers are offered a two-part incentive similar to the rate structure on energy services. A fixed part 
is offered to customers for participating in the program. A variable part is offered to the customer each time the 
demand is shifted to another hour 
Even though with the same amoimt of incentive, a different marketing strategy may result in a different 
number of customers participating in the program. However, to realize the effect of a marketing strategy, it is 
important to distinguish the difference between marketing strategy and operational efficiency. A marketing 
strategy is employed to increase the number of customers an ESCO may attract to its company for a given 
revenue-cost ratio (the revenue-cost ratio is referred as the revenue that the ESCO may collect from the 
customer with respect to the cost of serving the customer demand.) An operational efficiency refers to the 
ability of the ESCO to manage the cost of energy purchased through the auction market Scheduling 
supplementary energy improves the operational efficiency for a given marketing effort. An efficient operation 
improves the profitability that eventually provides flexibility to the ESCO in the marketing effort. In short, the 
^ A variable part of the incentive can also be the dollar per MWhr of the customer energy that is used for the load 
management purpose. Since the load management algorithm has been modeled for the first possibility, it will be used 
instead throughout the discussion. 
An operational efficiency can also be referred to as the efficiency of running the company. The reason for taking the first 
definition is to clear up the relationship among the marketing, the operational efficiency and the developed load 
management algorithm. 
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marketing effort improves sales for a given revenue-cost ratio while the operational efficiency improves 
revenue-cost ratio for a given sale. 
2.4 OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT OF AN ESCO 
As re-regulation enhances competition, each player within the market seeks to improve its profitability 
and strategic position. With each player driven to excel, rapid changes in the technologies and the business 
strategies are inevitable. This phenomenon increases the dynamics of the business environment, making it 
harder to differentiate the operation and management of an ESCO in the short run from the long run. Yet, to 
help the ESCO focus on its operation, the ability to identify the operation and management at various stages is 
important. This section addresses the characteristics of the factors influencing the ESCO operation, the time 
horizon at which these factors are considered in the decision making process, and the various possible 
objectives that an ESCO may have. 
From section 2.2, the factors influencing the operation of the ESCO serving customer demand can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Market - spot price, FFO price, and reliability. These market factors affect the cost of serving 
customer demand. 
• Customers - demand per customer factor, size of customer factor, fixed tariff factor, variable tariff 
factor, and energy reliability factor. These customer factors affect the revenue of serving customer 
demand. 
• Supplementary Energy — supply per participation factor, size of participation factor, fixed rebate factor, 
variable rebate factor, and reliability factor. The load management programs increase the ESCO 
capital cost, but at the same time improve the profitability of serving customer demand and relax the 
customer demand. 
To achieve its objective, the ESCO needs to incorporate into its decision making the factors influencing its 
operation. However, before incorporating these factors into the decision making process, their characteristics 
should be identified. There is more than one way to characterize these factors. To help develop algorithms to 
achieve the ESCO objective, this research identifies are three major characteristics that are crucial. The first 
characteristic is whether the factor is dependent or independent. A dependent factor is a function of some other 
factors while an independent factor is not. For example, as the ESCO may offer customers with higher 
purchase power a lower rate, the rate structure (tariff) can be a function of the customer demand. Evaluating the 
factor dependency is important whether the ESCO is trying to estimate or make decision. The second 
characteristic is whether the factor is parametric or variable. A parametric factor refers to a factor that is known 
at the time of decision making. For instance, the tariff charged to a customer for the next day is known at the 
time of decision making and should be considered as a parameter. A variable factor refers to a factor that is not 
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known at the time of decision making. The ESCO ne^ds to determine the value of the variable factor at the ume 
of decision making. For example, the ESCO needs to determine the number of spot contracts to be purchased 
for tomorrow's customer demand. The third characiteristic is whether the factor is deterministic or uncertain. 
For example, since the ESCO may not know exactly how much energy a particular customer will consume, the 
demand per customer is an imcertain factor. 
As time duration changes, the characteristics of the factors influencing the ESCO operation change as 
well. For instance, the ESCO knows the tariff th.at it can charge a customer for tomorrow, making it a 
parametric, independent, and deterministic factor. However, when looking into the future, the ESCO may be 
forced by competitors to reduce the tariff or, if energy costs increase, to increase the tariff. Then, the tariff 
becomes a variable, dependent, and uncertain factor- Thus, the time horizon of the operational management 
should first be determined to allow proper classification of the factors influencing the ESCO operation. The 
specification of the time horizon depends on two issues. First are the realities that influence the energy and 
consumer markets. For example, PJM requires the dlistribution customers to notify the change of their energy 
service providers a month ahead of time. The ESCO is assured of the number of customers that it serves within 
the month. Thus, the number of customers that the ESCO serves becomes an independent, parametric, and 
deterministic factor within tiie month. When the time horizon exceeds one month, the number of customers that 
the ESCO serves will most likely depend on the competition it faces. Then, when the time horizon exceeds one 
month, the number of customers that the ESCO serves becomes a dependent, variable, and uncertain factor. 
Second are the assumptions that the ESCO establishes: to solve the intended problems. For example, the interest 
rate factor is uncertain most of the time. No matter how stable the economy, the traded market interest rates 
(treasury bonds, treasury bills, and corporate bonds) fluctuate throughout the trading hours due to the 
speculations of the buyers and sellers. However, in solving some short-term problems, scheduling customer 
demand and purchasing electric energy, for instance, the interest rates can be assumed as a parametric, 
independent, deterministic factor. This assumption can be supported if the ESCO has hedged against the interest 
rates risk in the short-term or if the economy in the rtear term is so stable that the fluctuation in interest rate is 
insignificant. As the assumptions made by each company vary, the specification of the time horizons varies 
from one company to another as well. Table 2-2 shows one possible way to classify the different time horizons 
that an ESCO may consider in its operational planning. Each of the time horizons will be discussed fiirther. 
Once the factors influencing the ESCO operation are characterized for the different time duration, the 
ESCO must determine what it would like to achieves within each time duration. The selected objective will 
govern how all the variable factors influencing ESCO operation within a time duration should behave. There 
are many choices for the objectives. Also, the selected objectives can affect the performance of the company as 
well. For example, while minimizing customer demand during peak dememd hours can minimize the risk of 
jeopardizing the energy delivery system, the ESCO'ss expected profit could be significantiy lowered. This is 
especially true if the peak energy price does not correslate well with the peak demand. Column 3 of Table 2-2 
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provides some objectives that the ESCO may choose during the dififerent time horizons. In Table 2-3 through 
Table 2-5, the characteristics of factors influencing the ESCO operation in different time horizons are presented. 
If the open market is perfect, no player should be able to influence any of the market factors. 
Therefore, all market factors should be parametric. Since the open market interest rate is not to be modeled, the 
factor is assumed to be independent In addition, since it is assimied that the open market interest rate is stable 
in the near term, the factor is deterministic from the reactive scheduling/control level to the short-range 
planning level. In most instances, all market prices are uncertain because they are the combinatorial effect of all 
market players. However, in the reactive scheduling/control level, it is assumed that the ESCO must be 
infomied of the incentive if it is to reschedule its demand. Therefore, the spot market price in the reactive 
scheduling/control level is assumed to be deterministic. Since the forward, fiitures, and options markets would 
most likely require all players to clear their positions prior to the beginning of contract duration, they are not 
available in the reactive scheduling/control level. 
Table 2-2. Classification of the ESCO operational and management levels. 
Level Horizon Examples of objectives 
1. Long-range planning 
(LRP) 
2. Middle-range 
planning (MRP) 
3. Short-range planning 
(SRP) 
4. Scheduling (SCH) 
5. Reactive 
scheduling/control 
(RS/C) 
more than 2 Service territory expansion; determining the need to expand energy 
years storage system and/or distribution generation capacity. 
1 year to 18 Designing the customer rate structure or rebate system; determining 
months the size of participation in the load management programs. 
1 month to Cash flow management; risk management using FFO contracts; 
several months determining the incentives to attracfmaintain new/existed 
customers. 
I day to Purchasing energy through the spot market, rescheduling customer 
several weeks demand and exercising future and option contracts to meet 
scheduling purpose. 
less than I day Meeting system requirement as outlined by the ISOACA/RTG and 
the contracted energy demand and supply. 
Since customer demand must be forecasted all the time, the demand per customer is an uncertain factor 
at all operational levels. Since customers need to inform the proper authority some time prior to switching their 
services to a different energy service company, e.g. customers in the PJM territory, factors other than the 
demand per customer factor are deterministic and parametric in the reactive scheduling/control and scheduling 
level. As the time duration increases to more than one month, customers may opt for a different energy service 
company for better service or prices; therefore, most factors become variable beyond the scheduling level. It is 
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assumed that the ESCO is less likely to change its policy in the fixed part of the rate structure, therefore, fixed 
tariff factor remains deterministic in the short-range level. Also, It is assumed that all customer factors can be 
modeled to better understand the needs of the customer. 
As mentioned before, the structure of the supplementary energy factors is similar to those of the 
customer factors. It is assumed that the customers need to inform the ESCO a month prior to discontinuing the 
load management programs. Thus, the first four columns of the two factors are similar. However, in this 
research, since no discussion will be made on the reliability of the load management devices and the 
trustworthiness of the customers participating in the program, the reliability factor is categorized as 
independent, parametric, and deterministic factor for simplicity. 
Table 2-3. The characteristics of market factors. 
Level Open market (supply-side) 
Spot price FFO price reliability Interest rate 
1. LRP DEP. PAR. UNC DEP. PAR. UNC DEP, PAR. UNC IND, PAR, UNC 
2. MRP DEP. PAR. UNC DEP, PAR. UNC DEP, PAR, UNC IND, PAR. UNC 
3. SRP DEP.PAR. UNC DEP. PAR. UNC DEP. PAR, UNC IND, PAR. DET 
4. SCH DEP. PAR. UNC DEP. PAR. UNC DEP, PAR, UNC IND, PAR, DET 
5. RS/C DEP. PAR. DET Not available DEP, PAR, DET IND, PAR, DET 
Table 2-4. The characteristics of customer factors. 
Level Customer (demand-side) 
Rate structure Demand per Number of Energy 
fixed Variable customer customers reliability 
l.LRP DEP. VRB, DEP , VRB, DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. 
UNC UNC DEP. VRB. UNC UNC UNC 
2. MRP DEP, VRB, UNC DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB, DEP. VRB. 
UNC DEP. VRB. UNC UNC UNC 
3. SRP DEP, PAR. UNC DEP. VRB. DEP, VRB, DEP. VRB. 
DET DEP. PAR. UNC UNC UNC 
4. SCH DEP. PAR. DET DEP. PAR. DEP, PAR, DEP. PAR. 
DET DEP. PAR. UNC DET DET 
5. RS/C DEP. PAR. DET DEP. PAR. DEP, PAR, DEP. PAR. 
DET UNC DET DET 
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Table 2-5. The characteristics of supplementary energy factors. 
Level Supplementary energy (load management programs) 
Rebate structure Supply per Size of Reliability 
fixed variable pam'cipation participation 
l.LRP DEP. VRB. DEP, VRB. DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. IND. PAR. 
UNC UNC UNC UNC DET 
2. MRP DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. IND. PAR. 
UNC UNC UNC UNC DET 
3.SRP DEP. PAR. DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. DEP. VRB. IND. PAR. 
DET UNC UNC UNC DET 
4. SCH DEP. PAR. DEP. PAR. DEP. PAR. DEP. PAR. IND. PAR. 
DET DET UNC DET DET 
5.RS/C DEP, PAR. DEP. PAR. DEP. PAR. DEP. PAR. IND. PAR. 
DET DET UNC DET DET 
2.4.1 Long-range Planning 
At this level, there are two major concerns. The first is the market share^ of the company. A business 
unit's return on the investment is directly related to its share of the market because businesses with high market 
shares tend to enjoy economies of scale [10]. Also, since the gain of market share is lead by the quality of 
services and products, it is important to consider improving the quality with attributes like added staff and 
service options. The second is the installation of the generation and storage systems that requires high capital 
cost, including energy storage system and distributed generation (if allowed). These high cost tools help the 
ESCO to avoid the high market risk and to manage customer demand with greater flexibility. Ultimately, the 
use of these tools will result in a higher profit margin in servicing the customer demand. 
2.4.2 Middle-range Planning 
At this level, the operation is down to 1 - 1 '/2-year horizon. In this duration, the ESCO determines if 
existing customer rate strucmre will appropriately improve its profitability in servicing the customer demand 
and maintaining sufficient market share. This includes analyzing the competitions from the other ESCOs or the 
^ Having a large market share does not guarantee market power to the ESCO. A market power refers to the ability of the 
ESCO to control the competitive environment in which all other competing ESCOs operate. However, market share only 
describes the number of customers that the ESCO serves comparing to the rest ESCOs. If the ESCO is operating in a 
competitive market, the market share will, however, not provide any market power to the ESCO. 
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alternative energy source providers. In addition, it is important to consider if existing DLC and IDLC programs 
are appropriately maximizing the profitability of servicing the customer demand and improving the flexibility of 
the customer demand. The major reason for including the DLC and IDLC programs in the middle-range 
planning is that they are easier to set up relative to the installation of high cost yet time consuming ESS. 
Comparing Tables 2-3 — 2-5, one would find that the characteristics of factors influencing the ESCO 
operation in both LRP and MRP are exactly the same. However, the objectives in both planning horizons are 
different. The difference in the obj'ectives is a result of some high-capital investment that needs to take into 
account the effect in the future time. For example, a comparison between section 2.4.1 and section 2.4.2 
suggests that no expansion in the distributed generation be evaluated in the MRP. Even though the expansion 
may take less than 1-114 years to be completed, the evaluation should take into account the remm on 
investment that often time takes more than I — VA years. 
2.4.3 Short-range Planning 
At this level, the ESCO operation is down to less than a year. Cyclical customer demand is relatively 
unchanged, other than some trend movement as a result of, say, changed weather. Except for some rebate 
scheme, the rate structure offered to customers does not change much during this duration. Thus, the objective 
at the short-range planning level is to maintain an acceptable cash flow condition, reduce the short-term risk 
using the fumres and options contracts, and raise capital, through equity or debt, to help maintain a healthy 
financial condition. 
2.4.4 Scheduling 
At this level, the ESCO operation is down to several weeks. At this level, the customer contracts are 
not alterable. The number of customers participating in the load management programs and the availability of 
the ESS are known. Meanwhile, the rate structure agreed upon by the ESCO and the customers is set. The 
targeted objective (profit maximization, cost minimization, or peak load minimization) is reached by managing 
the controllable energy under the DLC and IDLC program, sending the proper rate signal to the customers 
participating in the IDLC program, purchasing energy through the auction market, and exercising the futures 
and options contracts. 
2.4.5 Reactive Scheduling/Control 
At this level, central issues are emergencies and glitches [13]. The customer demand is monitored to 
assure that the purchased energy and ancillary services meet the requirements stated in both the customer 
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contracts and the regulation. Properly developed monitoring systems should help the dispatcher when 
contingencies occur. 
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CHAPTER 3 LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
Load management programs were initiated in the 1970s to actively influence customer demand. 
Generally, it can be categorized into direct load control (DLC), indirect load control (IDLC), and energy storage 
system (ESS). Figure 3-1 shows the classification of load management programs. 
This chapter focuses on modeling the DLC and ESS demand at any time duration (seconds, minutes, or 
hours). Section 3.1 reviews the load management programs, and includes a perspective on why load 
management should not be ignored in the re-regulated business environment Section 3.2 reviews the different 
load management models in existing literature. Section 3.3 provides a list of variables and parameters used in 
modeling the DLC and ESS program. Section 3.4 presents the DLC model, while section 3.5 presents the ESS 
model. 
Indirect load 
control (IDLC) ] 
Load 
Management 
Directload 
control (DLC) 
Energy storage 
system (ESS) 
Figure 3-1. Load management programs. 
3.1 LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGEIAMS 
The DLC allows the ESCO to shed remote customer demand unilaterally. The DLC program can be 
further classified, depending on the employed technology. Remote control uses the communication system to 
execute the load deferment or load paid back instruction. Point-of-use, however, uses devices like cyclic timers, 
thermostats, and time clocks to carry out the [14 - 16]. IDLC allows the customers to control their demand 
independently according to the price signals sent by the utilities. Both DLC and IDLC share the same concept, 
where controllable demands are shifted to the future where the economic values are higher. However, they 
differ on who has the ultimate control on the electric appliances. Finally, ESS allows both the ESCO and the 
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customers to store energy during low-cost sessions and consume during high-cost sessions. ESS installed at the 
customers' end includes cool storage, storage space heating, and storage water heating. ESS installed at the 
providers' end includes batteries, pumped hydroelectric storage, compressed air energy storage, liquid-phase 
methanol with coal gasification combined-cycle, and superconducting magnetic energy storage [17]. 
Load 
Management 
Indirect Load 
Control (IDLC) 
Direct Load 
Control (DLC) 
Energy Storage 
System (ESS) 
Supply Side 
Technology 
Demand Side 
Technology 
Point-of-use 
Control 
Remote 
Control 
1. Cyclic timers 
2. Thermostat 
3. Time clock 
Involves use of 
communication 
system 
L Cool storage 
2. Storage space 
heating 
3. Storage water 
heating 
1. Time clock 
or switching 
2. Thermostat 
3. Time-of-use (TOU)/ 
time-varying (TV) 
rate 
4. Current limiter 
5. Interlock 
6. Cyclic 
7. Demand control 
1. Pumped 
hydroelectric 
storage 
2. Batteries 
3. Compressed air 
energy storage 
4. Liquid-phase 
methanol with 
coal gasification 
combined-cycle 
5. Superconducting 
magnetic energy 
storage 
Figure 3-2. Classification of the load management programs. 
Since its inception, the demand under the load management programs has accounted for 5% to 10% of 
the total electric demand patterns. The programs once flourished in the early 1980s. However, as time went on, 
interest in the program subsided. Except in states like Florida and California, with insufficient generating 
capacity to handle the peak demand, the programs are generally not a popular option anymore. The lack of 
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interest in the programs is attributable to three major reasons. First, the load management programs are 
relatively young compared to the power industry in general. The technology has not matured enough for the 
utilities to feel comfortable about adopting the load management programs. Second, to a large degree, the load 
management programs are regulatory forced upon the utilities. Utilities may not see the value of the programs 
but still adopt them to please the regulators. With no proper incentive, the growth in adopting the programs is 
naturally slowed. Finally, the load management programs can be used by the utilities as a shortcut to cross 
subsidize some customers. Or, as Andrew Rudin put it, "the program imfairly taxes non-participants" [18]. 
The advent of re-regulation sheds some light on the prospect of adopting load management programs. 
At least, the three concerns that impede the growth of the load management programs can be eliminated. Since 
the ESCO is driven to the market by the profitability of energy services, there will be no concern on the 
possibility of regulatory forced programs. Also, since the customers are free to choose any energy service 
providers, even to the extent of managing the demand by themselves, the unfair load management programs 
will drive customers away. Finally, as long as the load management programs are profitable, why should one 
worry about the maturity of technology? If there should be any reason that the load management programs are 
forfeited, it should be the unprofitable nature of the programs — nothing else! 
In this research, the load management programs are used extensively. First, developing a flexible 
customer demand and strengthening the purchasing power in the auction market helps the ESCO. Second, 
rescheduling the demand, fi-om the low profit-margin periods to the high profit-margin periods, can enhance the 
profitability of serving customer demand. Third, increasing the service options makes the ESCO more 
attracting to the customer. Fourth, reducing the cost of purchasing energy firom the auction market can improve 
the ESCO's cash flow. Finally, serving as the alternative source for the ancillary services, the load management 
programs diversify the ESCO portfolio of energy contracts. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON LOAD MANAGEMENT MODEL 
The DLC receives the most attention of all load management tools. The program allows customers to 
exchange short-term discontinued electric service with rebates that reduce their bills. Various algorithms have 
been developed to reduce system peaks, operating costs, and spinning reserves, or improve the profitability of 
serving customers. The two commonly used techniques are dynamic programming [19 - 24] and linear 
programming [12, 25 - 28]. Algorithms using dynamic programming determine the amount of energy to be 
deferred/paid back at any particular time. On the other hand, algorithms using linear programming determine 
the number of customers to undergo load deferment/pay back. While relatively inexpensive and powerfiil, 
algorithms that used linear programming may directly determine the cost/benefit of each customer in the DLC 
program [12,25]. 
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Various ESSs exist in the literature and practice. Investigated algorithms for ESSs are commonly 
found on pumped hydroelectric storage [29 - 37], batteries [32, 38 — 41] and cool storage [42 - 44]. Pumped 
storage is the ESS that receives the most attention. Different algorithms were developed to integrate pumped 
storage operation with hydrothermal systems [29 - 37] or batteries [32]. Reported algorithms include dynamic 
programming [32, 35], gradient methods [37], Lagrangian relaxation [29, 30, 34], linear programming [31, 33], 
etc. Within the ESS field, battery energy storage systems (BESS) have seen significant technological 
advancement during the past few years. Algorithms for scheduling BESS are mostly dynamic programming 
[32, 39 - 41] and linear programming [12, 25]. Coordination of battery operation with others is rare except for 
coordinating batteries with pumped storage [32], and with DLC [12]. Research work conducted on cool storage 
increases each year. Reported scheduling algorithms, however, are few [42 - 44] Eind solved mainly using 
nonlinear programming techniques. 
IDLC requires the knowledge of how customers would react to price versus time of day. Conceptual 
and theoretical models have been proposed [45 — 47], Because the understanding of cross-time price elasticity 
of customer demand is limited, further smdy is still needed. 
3.3 NOMENCLATURE 
3.3.1 Parameters 
cdf jj^: The rebate given to each customer in load group i for energy deferment of k periods beginning at 
period y. 
cdi: The ESS I per unit type i operating and maintenance cost when each unit begins the charging sequence. 
r. j: The rate customers in load group i are charged at period J. 
Ed/ jj^: The deferrable energy by each customer in load group i at period j. 
gi: The maximum number of customers in load group i that is available for load deferment. 
G,: The maximum number of units in ESS II model that is available for both energy storage and release. 
dij^: ESS II unit /'s efficiency when ^ P''ij.k is generated. 
V* 
cOij,: ESS II unit /'s efficiency when ^ Psi jj, is used. 
Vk 
Prijc: The maximum energy used by the ESS 11 unit i at the fc-th linearized segment when energy is released. 
Psijc: The maximum energy used by the ESS II unit i at the X:-th linearized segment when energy is stored. 
sdjjt: The rate the energy stored in ESS II unit i loses at A^-th amount of stored energy during the last period. 
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: The minimum storage needed within ESS E. 
• Th^ maximum storable energy within ESS II. 
«(*): Unit step function. 
«(•) = ! if »>I 
«('*) = 0 otherwise 
: The energy pay back ratio for each customer in load group ; at period (j+k+s-I) when energy is 
deferred for k periods. 
3.3.2 Variables 
I J : The stored energy at period j by the ESS II. 
Oj :  The  s to red  energy  used  fo r  d i scharg ing  purpose  a t  pe r iod  j  by  the  ESS I I .  
PT^toad* '• Penalty function for the increased revenue when the load increase is experienced during pay back or 
cold load pickup. 
P^tocd- - Penalty flmction for the revenue loss caused by the reduced customer energy during cold load pickup. 
: Penalty function for the increased revenue when the controllable demand is shifted to a high rate 
period. 
P^revame- '• Penalty fiinction for the revenue loss caused by the reduced rate charged on customers during pay 
back. 
Sj : The losses of stored energy at period j by the ESS II. 
X, yj.: The number of customers from load group i that will undergo k periods of energy deferment beginning 
at period J. 
jj,: The number of ESS I unit / whose storage compartment is to be fully stored at period j for k periods. 
Zf j j^ :  The  number  o f  ESS I  un i t  i whose stored energy is to be fully released at period J for k periods. 
Pr^ jj^: The electric energy released by ESS II unit i at period J when the unit is operating at an efficiency level 
PSi jj^: The electric energy used by ESS II unit i at period j when the unit is operating at an efficiency level of 
Vj: The total stored energy at period j by the ESS II. 
Vjj^: The stored energy at the ^-th linearized segment at period j by the ESS II. 
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3.4 DLC MODEL 
Appliances like air-conditioners, heaters, refrigerators and freezers are controllable. Depending on 
factors like energy rating, end-iisers energy consumption pattern, and surrounding temperatures, each appliance 
will perform differently. A siuccessfiil DLC program requires knowledge of how the customer would behave. 
In particular, extensive resear^ch was conducted to study the recovery of heating and cooling loads during cold 
load pickup. Five major mathiematical models, ranging from deterministic to stochastic models, were proposed 
for the task [48]. This research not only proves the feasibility of controlling the customer demand; it serves as 
the groundwork for designing scheduling algorithms for large-scale operation. 
Potential DLC load models vary. At one end, detailed equations could be made to describe the 
consumption behavior of each appliance. This approach, howe.ssr, requires the collection of an enormous 
amount of data, including energy rating, ambient weather conditions, and end-user consumption behavior. It 
could be timely and costly to cany out. At the other end, appliances with similar energy ratings and cycling 
patterns could be grouped together to enhance the predictability of controllable demand without the complete 
set of information. 
An efficient scheduliing algorithm for the DLC program requires the determination on both the duration 
and the amount of energy to lie deferred/paid back. However, determining only the amount of energy to be 
deferred or paid back at any particular time leaves a hefty hidden cost, since the ESCO ultimately needs to 
know the number of customer-s that should undergo demand deferment/pay back. In addition, customers with 
different types of controllable demand may be offered different incentives to encourage participation, creating 
additional complexity in tryinig to figure put the profit margin of deferring the demand of a particular 
controllable appliance. 
A more complex scBieduling algorithm could be structured to directly determine the number of 
customer appliances and the duiration for energy deferment or pay back, i.e. the load control choices. However, 
this technique will result in tlie use of an enormous number of variables. Linear programming techniques, 
which are well known for theirr computational power, are suitable to handle an enormous number of variables. 
To successfully use linear programming as the search medium for optimal scheduling sequences, the following 
criteria are required: 
• Linear objective function with linear constraints. A nonlinear, convex objective fiinction can still use the 
linear programming techmique by successively approximating or piecewise linearizing the objective 
fimction. 
• Floating point solution is allowed. The number of customer appliances for load deferment/pay back is 
integer in nature. Howewer, if total controllable energy is relatively large compared to the amount of 
energy each controllable appliance contributes, the floating point solution will do little harm to the 
precision of the solution reached by linear programming. In other words, the number of controllable 
customer appliances should be relatively large if the floating point solution were to be permitted. 
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In this section, an efficient model for the DLC program is developed to capture the load control 
choices that the ESCO may exercise. It is a major improvement over previous research that fails to capture all 
load control choices [24, 28]. Prior to formulating the DLC model, the controllable customer appliances are 
assumed to be categorize-able, i.e., controllable demand with similar demand pattern and profitability is 
grouped together. The problem of modeling the DLC program is greatly simplified if ±e following two 
conditions hold: 
• At each period, the ESCO determines (1) the number of customers within each group who will undergo 
energy deferment and (2) the duration of energy deferment for each controllable demand. 
• At the end of energy deferment, the deferred energy will be paid back instantaneously. 
Let X,- (each unit representing some customer appliances that have been grouped together for higher 
forecast precision) be the variable representing the number of customers from load group i that will undergo k 
periods of energy deferment beginning at period J, EDj, EPj and CDj are shown in (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) 
respectively. 
+ (3.1) 
Vi a»l VJfe 
where EDj is the total deferred DLC demand at period y"; Ed^ j is the deferrable energy by each controllable 
demand in load group i at periody; and the unit step function «(*) {^*=a+k-j'-I in (3.1)) acts as ON/OFF switch 
to decide if the variable is deferring energy that extends to period J. 
(3.2) 
k 
where EPj is the total paid back DLC demand at period /; 'S the total deferred energy by each 
Vs| 
customer in load group i for k periods beginning at period (f+k-1); cc^ jj. is the energy pay back ratio for 
each customer in load group i at period (j+k+s-I)-, and the unit step fimction acts as ON/OFF switch to decide if 
the variable is paying back energy at period j. 
EP,= 
V v=l 
CD, 
vi y* 
(3.3) 
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where CDj is the total cost of controlling the DLC demand at period /; cd^ jj^ is the rebate given to each 
customer in load group i for energy deferment of A: periods beginning at period J. 
To ensure that the controlled (deferred or paid back) customers do not exceed the existing customers 
enrolling in the DLC program, (3.4) and (3.5) are included in the constraints set. 
>0 (3.4) 
which requires non-negative values for the controllable load choice, .r, jj^. 
+ (3-5) 
where q{i,a.k) is the maximum pay back duration when customers in load group i undergo energy deferment 
of k periods at period a; and the unit step function acts as ON/OFF switch to decide if the variable has a 
energy deferment or pay back duration that extends to period J. 
In a price-based DLC program (the concept of the price-based DLC program will be explored in 
Chapter 4), various penalty functions may be included in the objective function to assure the customers in the 
DLC program that a price-based operation will not hurt them financially. Equations (3.6) and (3.7) show the 
penalty functions for such a purpose. In particular, (3.6) describes the penalty for the increased revenue when 
the load increase is experienced (total deferred energy is less than paid back energy), and (3.7) describes the 
penalty for the increased revenue when the demand is being shifted to a higher rate period. 
= Z Z S [Z n.j.v-i ]Aew(Ae) 
Vi Vy V* \v^l J 
where 
Ae = t (3.6) 
where represents the revenue collected from the deferred load of group / at period Q+v-l)\ Ae 
represents the percentage load increase under control choice j; and the unit step flmction acts as ON/OFF 
switch to exclude the effect of the decreased load during load deferment process. 
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=ISl4/J'(Ar) 
where 
A/" = i y>v-. 
f qd.jM) 
VHr»l 
(3.7) 
where represents the total deferred energy under control choice ; the first term of the right side 
•^1 
of A/" represents the expected revenue from the total deferred energy; the second term of the right side of A/" 
represents the collected revenue from the paid back energy for customer type i at period (j'+v+s-I)\ and A/" 
represents the increased revenue when the deferred energy has been shifted to a higher rate period. 
In a cost-based DLC program (the concept of the cost-based DLC program will be explored in Chapter 
4), various penalty ftinctions may be included in the objective function to assure that the increased cost savings 
do not result in excessive revenue loss. Equations (3.8) and (3.9) show the penalty functions for such purpose. 
In particular, (3.8) describes the penalty for the revenue loss caused by the reduced customer energy during pay 
back or cold load pickup (total deferred energy is more than paid back energy). Equation (3.9) describes the 
penalty for the revenue loss caused by reduced rate charged on customers during the pay back (rate structure 
during energy defer Iment is higher than the rate structure during energy pay back.) 
= Z Z Z {Z lAew(Ae) 
Vi V/ V* 
where 
q(t.J.kl ^ 
Ae,  = | l -  Za . -M.^  
S*\ 
(3.8) 
where Ae, represents the percentage load decreased under control choice, ,. 
^7'_«_=zZZAr«(Ar) 
where 
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AT. =< 
qf'J.ti 
Z a Xs{ i.fjijs j (3.9) 
where A/i represents the decreased revenue when deferred energy has been shifted to a lower rate period. 
3.4.1 Graphical Representation 
To illustrate the DLC model. Figure 3-3 is presented. The n pieces are lying on top of each other to 
represent the individual controllable customer group. For each individual piece, monitored m periods are listed 
from left to right. Listings from the top to the bottom of each piece are the load-shifting choices and how they 
acted throughout the time period. The gray boxes on each piece represent the periods when the load is deferred 
while the black boxes represent the period of paid back load. 
In accordance with equation (3.1), the coefficient of each control choice, x, , is represented by the 
solid boxes. By (3.2), the coefficient of each control choice, x^jj^, is represented by the dashed boxes, 
determines how the deferred energy is paid back. It may be estimated using the historical data and the present 
demand pattern. 
controllable customerS'^'UP 1 
controllable customer group 2 
controllable customergroup n 
Figure 3-3. Control pattern for DLC program. 
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By (3.4), each control choice, has to be greater or equal to zero, i.e., x, ,, St 0, x,,, > 0, > 0, 
etc. From (3.5), the maximum control choices of any period, , of any customer group i should be smaller 
than or equal to the maximum allowable number, gi. At any period, for any customer group i, if the box 
(dashed or solid) corresponding to x, is extended to the observed period, is considered as one of the 
elements that will confine the maximum controllable groups during the period. Figure 3-4 shows an example 
on how and EP^ are related to the graphical representanon in Figure 3-3. 
At time penod 
4 ^ 5  6  7  
controllable customer group 1 
controllable customer group ^ 
controllable customer group n 
Figure 3-4. An example relating the deferred and paid back energy to the DLC model. 
3.5 ESS MODEL 
ESS includes pumped hydroelectric storage, batteries, cool storage, and storage space heating. Even 
though each device operates uniquely, they share some characteristics that make generalization possible. 
Electric energy is purchased from the auction market to charge/store the ESS. Energy may be stored in various 
fomi such as kinetic energy (flying wheel,) potential energy (pumped hydroelectric storage,) and chemical 
energy (batteries). The ESS may be composed of one (cool storage) or many (batteries) smaller units. These 
units may (pumped hydro) or may not (batteries) share the storage space. The number of operating units and 
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the charging duration determine the amount of energy needed to be purchased from the auction market If the 
stored energy is not used immediately after charging, the releasable energy decreases over time. The energy is 
dissipated through various means such as friction (flying wheel,) leakage (pumped hydro,) and diffusion (cool 
storage, storage space heating). During discharge, stored energy is released and add to customers. The number 
of operating units and the charging duration determine the amount of energy that may be released and sold to 
customers. 
Despite the different varieties of ESS appliances existing on the market, they share some 
characteristics that make generalization possible. The shared characteristics permit the existence of two generic 
models to represent the vast majority of ESS appliances. 
ESS (ESS I) is composed of a large number of small-capacity units that operate independently of each 
other. The storage capacities of these uruts are insignificant relatively to the ESS itself. Assuming that these 
units have to complete a full charge (storing energy) and discharge (releasing energy), the scheduling process 
becomes one that determines the number of units to be charged/discharged at each instant. A good example is 
battery energy storage system (BESS) that consists of a large number of battery cells. The model to be 
presented in section 3.5.1 is a generalization shown in [12]. 
ESS (ESS n) is composed of single or a small niunber of large-capacity units. The storage capacities 
of these units are equivalent or large relative to the ESS appliance. By assuming that these units are one single 
entity, the scheduling process becomes one that determines the amount of energy to be charge/discharge at each 
instant. A good example is pumped hydroelectric storage that consists of a few pumps and turbines. The model 
to be presented in section 3.5.2 is a generalized model shown in [37], 
Both models, ESS I and ESS H, are presented in section 3.5.1 and section 3.5.2 respectively. 
3.5.1 Energy Storage System Type I (ESS I) 
Depending on the charge/discharge characteristics, the ESS I units are categorized into different 
groups. The following assumptions were made in modeling ESS I: 
• At each period, the ESCO determines (1) the number of units to be used for charge/discharge and (2) and 
the duration that each unit charge/release. 
• Full charge/discharge of units is assumed. Partial charge/discharge can be achieved by assuming the next 
charge/discharge state as a new set of variables. 
Let y^ jj^ ( Zi J) be the variable that represents the number of units type i to be fiilly charged (released) for 
A periods beginning at periody. ESj, £7?y,and CEj are modified as in (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) respectively. 
(3.10) 
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t Z y - a - A:; - X IMX Vk 
^0 (3.15) 
which indicates that at any period, the total numbers of ESS I units should not be more than the installed units. 
The unit step fiinctions act as ON/OFF switches to decide if ESS I units under control choice are fully 
charged at period j. 
3.5.1.1 Graphical Representation 
To illustrate ESS I model. Figure 3-5 is presented. The n sheets lying on top of each other represent 
units with different charge/discharge characteristics. The charging phase, with variables , is shown on the 
left. The discharging phase, with variables - , is shown on the right. Governing equations connect the charge 
and discharge phases for different groups of ESS I units. Equations (3.14) and (3.15) are individualized 
constraints. According to (3.14), the maximum number of charge and discharge units of any group is restricted 
by the existing installation, G,. Equation (3.15) further restricts the available discharge units to available fully 
charged units. A group constraint described the total energy required for charging the ESS 1 units and the total 
energy released by ESS I units. They are discussed in section 3.3 and 3.3. Figure 3-6 shows an example 
relating ES^ and ER^ to ESS I model. 
Figure 3-5. ESS type I. 
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Gronp 
construat 
Figure 3-6. Relating the stored and released energy to the ESS I model. 
3.5.2 Energy Storage System Type 11 (ESS II) 
Each unit in ESS II has different charge/discharge characteristics that may be described as a piecewise-
linearizied function. The following assumptions were made in modeling ESS II. 
• Energy, ESj , purchased from the market will be stored in another form of energy, with rate cOjj^ for unit i  
at fc-th amount of energy purchased. 
• During storage, the stored energy, Vj, is lost at rate sd^j^ for unit i at Ar-th amount of stored energy, ^, 
of last period. 
• Energy, ERj,  released to the system will have rate 9^^ for unit i at i-th amount of stored energy used. 
Let IJ be the stored energy at period j, Oj be the energy used for discharge at period j, and Vj be the 
total stored energy at period J, ESj and ERj in ESS 11 are described in (3.16) and (3.17) respectively. 
Es, 
Vi yfk 
y/ (3.16) 
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where Ps^jj^ is the electric energy used by unit / at period J when the unit is operating at an efficiency level of 
£U,^ ; represents ESS II unit / efficiency when ^ is used. 
V* 
vy (3.17) 
Vi vt 
where Pr^jj, is the electric energy released by unit / at period J when the unit is operating at an efficiency level 
of represents ESS II unit i  efficiency when ^ Pfi^j, is generated. 
• fk  
Equations (3.18) and (3.19) shows the relations between stored and purchased energy. 
V/' (3.18) 
Vi v* 
0<Ps,j j ,  <Fsij ,  Vi .J .k  (3.19) 
The losses of stored energy at period j, Sj, depends on the volume of water at period (/-/A Vj-i • 
Equation (3.20) shows the relation. 
•Jy y/ (3-20) 
V* 
where 
0<F^-., , <Ft VJc (3.21) 
where represents leakage rate when there is ^ (= F^._,) amount of stored energy at period (j-1). 
V* 
Equations (3.22) and (3.23) shows the relations between stored energy used for discharge, Oj, and 
released energy. 
(3-22) 
Vi v* 
Q<Pr.j ,<Pn.t  'Vi .J .k  (3.23) 
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The reservoir water at the end of period J depends on the reservoir water at the end of period J, water 
pumped into the reservoir, spill out, and water used for generation. Equations (3.24) and (3.25) show the 
relations between Vj, , Ij, Sj, and Oj. 
-Oj Vy (3.24) 
where 
V <V.<V \ f i  (3.25) 
mtn — J — max J ^ ' 
where the total stored energy at any time must remain within the limit. 
To assure that the solution reached by the algorithm is also a global optimal solution, (3.26), (3.27), 
and (3.28) must hold. 
Vj.A: (3.26) 
V/.Xr (3.27) 
sd^ Vk (3.28) 
3.5.2.1 Graphical Representation 
To visualize ESS II model, a graphic representation is shown in Figure 3-7. The purchased energ>', 
ESj , is used by the n units of ESS n. Each unit uses Ps^ j for storage purposes. The stored energy, Ij, 
depends on the amount of Psi j used and the efficiency curve that has been linearized to k segment, from, tu,, 
to On . The relationship is described by (3.18). The storage compartment has a total stored amount of Vj at 
periody. The outflow of stored energy, Oj, is released and sold to the customers during high cost periods. The 
released electric energy, ERj,  depends on the amount of stored energy, Oj used and the efficiency curve that 
has been linearized to k segments, from 0,. , to O^j^. The relationship is described by (3.20). At any period, 
whether the energy is stored or released, the amount of the stored energy within the storage compartment losses 
its potential. The amount of the energy lost, Sj, depends on the total stored amount, Vj , and the leakage rate 
curve that has been linearized to k segments, from sd^ to sd,^. The relationship is described by (3.22). To 
assure that the solution reached by the linear programming is globally optimal, (3.26) — (3.28) set the criteria for 
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^i.k' respectively. Finally, (3.24) assures that the energy remained in the storage compartment 
will always follow the law of conservation of energy. 
Purchased 
electric energy 
ES, 
Figure 3-7. ESS II. 
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CHAPTER 4 SCHEDULING CUSTOMER DEMAND AND AUCTION 
MARKET 
In Chapter 2, scheduling customer demand was emphasized in improving an ESCO's profitability. 
Even with Chapter 3 describing the various load management models for DLC and ESS, the why and how of 
scheduling customer demand are still not clear. More importantly, the interaction between scheduling customer 
demand and participating in the auction market has yet to be linked. In this chapter, the why and how are 
emphasized, i.e., why the customer demand should be scheduled and how the scheduling affects the buying and 
selling in the auction market. 
Section 4.1 provides a list of variables and parameters used to formulate the scheduling model. 
Section 4.2 presents the economic models of scheduling customer demand using the DLC and ESS programs. 
These models include load-based, cost-based, profit-based, and cash management approaches. It will be shown 
that profit-maximization is in fact no different than cost-minimization. In addition, how the different 
approaches may be used at the different ESCO operation levels will be discussed. Section 4.3 shows the 
relationship between the auction market and scheduling customer demand. How the different contract 
specifications described in Chapter 2 can be included in the scheduling model will be shown. The limitations of 
the scheduling model will also be discussed. 
4.1 NOMENCLATURE 
4.1.1 Parameters 
: Energy contract delivery duration. 
prj : Per-unit energy price on the auction market at period J. 
prf:  Per-unit energy price on the auction market at period j  on day D. 
q(*y. Quotient of *. 
rj : The rate customers are charged at period J. 
rf : The rate customers are charged at period J on day D. 
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lu  J.: Rate of interest obtained from investment (P<T).  
I j j  j . : Rate of interest charged on debt issued in period T and falling due in period D(D>T).  
size: The size of the contract in MW. 
TEj : Total customer demand at period J.  
TE° : Total customer demand at period j on day D. 
Z: The right-hand-side value of the budget constraint. It is equivalent to net revenue (collected revenue 
minus all expenses) collected during the day. 
: The reliability level under contract type h, delivery begirming at period a, and has a duration. 
'• The average reliability level requested by the customers at period J. 
af°  :  The reliability level exhibited by the deferred energy at period j (DLC program.) 
af: The reliability level exhibited by the paid back energy at period j (DLC program.) 
a " : The reliability level exhibited by the released energy at period J (ESS program.) 
: The reliability level exhibited by the stored energy at period J (ESS program.) 
: The allowed volatility level in the customer demand by contract type A, delivery beginning at period a, 
and has z. duration. 
Xo : The ratio of the payments made by the customers on day D over the expected cash receipt for the 
energy ser\'ice provided in the month m. 
4.1.2 Variables 
CDj: The rebate given to the customers participating in the DLC program at period J. 
CD°: The rebate given to the customers participating in the DLC program at period j on day D. 
CEj : The operating cost of ESS at period j .  
CEf : The operating cost of ESS at period J on day D. 
COYq : The total cash outlay on day D. 
E: Maximum peak demand during the scheduled duration. 
EOY[i: The energy payment made to the auction market on day D for all the energy purchased during the day 
before day D. 
EDj : Deferred customer demand at period j .  
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ED°-. Deferred customer demand at period j on day D. 
EM J : Energy purchased from the auction market at period/. 
: Energy purchased from the auction market at period j on day D. 
BP J-. Paid back customer demand at period j. 
EPf:  Paid back customer demand at period j on day D. 
ERj:  Energy released from ESS at period J. 
ER°: Energy released from ESS at period J on day D. 
ES,:  Energy stored at ESS at period J. 
ES°: Energy stored at ESS at period J on day D. 
EX* r 
a.d^ rEnergy to be purchased at the auction market using contracts delivering longer than duration. 
EX' f 
a.d' :Excess energy not to be purchased at the auction market after using contracts delivering d^ duration. 
L: The negative accumulation of cash at period «. (L = "loss") 
NOY^-.  The operating and maintenance cost of the ESS (ESCO-owned, ESCO-operated.) 
P: The total buildup of cash available at period n. (P = "profit") 
Pr Energy purchased for period j. 
p;-. Energy purchased for period j on day D. 
pd^Mh-Ph ;Energy purchased for contract type h with allowed volatility , reliability level , delivery 
beginning at period a, and has a duration. 
p;-- Energy to be purchased at the auction market using contracts delivering longer than d/" duration. 
PJ-- Excess energy not to be purchased at the auction market after using contracts delivering d° duration. 
/?,: Collected revenue from serving customer demand at period j. 
REV„: Collectible revenue for the energy served during month m. 
RCT^: Receipt payment on day D for the energy served during month m. 
^D.T • Purchase of claim (lending) on day D, maturing on day T.{D<T) 
^D.T '• Issue of debt (borrowing) on day T and falling due on day D.{D> T) 
As:  Increased cost during the scheduled duration from the load management programs. 
(A negative value indicates cost saving) 
hn: Total increased profit during the scheduled duration from the load management programs. 
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A^Ty : Increased profit at period j from the load management programs. 
Kf: The profit of serving customer demand before the implementation of the load management programs. 
: The profit of serving customer demand after the implementation of the load management programs. 
4.2 SCHEDULING CUSTOMER DEMAND 
While maintaining the reliability of the electric power network, scheduling customer demand using the 
load management programs has helped utilities to reduce capital and operating costs. The two commonly 
perceived objectives of scheduling customer demand are peak-load shedding and cost minimization. The major 
reason for adopting a peak-load shedding approach is that a congested transmission poses extreme risk to the 
power system operation. To avoid the risk of system breakdown, the customer demand should be rescheduled 
to reduce the system peak. The cost-minimization approach, however, assumes that all costs, the energy cost 
and the breakdown risk, have been accounted for Thus, the rescheduled customer demand should 
immediately reduce the cost of operation. 
With the advent of re-regulation and competition, two additional objectives for rescheduling customer 
demand emerge. The first objective, profit maximization, assumes that if proper compensation is made to the 
customers who participate in the load management programs, the ESCO should be allowed to profit from 
scheduling the customer demand. The second objective, cash management, captures the cash flow of the 
company and includes the effect of the cost of borrowing and lending to enhance the ESCO's ability to improve 
the profitability of serving customer demand. 
In this section, various economic models are presented. In section 4.2.5, the cost minimization 
approach and the profit maximization approach are compared and discussed. In addition, in section 4.2.7, the 
four approaches are evaluated to tackle the ESCO operational problem at different time horizons. 
4.2.1 Customer Demand and the Cost of Energy 
Prior to the implementation of the DLC and ESS programs, all energy was purchased on the auction 
market at a per-unit energy price of prj. The cost of serving customer demand is prjTEj, where TEj is the 
total customer demand. The revenue collected is rjTEj, where is the rate customers are charged. The profit 
before implementing load management is {tj - prj )rEj. 
® The cost of breakdown risk is implicitly accounted for in the cost-minimization approach. The reason is that the utility will 
try to serve the customer demand with the lowest-cost generation units. Thus, the cost minimization approach that schedules 
the customer demand at the higher cost periods to the lower cost periods will also reduce the peak demand. 
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When DLC and ESS are introduced, the energy to be purchased on the auction market, EMj , is shown 
in (4.1). 
EM ^ = TEJ - ED J + EPj + ES^ - ERj (4.1) 
ED J is the deferred customer demand, EPj is the paid back customer demand, ESj is the energy 
stored, and ERj is the energy released from the ESS. 
4.2.2 Load-based Approach 
The load-based approach, shown in (4.2), minimizes the maximum energy to be purchased on the 
auction market. 
min E 
subject to: (4.2) 
EM J < E V / 
£ is the maximum hourly energy to be purchased on the auction market; EMj is described in (4.1). 
4.2.3 Cost-based Approach 
The cost of serving customer demand is prjTEj prior to the introduction of the load management 
programs, and the cost of serving customer demands with the program is pr^EM j. The cost-based approach, 
shown in (4.3), minimizes the increased cost of load management, or, shown in (4.4), maximizes the Increased 
savings from the program. 
min As = '^ prjEM j - prfTE. + CD - + CE. 
V/ 
=  S P ^ j ( - +  E P -  E S -  - E R . ] + C D ^  +  C E .  (4.3) 
max - As = ^  pr. {EDj - EPj - ES^ + ERj)- CD ^ - CE^ (4.4) 
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CD J is the rebate given to the customers participating in the DLC program and CEj is the operating 
cost of ESS. 
4.2.4 Profit-based Approach 
From (4.1), the profit of serving customer loads before the implementation of the DLC and ESS 
programs, 7t"°, may also be described in (4.5). 
= {rj  -  pr.  \eM .  + ED. -  EP. -  ES. + ERj ) (4.5) 
With DLC and ESS implemented, the cost of purchased energy is pr^ EM /. The collectible revenue, 
Rj, is shown in (4.6). 
Rj = rj [EM J - ESj )+rjERj (4.6) 
is the purchased energy that may generate revenue. 
The profit of serving customer loads after the implementation of the load management programs is 
shown in (4.7). 
Ttf  = Rj -pr.EM. -CDJ -CEj 
= Kj [em J - ES J + ERj)- pr. EM. -  CDj -  CE. (4.7) 
The profit-based approach, shown in (4.8) maximizes the gain from the load management programs. 
max 
The increased profit from the load management programs is shown in (4.9). 
A;r,=;rr-^r 
= r.{EDj -EPj)-pr^EDj -  EPj -ESj  + ER^)-CD. -CE^ (4.9) 
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Or, alternatively, a profit-based approach, shown in (4.10), maximizes the net gain from the load 
management programs. 
max A;r = (4-10) 
*•/ 
A quick glance at (4.4) and (4.10) shows a difference in changed revenue, ^rj{EDj —EPj],  which 
vy 
happens only in the DLC program when customer demand is deferred/paid back. Since there is no change in 
ESS operational revenue, cost-based and price-based ESS operations will always reach the same optimal 
solution. 
4.2.5 What Changes Revenue? 
There are, in general, two ways that the revenue could change. First, when DLC energy is deferred to 
a low-rate period from a high-rate period (or vice-versa,) the ESCO experiences a reduction (increase) in the 
revenue due to a difference in the rate over time. Second, when paid back DLC energy is lower (higher) than 
the deferred energy, the ESCO experiences a reduction (increase) in the revenue due to changes in the customer 
demand or energy loss. 
Using a simple, two-period example, Ng [12] shows that a cost-based approach and a profit-based 
approach differ only on the degree of implementation. If proper discount factors are included in the economic 
models, either in (4.3), (4.4), (4.8) or (4.10), a cost-based approach will be equivalent to a profit-based 
approach. 
Because deferrable energy and paid back energy are often subject to a certain degree of uncertainty, it 
is hard to determine if one approach should prevail over the other. However, if re-regulation promotes 
competition, a profit-based approach sounds more reasonable. On the one hand, competition would drive 
ESCOs to compete with each other to provide the best return to the customer. On the other hand, the customers 
would keep track of their bill and service satisfaction to determine if the service providers had lived up to their 
promises. 
4.2.6 Cash Management Approach 
The ESCO receives payments from the customers at certain times for the services. Meanwhile, it must 
make payments for purchased energy, operation costs, and maintenance costs. At the end of each day, the 
ESCO has to decide if it has enough cash on hand to pay for tomorrow's expenses. If the ESCO should choose 
to raise fimds, it has to determine when and how to raise that capital. Also, it must decide the expiration date 
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for each type of capital raised. Likewise, if the ESCO should choose to invest the excess cash, it has to 
determine when and how to invest it. Also, it has to decide the maturity date of each investment. 
The load-based, cost-based, and profit-based approaches, described in sections 4.2.2 through 4.2.4, fail 
to consider the complexities of these situations in the ESCO operation. First, the earning potential of the cash 
on hand and the cost of the borrowed funds that subsidy the ESCO operation are not included in ±e model. 
Second, the three models do not consider the possibility that the ESCO may be out of cash to fund its project. A 
remedy to these situations is the cash management approach. The cash management problem has been studied 
extensively in most industries to manage the cash flow of the corporation. Reference to the cash management 
model can be found in [49]. That model is extended in this section for the ESCO operation. Section 4.2.6.1 
describes the cash receipts, the payments received firom the customers for the energy served. Section 4.2.6.2 
describes the cash outlay, the cost of serving customer demand. Section 4.2.6.3 describes the issue of debt and 
investment, and section 4.2.6.4 describes the deterministic cash management model. To aid the modeling 
process, there are equal M days in each month. Also, there is periods in each day. 
4.2.6.1 Cash Receipts 
The ESCO receives payments from the customers for the energy served. However, the payment is not 
made until a certain time in the future. Assuming that the ESCO collected the payments from the customer 
once a month, (4.11) shows the revenue to be collected for each month. 
replica of (4.6), except for the added superscript D to differentiate the energy served at different day. Equation 
(4.11) is finally obtained by substituting EMj with (4.1). CDj is the rebate given the customers for 
participating in the DLC program at period j of day D. CE° is the rebate given to the customers for rendering 
their energy storage system to the ESCO control at period j on day D. REV^ is the collectible revenue for 
energy served during month m. 
Once the bills are sent to the customers, not all customers will pay at the same time. Rather, the 
payments will be spread over several days. Assuming that no late payment is made by any of the customers and 
that the payments will be made in fiill over the allowed duration, from the /f* day to the (k+r)'^ day after the end 
of each month, (4.12) shows the actual payment received on day D. 
REV„ Z Z )+ -  CDf -  CEf 
r°  (EMf -  ESf)+ rfERf is the collectible revenue for energy served at period J on day D. It is a 
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RCT^ =y2REV^ D={m*M+k\...,{m*\f+k + r) (4.12) 
y2 is the ratio of the payments made by the customers on day D over the expected cash receipt for the 
month m. Since all bills will be paid in full and no late payment is made, must equal I. 
4.2.6.2 Cash Outlays 
In serving the customer demand, the ESCO has to purchase the electric energy from the auction 
market. In addition, there are payments to be made to the staffs to operate and maintain the company daily 
operation. Equation (4.13) shows the payment made to the suppliers on day D for all the energy purchased on 
the day before day D. 
EOY^=Y^prj'-'P°-' (4.13) 
V 
is the cost of energy and £01^ is the energy related cash outlay. 
V/ 
Shown in (4.14) is the total cash outlay on day D, COY^ . It is the simi of the energy related cash 
outlay, EOYj), and the non-energy related cash outlay, NOY^. The non-energy related cash ouday is the 
payments made to maintain and operate the ESCO. 
COYi, = EOYo + l^OYo (4.14) 
4.2.6.3 Issue of Debt and Investment 
To subsidize the daily expenses, the ESCO has to borrow from the future. Assuming that the best 
offered interest rate is iaiown, the ESCO will then have to determine the amount of money to be borrowed, the 
expiration date of the issued debt, and the day to incur the debt. To help the modeling process, the following 
assumptions are made: 
• ^D.T < D)is the interest rate for borrowing on day T and falling due on day D. 
• is the amount of debt issued on day T and falling due on day D. 
• The amount of money received on day T is equal to {l -1jj'o.r • 
At any time, when there is a surplus in its account, the ESCO may choose to invest it. Assuming that 
the best offered interest rate is known, the ESCO will then have to determine the amount of money to be 
invested, the maturity date of the investment, and the day to invest the surplus. To help the modeling process, 
the following assumptions are made: 
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•  I^ j .  (T> D) is  the interest rate for investment made on day D and matured on day T. 
• Xq j- is the amount of investment made on day D and matured on day T. 
• The amount of money received on day T is equal to (l +1• 
Money is either borrowed or invested at any day. All the surpluses from any daily operation will be 
invested. All the payments will be made in fiill, either using the collected revenue or the borrowed money. 
4.6.6.4 Model Representation 
The objective of the cash management problem is to maximize the total cash buildup at the end of the 
considered duration. Equation (4.15) shows the objective of the problem. 
max P-L (4.15) 
The budget constraint in each time states that the total sum of the cash funds be coming available must 
equal the siuii of the cash needs. Equation (4.16) shows the budget constraints. 
l ( l  + ^ r^kr.o+ jiYaj-=-RCTS +COY0 D = l  (/z-l) 
r=i /=£)+! r=i r=o+i 
S(1 + It j>)Xt.d - I^D.T -P + L = -RCT„"'  + COY„ D=n (4.16) 
r=i r=i 
The value of the superscript m in (4.16) can be determined using (4.17), assuming that there are M 
days in each month. For example, when M = 30. D = I yields m = 1,D = 35 yields m = 2, etc. 
. fD + M\ 
m = quotient\ ——— J (4.17) 
The value of the superscript and subscript D used in this section can be determined using (4.18), 
assuming that there are periods in each day. For example, when N= 96,y = 1 yields D = l,y = 200 yields D = 
3, etc. 
D = quotient]^ | (4.18) 
Table 4-1 is the tabular form of (4.16). Table 4-2 is the load management arcs of Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1. Tabular form of Equation (4.16). 
t 
Load 
Management (^..2 
Lending Arcs 
...xj ... 
Borrowing Arcs Ultimate Constant 
Gain 
Arcs (2 ... n) (3 ... n) .. . (n-I) (2... n) (3... n) ... (n) P L 
D= 1 (-1 .. . -I) (0 ... 0) . .. (0) (B... B) (0... 0) ... (0) 0 0 = z, 
D = 2 Refer 
Table 4-2 
(A) (-1 ... -1) .. • (0) (-1 0 ... 0) (B ... B) ... (0) 0 0 == Zz 
D =n-I (A) (A) ... . (-1) CO ... -1 0) (0 ... -I 0) ... (B) 0 0 = 
D = n (A) (A) .. • (0) (0...0-l)C0...0 -I) ... c-1) -1 I = 
m'M 
Zo=NOYo- rZ  S  
s^m~\ )*M-¥\ 
X r/ ij-E'j - ED) + £P/ )- CD) -  CE) 
v/ 
Table 4-2. Load management arcs. 
Load Management Arcs 
D = 1 
D=2 
I m'M n Z 
m*Af 
Yz S 
Z r/ (- ED) + EPJ)-CD)- CE) 
"j 
X r/ (- ED) + EPJ )  -  CD) -  CE) 
- EOVi 
EOY. 
D = n - 1 
D = n 
m'M 
r:-: E 
s=fm-lJ 'U+l 
m'M 
K S 
m—l^*Af+I 
Z r/ (- £DJ + EPJ)-  CD) -  CE) 
£ rj (- ED) + EPJ) - CD) - CE) 
V/ 
- eoy„., 
- EOY, 
4.2.7. Concluding Remarks 
The four approaches presented to scheduling customer demand differ by what were included in the 
objective function. The load-based approach is the simplest of all. It attempts to reduce the peak demand. The 
cost-based approach advances the load-based approach to include the cost of energy. Even though the cost-
based approach does not specifically reduce the peak demand, it does implicitly carrying out the task. The cost 
56 
of energy, more often than not, depends on the supply and demand of energy. As energy demand increases, the 
cost of energy will usually increase to reflect the higher cost of production. Thus, even though the cost-based 
approach does not explicitly reduce the peak demand, it will usually lead to peak reduction, but less 
dramatically. 
As suggested in section 4.2.5, the difference between the profit-based approach and the cost-based 
approach is due to former approach including the potential change in revenue. Since a cost-based approach 
implicitly reduces the peak demand, so will the profit-based approach. However, since the profit-based 
approach includes the potential change in the revenue to the objective function, the approach will prevent the 
scheduling of customer demand ft'om hurting the ESCO profit more than the cost-based approach. 
Even though the model seems complicated, the cash management approach differs from the profit-
based approach only in terms of implied cash flow. The inclusion of the cost of borrowing and lending guards 
the ESCO against excessive lending and borrowing. It also makes the ESCO aware of the cost of borrowing. 
Thus, a profit-based approach that does not include the cost of lending and borrowing in the objective function 
may improve the profitability in the short-run, but hurt the ESCO's performance in the long run. Table 4-3 
shows the different approaches and their effects on peak demand, cost, revenue, and cash flow. 
Table 4-3. Scheduling customer demand and its effect. 
Approaches Factoring in 
Peak demand Cost Revenue Cash flow 
Load-based V X X X 
Cost-based Implied V X X 
Profit-based Implied V V X 
Cash management Implied V V 
Since the cash management approach includes most factors in the scheduling model, one may be 
inclined to suggest the cash management approach as the best approach to handle the ESCO operational 
problem. However, a careful study of the different models may suggest otherwise. 
Since energy cost is included in the constraining equations, a nonlinear energy cost function will cause 
the constraints to be nonlinear as well. This will pose difficulty in solving the problem in the short time. In 
addition, the number of variables is also increased tremendously to reflect the opportunity to loan, r 
invest, X^^j-, making the cash management approach harder to use than any other approach. In section 2.3, the 
ESCO operation was discussed for different time horizon. In evaluating the ESCO operation for a time horizon 
shorter than one month, it just does not seem necessary to consider the cost of borrowing and investing as 
significant variable factors. Thus, in this research, when evaluating the ESCO operation in the reactive 
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scheduling/control and scheduling level, the profit-based approach will be utilized. When evaluating the ESCO 
operation in the short-term, mid-term, and long-term scheduling levels, the cash management approach is 
assumed. 
Should the cost-based approach and the load-based approach be disc<uded when evaluating the ESCO 
operation? To my belief, the cost-based approach is still valuable. Ideally, in a competitive environment, the 
pricing mechanism should reflect the energy cost and the effectiveness of the load management programs. 
Thus, if the result from a cost-based approach does not match the result from a profit-based approach or cash 
management approach, the pricing mechanism may not have been designed properly. Or, the pricing 
mechanism can still be redesigned to lower the cost of serving customer demand. In short, the cost-based 
approach should be used as a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of pricing customer demand. 
Since the load-based approach fails to consider the cost of energy and the collectible revenue, the potential for 
adopting the approach is low. 
4.3 AUCTION MARKET 
In chapter 2, the auction mechanism and the contract specification were discussed. In this section, the 
association between scheduling the customer demand and purchasing the contracts through the auction market 
is presented using mathematical models. In particular, the volatility and reliability specified in the contracts 
will be incorporated into the scheduling model. This section begins with the assumptions and criteria about the 
contracts, following by the contract volatility and reliability models. To end this section, the limitations of the 
scheduling model are discussed. Remedial approaches to the model are also presented as alternatives. 
4.3.1 Assumptions and Criteria 
In addition to the assumptions set forth in Chapter 2, the assumptions and criteria about the energy 
contracts and auction markets are added to aid the modeh'ng process. 
First, only the spot and forward contracts are modeled. Futures and options contracts are financial 
instruments used to hedge against the financial risk with no physical (or little chance of) delivery of energy. 
Since the scheduling model is intended to address the supply and demand issue in energy delivery, the futures 
and options contracts are not considered at current stage. Second, the energy is to be delivered equally 
throughout the delivery duration, except for the allowed volatility and reliability. For instance, if the size of the 
contract for one-month duration is 5 MW, then the energy is to be delivered is 5 MW for all instances during the 
month duration Third, at any instance, there is no overlap in the time of delivery with contracts of equivalent 
' This is different than the futures contracts traded or the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT), where energy is only contracted for delivery during peak hours. 
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delivery duration. For instance, if the contracts of one-month duration have a time of delivery beginning 
February 01, the next time of delivery on the tradable contracts of one-month duration will begin on March 01, 
but not for any other dates within February. Fourth, all forecasted elements (energy price, customer demand, 
reliability, volatility, supplementary energy) are assumed to be deterministic with no margin of error. The 
problems of imcertainty in the forecasted elements will be addressed in Chapter 6. Fifth, the customer demand 
can be forecasted for all contract delivery duration. For instance, if a contract exists for 15 minutes intervals, 
the customer demand is then assumed to be determinable for all 15 minutes intervals. Finally, the simplest 
assumption is that there are an equal days in each month. For example, there are 30 days in a month, from 
January to December. This assumption is intended to simplify the notation in the mathematical model. 
Let bg tjjg energy purchased for contract of reliability, volatility, and delivery 
begirming at period a with a delivery duration of periods. From the second assumption, the size of the 
pd^ah-Ph /  
contract is then equivalent to " /size' contract energy to be delivered each period 
during delivery duration. For example, if the energy purchased is determined to be 16 MW, and the size per 
contract is 5 MW, the number of contracts purchased is equivalent to 3.2 (assuming that the ESCO may 
purchase a portion of a standardized contract.) From the third asstmiptions, the potential time of delivery for 
•<^h -Ph j3 governed by (4.19). 
a~f.d^- . t  + m — d^ (4.19) 
For example, if the first contracted delivery time is at period 1, / = 1, the delivery duration is 5 
periods, d^ = 5, and the schedule duration is 15 periods, m = 15, by (4.19), the potential time of delivery will 
then be at period I, 6, and 11. 
4.3.2 Meeting Customer Demand Volatility with the Purchased Contracts 
There are three criteria in meeting the volatility within the purchased contract. First, the ESCO will 
not receive an amount of energy greater than the maximum rating (\ + ^p^^-oh-Ph ^ ^here is the 
volatility written in the contract. Second, if the customer demand is falling below (\- ^pd^ ^ h-Ph ^ {{jg 
ESCO will not be compensated. Finally, the average energy delivered during the contracted delivery duration d 
should be equal to the purchased agreement, •"'••Ph Figure 4-1 provides an example of the customer 
demand patterns an ESCO serves during a particular duration and shows how the three criteria are met. 
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Customer 
demand A 
Not delivered 
Pil + P) 
Not compensated 
Period 
Figure 4-1. The customer demand during a particular duration. 
Since, for each period, the ESCO may choose to purchase different kinds of contracts with different 
quality and delivery duration, the customer demand at any period should not be greater than the aggregated 
maximum rating. Equation (4.20) shows the relation. 
TEj -  ED J + BP J + ESj-ERj<Y.Y.{^ + Vy 
VA vj/ V J 
(4.20) 
The value of the superscript and subscript a used throughout section 4.3 can be determined using 
(4.21). g(*) is the quotient of*. For instance, 9(14/4) is 3. For example, when =4and/= l,y= 1 yields 
a= l,j = 200 yields a = 197, etc. 
a=t+d^* q J- (4.21) 
To illustrate (4.20), if A = 1, r = 1, = 1,2,4, at y = 4, 
TE^ - ED^ + EP^ + ES^ - ER^ < (l + }p^-^' + (l + + (l + (4.22) 
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By the second criterion, contracted energy that is not delivered because of the customer demand falling 
below the minimum rating at period j, PJ, is shown in (4.23). 
TEj -  ED J + BP J + ESj - - S Z f 1 - = Pj - PJ \/J (4.23) 
VA ^ ^ 
The third criterion requires that the average energy delivered during the contracted delivery duration d 
be equal to what is specified in the purchased agreement, p^^ . Satisfying this criterion takes additional 
work because the delivery diuation of all traded contracts is not necessarily equivalent. To take this criterion 
into account, first assume that the contract duration is organized in incremental fashion ,f = 0,...,F .) For 
example, for contracts with 1, 8, 4 periods, delivery duration, d" =l.d' = 4,d^ = 8 (the final contract duration 
is the third delivery duration, or, F = 2.) Then, the excess energy, , that is not satisfied by contracts of 
d^ delivery duration is described in (4.24) and (4.25). 
I f+arf"-! r \ jQ a 
S ^a^f.dr :t.m-dr,dr=d'^ (4.24) 
" /=f+ra-I></0 ^ ^ 
The reason for adding P~ in [eMj +/'/) is that the ESCO will have to bear the cost when the 
customer demand falls below the minimum rating. 
.d '  *d' .d '  (4.25) 
" J=t-Ka-l)dJ 
The reason for not including EX~^j-_^ in (4.25) is that any energy not delivered by contracts of 
delivery duration d^~^ will not bring any compensation to the ESCO. A similar argument was made in the 
second criterion on the volatility requirement. Equation (4.26) states that the purchased energy of delivery 
duration d'' must exceed the average excess energy after excluding the supply and demand of shorter delivery 
duration. 
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t + a d ^ p  
=—— X r"\ F ya=^t:d^ :t+m-d^ ,d^ ^d'' (4.26) 
J=Ma-X)<l'' 
/=yw^-' 
4.3.3 Meeting the Customer Reliability Requirement with the Purchased Contracts 
To meet the customer reliability requirement, the energy purchased through the auction, after 
excluding the maximum potential energy not delivered, should exceeds the minimum customers reliability 
requirement. Equation (4.26) shows the reliability criterion. 
7'£,(l-af)-£:D,(l-af)+£P,(l-af) 
+ £5y(l-af (4-26) 
VhVd^ J 
4.3.4 Limitations and Remedies 
There exist some limitations to the formulations relating the auction market to scheduling customer 
demand. First, the cost of the purchased energy not meeting contract requirement is not included in the 
formulation, i.e., the payment that the ESCO may receive when the market does not deliver as promised is not 
considered. Second, the cost of the actual customer demand exceeding the forecasted customer demand is not 
accounted for in the model. Finally, since all elements within the model, including the energy price, customer 
demand, supplementary energy, and reliability in the delivered energy are forecasted, there is no certainty the 
forecasted elements will behave as predicted. The uncertainty in the forecasted elements is an important aspect 
and that discussion is delayed until Chapter 5 and 8. 
To remedy the first limitation, one possible way is to use the reliability level of the contracts based on 
the forecasted reliability level rather than the contract specified reliability level. Then, the forecasted payment 
received by the ESCO firom the different type of contracts can be included in the objective functions as 
described in (4.3), (4.4), (4.8) or (4.10). In Chapter 5, another approach, the value at risk approach, is presented 
to consider the cost of purchased energy not meeting contract requirements. 
To remedy the second limitation, one way is to assume that the possibility of the cost of actual 
customer demand exceeding the forecasted customer demand is high. Then, to avoid the high cost, the higher 
forecast (to improve the probability that the forecasted customer demand will exceed the actual customer 
demand) of the customer demand should be used in the formulation. However, it is hard to determine how high 
should the forecasted customer demand be adjusted to reflect the cost of the lower forecast. In Chapter 5 and 8, 
the problem is addressed. 
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CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING IN THE PRESENCE OF RISK 
The canonical form of a classical maximization linear programming problem can be stated as: 
max c^x 
subject to: 
Ax<b 
x>0 (5.1) 
is the vector of cost coefficients. Since (5.1) maximizes the objective, represents the profit per 
unit of X. A is the constraint matrix, b is the right-hand-side vector, representing the minimal requirements to 
be satisfied. All coefficients of , A , and b are all known deterministically, the inequality sign, is not 
to be violated, and the objective is a strict imperative [50]. 
However, in real life, these conditions may not always be true. The collected data used to formulate 
the problem is bounded to uncertainty. Uncertainty is the condition in which the possibility of error exists, 
because we have less than the total information about our environment [51], For instance, the forecasted market 
price and the forecasted customer demand used in the formulation in both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, are 
estimated values. Risk arises when decision-makers and analysts attempt to make a decision based on uncertain 
information. To make a good decision, the uncertainty needs to be incorporated into the formulation. There ore 
numerous decision algorithms commonly used in the presence of uncertainty. The first approaches are simply 
sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis. The second approach is mean-variance analysis that maximizes the 
expected profit while discounting the effect of uncertainty by including the covariance matrix of the decision 
factors. The third approach is stochastic linear programming. The stochastic approach has been researched 
since the 1950s, when it was introduced independently by Dantzig and Beale in 1955 [52]. The stochastic linear 
programming approach borrows its concept from statistics. More importantly, this developed approach is in the 
most generic form among all approaches, allowing decision-makers to consider both deterministic and uncertain 
parameters in , A, and b. However, due to the requirement of the Monte Carlo simulation and the Bender 
decomposition in solving a stochastic linear programming model, the size of the problem increases immensely 
as the number of uncertain parameter increases. The fourth approach is fiizzy linear programming. It was 
introduced in the 1970s with two distinct approaches, by Zimmermarm [53] and Tanaka [54], The fiizzy 
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techniques borrow their concept from the fuzzy logic extension theory. The resulting methodology is simple 
and efficient. However, the fuzzy linear programming approach has an inherent difficulty in explaining the 
concept of aspiration level. The last technique, the value at risk ®(VaR), originated in the financial industry and 
seeks to improve the financial performance and to ensure an instimtion does n&v suffer unacceptable losses. The 
value at risk technique is a statistical measure of risk that estimates the maximum losses that may be 
experienced in a portfolio with a given level of confidence [55]. These five approaches collectively represent 
the risk management and assessment tools the decision-maker may employ to address the imcertainty in the 
ESCO operation and management. 
In this chapter, the five risk management and assessment tools are presented to search for an optimal 
decision at minimum risk. Section 5.1 provides a list of variables and parameters used in this chapter. Section 
5.2 presents stochastic linear programming. Section 5.3 presents mean-variance analysis. Section 5.4 presents 
sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis. Section 5.5 presents fuzzy linear programming. Section 5.6 
presents value at risk. Finally, section 5.7 compares and contrasts the various approaches. 
5.1 NOMENCLATURE 
5.1.1 Abbreviations 
DECIS: Decomposition and importance sampling, a software package accompanying [52]. 
E.; The expectation with respect to *. 
ENS: Energy not served. 
R: The fuzzy region described by the set of fiizzy constraints. 
S{r) : The support of fiizzy region R. 
var: variance. 
VaR: Value at risk. 
VAR: Volt-ampere. 
5.1.2 Parameters 
b: right-hand-side vector. 
b : The fiizzy b.  
* In the power industry, VAR is used to represent the volt-amp reactive (the reactive power). The same notation has also 
been used by statisticians to represent the variance and by risk managers to represents the value at risk. To avoid confiising 
the reader, VAR is used to represent volt-ampere, VaR to represent value at risk, and var to represent variance. 
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b' : The changes in b to be analyzed in the sensitivity and parametric analysis. 
: Vector of cost coefficients. 
: Vector of cost coefficients. 
c.: The cost of utilizing technology 
c'^: The changes in to be analyzed in the sensitivity and parametric analysis. 
dj: /'* element of the vector d. 
d: The vector comprising of the aspiration level z and the right-hand-side vector b. 
d(G)): right-hand-side vector in the recourse fimction that is uncertain. 
eig: The eigenvalues of the correlation matrix, C. 
{^{o}): Objective vector corresponding to y variables that is uncertain. 
n: The vector of normally distributed random numbers. 
: The number of contracts purchased by the ESCO for contract type k. 
Pi: The tolerance interval of the fuzzy criteria. 
pm,^: Contracted payment to be made to the ESCO by the auction market for each lowered reliability level 
on delivered energy for contract type k. 
v: The matrix of eigenvectors corresponding to the correlation matrix, C. 
w : The matrix describing the width of the fuzzy number in the matrix B . 
w,: The i"" row of the matrix w . 
X*: The solution for x solved in the master problem in the stochastic linear programming approach. 
z: The aspiration level of the objective. 
z.: The optimal objective value using model * (refers to section 5.2.2.) 
z : The fuzzy aspiration level of the objective. 
A: constraint matrix. 
A : The fiizzy A . 
B : The matrix comprising of the and A . 
B : The fuzzy set matrix comprising of the fuzzy cost vector, c'^, fiizzy constraint matrix, A , fuzzy 
aspiration level, z , and fuzzy right-hand-side vector b .  
B(a)): Transition matrix corresponding to x variables that is uncertain. 
Cov(*.,v):Thecovariance between *• and *j. 
C: The correlation matrix of the objective fimction. 
65 
D(®) : Technology matrix corresponding to y variables that is uncertain. :Identity matrix of size (m+l) 
by (m+I).  
M: The number of constraints. 
N: The number of variables. 
P: The tolerance interval vector of the fiizzy criteria. 
P : The proportion or position of the assets in monetary value. 
Q-. The number of fiizzy constraints. 
Q: The covariance matrix of the objective function. 
W: The width of a fiizzy number. 
a: The center of a fiizzy number. 
a : The matrix describing the center of the fiizzy number in the matrix B . 
a,: The /-th row of the matrix a . 
ay : The contracted reliability level to be delivered by the auction market for contract type k. 
a'y : The reliability level delivered by the auction market for contract type k. 
A':  A particular satisfaction of the criteria. 
A,: The uncertainty level corresponding to technological advancement *. 
'• The correlated random change for Ac'^ or Ab'. 
or.: The standard deviation of*. 
CO : An element of the probability space. 
5.1.3 Variables 
X: The decision variable. 
y: The decision variable to be solved in the recourse fimction (stochastic linear programming.) 
(AX), : The /'* row of the constraints. 
(BX), : The f'' row of the criteria. 
CPST: The compensation granted to the ESCO by the auction market when the reliability level delivered by 
the market is below the reliability level described in the contract. 
E: The expected objective fimction. 
e(x ,<y): Recourse fimction. The second stage optimization problem containing the uncertain parameters. 
V; The covariance matrix of the objective fimction multiplying by the square of the decision variables. 
A : The definition for A. varies fi'om one approach to another. It in general represents the degree of 
monetary risk that the decision-maker is bearing as a result of uncertainty. A smaller A. means that the 
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decision-maker is bearing a higher risk while a larger A means that the decision-maker is bearing a 
lower risk. 
fii (x): The fuzzy set of i'* fuzzy criteria. 
: The transformed fuzzy set of the crisp objective flmction. 
£(x): A monotonically increasing function describing //, (x). 
sup f: Check the text for definition. 
sat) 
inf f : Check the text for definition. 
S ( R j  
Iter. The number of iteration. 
Toh The tolerance on the accuracy of the solution reached by the fiizzy linear programming approach 
proposed by Tanaka and Asai. 
5.2 STOCHASTIC LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
Stochastic linear programming is the most generic approach. In section 5.2.1, the approach is 
presented. In section 5.2.2, this approach is discussed, in particular, on how the model is used in the ESCO 
operation. 
5.2.1 Model 
Stochastic linear programming problem can be described as shown in (5.2). 
max Zj =c'^x+ f'^(fi;)y 
subject to: 
Ax < b 
- B(fl>)x + D((w)y < d(co) 
x > 0  
y^O (5.2) 
The matrix. A, and vectors, and b, are known with certainty. The matrices, transition matrix B(<a) 
and technology matrix D(d»), objective vector (^{ea) and right-hand-side vector dip}), are uncertain, (o is an 
67 
element of the probability space. Simply speaking, D(o}),  {^{eo),  d(<u), are uncertain parameters, while 
A, , and b are deterministic parameters [52]. 
The classical approach to the stochastic linear programming problem described in (5.2) is a two-stage 
linear program with recourse [52]. It has the form shown in (5.3) and (5.4). 
max z^=c^x +E^Q{x,a}) 
subject to: 
Ax < b 
X > 0 (5.3) 
where 
Q{x,ct}) = max f^{(o)y 
r 
subject to: 
D(<y)y < d(«u)+B(g;)X 
y 2:0 (5.4) 
denotes the expectation with respect to co and the recourse function Q( X ,  ca) [52]. 
The requirement for a two-stage setting is due to the fact that one set of variables, y, has only uncertain 
parameters associated with it, while the other set of variables, x, has both deterministic and uncertain 
parameters associated with it Thus, one part of the problem solves for the variables y that have only uncertain 
parameters associated with it, D(«b), and d((u), as shown in (2.4), while the other part of the problem 
solves for the variables x with both uncertain and deterministic parameters, A, , and b. 
Infanger uses the Benders Decomposition to solve the two-stage stochastic linear programs in (5.3) and 
(5.4). The approach is an iterative procedure solving the master problem and sub-problems iteratively until a 
particular trial solution can be declared optimal. The master problem solves for the variables x and 6 (a 
variable introduced to link the master problem and sub-problems,) and consists of the Benders cuts, the 
deterministic coefficients (A, b, and ) and variables (x and 9 ). The Benders cuts are the values determined 
by solving the sub-problems. The sub-problems solves for the variables y and consists of the uncertain 
coefficients ( B(fij), D(fij), and x*, where x* is determined in the master problem) and variables (y). 
The details are presented in his book. The book is accompanied with a software, the DECIS (Decomposition 
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and Importance Sampling,) that uses the Benders Decomposition technique to solve the two-stage stochastic 
linear programs. 
5.2.2 Discussions and Extensions to the ESCO Operation 
Infanger presents three decision making models [52]. The first is the "wait and see" model. In this 
model, uncertainty does not exist. The uncertainty is resolved prior to decision making. The second is the 
"here and now" model. In this model, uncertainty exists. Information leading to the decision making is 
incomplete. The stochastic linear programming solves problems of such nature. The third is the "expected-
value" model. In this model, even though the uncertainty exists, the expected values of the uncertain 
parameters are used in the decision making. Let z,, z,, and Zj represent the optimal objective reached under 
the three models, z, < Zj < z,. The expected value of perfect information is the difference between z, and Zj 
(z, -Zj). The value of stochastic solution is the difference between Zj and z, (zj — z,). 
The previous discussion can be generalized. In the ESCO operation, the information used in the 
decision making can often be improved (decreasing the standard deviation, variance, and covariance of the 
uncertain parameters) at the cost of technological advancement. These include upgrading the technology, 
improving the forecasting techniques, hiring professionals with experience and knowledge, and gathering more 
information. To justify the cost of such improvements, let A. be the uncertainty level corresponding to a level 
of technological advancement, z^. be the optimal objective reached by solving the stochastic linear 
programming model using X., and c^. be the cost of utilizing A.. Then, in improving the uncertainty from A, 
to /I,, the cost of upgrading the technology is (c^i benefit of upgrading the technology is 
(z^2 ]• benefit outweighs the cost of technological advancement. In 
addition to justifying the cost of technological advancement, the benefit frontier of technological advancements 
can also be traced. Let A. be a function of decreasing uncertainties, the net benefit corresponding to A., 
(z^. is a function corresponding to the decreasing uncertainties. Then the frontier of utilizing the 
different technological advancement can be traced. Even though stochastic linear programming is not used in 
this research. Chapter 8 discusses why the presented example is not suitable for stochastic linear programming. 
5,3 MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS 
Mean-variance analysis assumes that the decision analysis is based on the expected income on the 
investment and the associated variance that represents the risk of investment. In section 5.3.1, the two 
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commonly used mean-variance analytical models are presented. In section 5.3.2, this approach is discussed, in 
particular, on how the model is used in the ESCO operation. 
5.3.1 Models 
There are various models to represent the mean-variance analysis. The two discussed models are 
shown in (5.5) and (5.61 respecHvely. 
max E—AV 
subject to: 
Ax < b 
X > 0 (5.5) 
min V 
subject to: 
c^x = A 
Ax<b 
X > 0 (5.6) 
E and V are the expected value and covariance matrix of the objective flmction, c^x . They are shown 
in (5.7) and (5.8) respectively. 
Vi 
= (£'C^)K (5.7) 
V/ Vy 
= x^'Qx (5.8) 
The notation E represents the expected value. Thus, Ec^ is the expected value of the cost 
coefficients. The notation Cov represents the covariance. Cov(cf,Cy) is determined using (5.9) and Q is 
shown in (5.10). 
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Cov(cr,cj) = £{c,''-£'c,''Xc' -£cj) (5.9) 
X<-ec[Xc[-Ec[}  E(C:-ec:XC[-EC[J 
Q = £(cr-£crXci-£c,o (5.10) 
£(cr-£cr)(c:-£cr) e(C:-E.:Jc:-£C:}_ 
Both (5.5) and (5.6) are quadratic progranuning models. Since Q is a positive semi-definite matrix, 
(5.5) and (5.6) can be solved using the modified simplex method to search for the optimal solution for the given 
A value. The modified simplex method is described in [56]. 
5.S.2 Discussions and Extension to the ESCO Operation 
On the one hand, in (5.4), A is the parameter indicating the unwillingness of the decision-maker to 
assume risk. On the other hand, in (5.5), A is the parameter indicating the targeted expected objective value. 
Either way, by varying parametrically, the optimal solution to the formulation in (5.4) and (5.5) will trace the 
locus of all efficient combinations of risk versus return (expected objective, (EC'^)JC). An ESCO model is 
analyzed using this approach in Chapter 8. The model uses the MATLAB quadratic programming tool. 
Sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis are the two simplest ways to help a decision-maker in assessing and 
managing risk. They are post-optimality analyses that are readily available fi-om the optimal solution reached 
by the linear program model in (5.1). In section 5.4.1, sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis are reviewed 
and the model to be used in the ESCO operation is presented. In section 5.4.2, these approaches are discussed, 
in particular, on how the model is used in the ESCO operation. 
5.4.1 Model 
Sensitivity analysis examines the effect of relaxing some of the constraints on the value of the optimal 
objective without having to resolve the problem. The analysis [50] includes 
• Change in the cost vector, c. 
• Change in the right-hand-side vector, b. 
5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
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• Change in the constraint matrix, A. 
• Addition of a new activity (increasing the number of row of the constraint matrix A). 
• Addition of a new constraint (increasing the number of the column of the constraint matrix A). 
Sensitivity analysis is used only when there are not many changes to be analyzed. Otherwise, 
sensitivity analysis is no different than solving a new linear programming problem. Furthermore, to conduct 
sensitivity analysis, the changes must be added one by one. For example, to analyze the effect on the changes 
in two cost coefficients, the technique requires the decision-maker to first analyze the effect of the first 
coefficients. Then, the decision-maker may choose to analyze the effect of the second coefficient based on the 
original optimal solution or the optimal solution reached after including the effect of the first coefficient. 
Parametric analysis examines how the optimal solution changes as several parameters change 
simultaneously over some range. This analysis includes: 
• Simultaneous changes in cost vector, c. 
• Simultaneous changes in right-hand-side vector, A. 
Parametric analysis is not suitable when the decision-maker intends to change the constraint matrix. A, 
either by changing the parametric values, or by adding new constraints and activities. 
5.4.2 Discussions and Extension to the ESCO Operation 
In this research, the interested subjects are the changes in the energy prices and the participation factor 
in the load management programs. They affect the cost vector, c. Even though the changes in customer 
demand and supplementary energy are also of interest, these changes modify the constraint matrix, A. Thus, 
they are not to be evaluated using sensitivity analysis or parametric analysis. 
To analyze the changes in the energy prices and the participation factor in the load management 
programs, the techniques proposed for the parametric analysis can be used. In analyzing the changes in the cost 
vector c, the simplex method is used. In analyzing the changes in the right-hand-side vector, the revised 
simplex method is used. The details are presented in [50]. Equation (5.11) shows the linear programming 
model that analyzes the cost vector c. Equation (5.12) shows the linear programming model that analyzes the 
right-hand-side vector b. 
In sensitivity analysis, A is a known value. In parametric analysis, A is the range of values to be 
traced for the change in the basis '. and b' are the changes to be analyzed. In sensitivity analysis, only one 
parameter in c'^ or b' is not equal to zero. In parametric analysis, however, more than one parameter in c'^ 
or b' is not equal to zero. In both sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis, choosing the c' or b' values 
' Basis is the set of basic variables. Basic variables are the dependent variables obtained as the simultaneous solution of the 
system of equations [50, 56]. 
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can be difScuIt. In this research, and or b' and b are related using statistical concepts by assuming 
and b as uncertain parameters. Equations (5.11) and (5.12) are modified respectively as shown in (5.13) and 
(5.14). 
max c^x + Ac'^x 
subject to: 
Ax < b 
x > 0  (5.11) 
max c^x 
subject to: 
Ax < b + Ab' 
x > 0  (5.12) 
max Ec^x + Xc'^x 
subject to: 
Ax < b 
x > 0  (5.13) 
max c^x 
subject to: 
Ax < Eb-i-Ab' 
x > 0  (5.14) 
In sensitivity analysis, c'^ and b' can be treated as the standard deviation of 
(b' = cr^ ) respectively. Thus, X determines the degree the standard deviation of c and b to affect the decision­
making. Comparing to model (5.4) in the mean-variance analysis, conducting sensitivity analysis as in (5.10) is 
equivalent to saying that there is only one parameter that is imcertain, i.e., c'^ = -^/q (except that in sensitivity 
analysis, the corresponding variable is x while in mean-variance analysis, the corresponding variable is x^.) 
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In parametric analysis, and Ab' can be treated as the correlated changes of and b 
correspondingly. The correlated random changes for and can be generated using (5.15) 
• cr 
AJC' 
Ocb'i 
Ac' 
fr T 
Vll 
r 
1 v„J n„ / Fn. 
(5.15) 
Ac' / is the correlated random change for Ac or -yi'. v and eig are the eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of or b. The correlation matrix of or b, C, can be determined using 
(5.15). Equation (5.16) shows the correlation matrix for ; the correlation matrix for b can be evaluated by 
replacing in (5.16) with b. n is the series of random changes generated from a normally distributed 
probabilistic function. Finally, cr is the standard deviation or volatility of the random cost vector, c'^, or the 
random right-hand-side vector, b. 
C = 
Ejc l -Ec l ld -Ec l )  
E jc l -Ec j lc l -Ec: )  
a- tCT 
£(cr-£c[)(cj-£c;) 
a- T<y T c/ c; 
£"(cr--gcrlcr-.gcr) 
£(c:-£c:k-^c:) 
•> 
(5.16) 
Equation (5.15) associates the change series with the random number, n. To perform parametric 
analysis, however, the parameter A needs to be included. Thus, instead of the normally distributed random 
number n, it is substituted with A, as shown in (5.17). 
'® The topic on the correlated random changes can be found in [55]. The expression presented in section 5.4 has been 
simplified. 
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r^'/, /KB\ 
With (5.17), c''^ and b' are associated with the uncertain cost vector, c'^, and the uncertain right-
hand-side vector,  b. 
5.5 FUZZY LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
Fuzzy linear programming is based on the fuzzy logic extension theory, this approach is introduced last 
among all approaches. In section 5.2.1, the approach is discussed in general. In sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, two 
major models in fuzzy linear programming are presented. In section 5.2.4, these approaches are discussed, in 
particular, on how the model is used in the ESCO operation. 
5.5.1 Introduction to Fuzzy Linear Programming 
In describing fuzzy linear progranuning, the concept of satisfaction of criteria is important. The 
criteria can be either the constraints or the objectives. In general, the objective is to find the x that would 
satisfy the set of criteria or equations in (5.18). 
-c^x<-r 
Ax<b 
x > 0  ( 5 . 1 8 )  
The value of z represents the aspiration level of the objective function. From an economic point of 
view, the goal of fuzzy linear programming is to minimize the risk of violating the set of criteria in (2.11). The 
formulation is similar to mean-variance analysis described in (2.7) with the exception that fuzzy set theory is 
utilized to formulate the problem. 
There are two distinct differences between fuzzy linear programming and mean-variance analysis. 
First, in mean-variance analysis, the uncertainty is stochastic, and in fiizzy linear programming, the uncertainty 
is fiizzy. Stochastic uncertainty is used mainly to describe vagueness due to the lack of information, where the 
future state of the system might not be known completely. Fuzzy uncertainty is mainly used to describe 
vagueness concerning the description of the semantic meaning of the events, phenomena, or statements 
themselves [53]. Second, mean-variance analysis requires solving a quadratic programming model while fuzzy 
TA 
A V 1 ) 
(5.17) 
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linear programming requires solving only a linear programming model. To solve fuzzy linear programming 
using a linear model, the fuzzy imcertainties among the criteria are assumed not correlated. 
There are three fuzzy logic terms that are introduced in this section, i.e., fuzzy set, fiizzy number, and 
fuzzy fimction. A classical set is normally defined by a collection of elements. An element is either belongs to 
the set or not. A fuzzy set, however, is a collection of elements with a fuzzy membership fimction. A fiizzy 
membership function indicates the strength of an element's membership in a set, with 1 indicating full 
membership and 0 indicating non-membership. The definition of fuzzy number is very often modified. In this 
research, a fuzzy number is a convex normalized fiizzy set of the real line that (i) there exists exactly one 
element with a characteristic value of 1 and (ii) the characteristic function that describes the fuzzy number is 
piecewise continuous. For example, the fiizzy set {(3, 0.1), (4, 0.5), (5, 1), (6, 0.5), (7, 0.1)} describing the 
fiizzy statement 'approximately 5' is also a fuzzy number. However, the fuzzy set {(3, 0.1), (4, 1), (5,1), (6, 
0.5), (7, 0.1)} describing the fiizzy statement 'approximately 5' is not a fiizzy number. A fiizzy fimction is a 
generalization of the concept of a classical fimction [53]. There are different degrees of fiizzification of the 
classical notion of a fimction that can be conceived. The various definitions of a fiizzy function can be found in 
[53]. 
In the fuzzy linear programming literature, there exist two distinct formulations. The first formulation 
is a research work led by H. -J. Zimmermann. The objective fimction and the constraints are represented by the 
fiizzy sets and then aggregated to derive at a maximizing decision. The second formulation is a research work 
led by H. Tanaka and K. Asai [53]. The coefficients, A , b, and , are described as fiizzy numbers and the 
constraints as fiizzy fimctions. Section 5.5.1 describes Zimmermann work and section 5.5.2 describes Tananka 
and Asai work. 
5.5.2 Approach 1 to Fuzzy Linear Programming [S3] 
There are two variations to the Zimmermann approach. Section 5.5.2.1 describes the symmetric fiizzy 
linear programming, i.e., all equations in the first two sets of equations in (5.18) are fiizzy. Section 5.5.2.2 
describes the non-symmetric fiizzy linear programming, i.e., some of the equations of the first two sets of 
equations in (5.18) are not fiizzy. 
5.5.2.1 Symmetric Fuzzy Linear Programming 
A symmetric fiizzy linear programming is formed when the inequality sign < in the first two sets of 
equations in (5.18) are fiizzy in namre. By substituting B = 
(5.19). 
f - z^  
— c 
and d = 
. A , 
, (5.18) may be restated as 
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Bx<d 
x > 0  (5.19) 
Here, < denotes the flizzified version of < and has the linguistic interpretation "essentially smaller 
than or equal to." The set of (w + l) constraints that carries the fuzzified inequality signs, <, may be 
represented by a fuzzy set, the membership function of which is //, (*) • J".-(*) should be 0 if the constraints are 
strongly violated and 1 if strongly satisfied. In between, shown in (5.20), is described by a 
nonmonotonically increasing flmction ^(X) from 0 to 1 when constraint i  of Bx<d ranges from (BX), —d^ to 
(BX),. - J, +/?,.. 
^,W = 
1 ?r(Bx),<^, 
£(x)  i f  d ,<iBx l<d ,+p ,  
0 Z/(BX), >< +/?, 
(5.20) 
Here, is the tolerance interval. Using the simplest type of membership function, i.e., linearly 
increasing over the tolerance interval, (5.20) is rewritten as (5.21). Figure 5-1 shows the graphic representation 
of (5.21). 
^,W = 
1 i f { ^x \<d ,  
1 _ if <(Bx), <d, + p, 
Pi 
0 i/(Bx), ><+p, 
(5.21) 
If the risk is inversely proportional to the satisfaction of criteria, (x), then, to reduce the risk, the 
minimum //, (*) criteria should be maximize. Equation (5.22) shows the mathematical representation. 
max< mm lao vi 1 -
(Bx), -d ,  
P, 
(5.22) 
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(Bx) 
I  ^  f  I  
0  df  (b j )_  d ,+Pi  X 
Figure 5-1. Fuzzy set //, (x). 
Introducing a new variable, A , to represent the minimum 
Pi 
, (5.22) can be written as 
(5.23). The A value reflects the satisfaction of criteria. X ranges from 0 to 1. The larger the A, the more the 
criteria are satisfied. 
subject to: 
max X 
+(BX),- ^d ,+p ,  
x > 0  
/ = + I 
(5.23) 
The constraints that have to be crisp, i.e. not to be violated, can easily be added to (5.21). Equation 
(5.24) shows the formulation when (5.1) is a formulation consisting of a fuzzy objective, q fuzzy constraints and 
(m-q) crisp constraints. 
subj'ect to: 
max A 
i = I q +1 
{Ax)i <6, i = q + l,...,m 
X > 0 (5.24) 
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5.5.2.2 Non-symmetric Fuzzy Linear Programming 
Non-symmetric fuzzy linear programming refers to the fuzzy linear programming model that has a 
crisp (deterministic) objective fimction. The problem is the determination of an extremum of a crisp fimction 
over a fuzzy domain. This problem can be solved using two approaches. They are: 
1. The determination of the fiizzy set "decision." 
2. The determination of a crisp "maximizing decision" by aggregating the objective function after appropriate 
transformations with the constraints. 
1. The determination of the fuzzy set "decision." 
This approach searches for the optimal objective value and decision choice x^. from every X value 
ranging from 0 to 1. The result is a fuzzy set and the decision-maker will have to decide which .A') he 
considers optimal if he wants to arrive at a crisp optimal solution. The mathematical equivalent for a decision 
problem with a crisp objective, q fiizzy criteria, and (m - q) crisp criteria is stated in (5.25). 
max X 
subject to: 
(AX),. <6,.+(l-A*)p, i = l q 
{Ax) i<bi  i  =  q  +  l  m  
X > 0 (5.25) 
2. The determination of a crisp "maximizing decision." 
In this approach, a transformation is needed to determine the fuzzy set of the crisp objective function. 
The fiizzy set of the objective function is determined using (5.26). 
1 -
> i f  c ^x>sup  f  
S ( R )  
c^x- in f  f  
if inf f <c.^x<sup f 
sup f - in f f  s (R)  s (R j  (5.26) 
S f R /  S ( R )  
i f c^x<in f  f  
S f R j  
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R represents the fuzzy region described by the set of constraints, fuzzy and crisp. S(j?) is the support 
the fuzzy region R. sup f and inf f can be determined using (5.27) and (5.28) respectively. 
S ( R )  S ( R )  
sup f = max c^x 
S ( R l  
subject to: 
(AX), <6,+P, 1=1 q 
(Ax); <6, i = q + l m 
x > Q  (5.27) 
inf f = max c^x 
S f R j  
subject to: 
(AX), <6, i = l,...,m 
x > 0  (5.28) 
The transformed objective flmction results in a symmetrical fuzzy linear programming problem that 
can be solved using the technique developed in section 5.5.2.1. The mathematical equivalent is shovra in 
(5.29). 
subject to: 
max A 
sup f — inf / + c X < — inf f 
\ S ( R )  S f R J  J S ( R )  
APi+iAx l  <bi+Pi  i  =  l  q  
(AX),. <6,- 1=9 + 1 m 
x > 0  (5.29) 
5.5.3 Approach 2 to Fuzzy Linear Programming [54] 
In this approach, each element of r. A, c^, and b are described as the fiizzy number (r , A , c'^, and 
b respectively.) These fuzzy numbers can be described by the fuzzy set with center a  and width w .  Figure 5-
2. shows a graphic representation of the fuzzy set of the fuzzy numbers that will be used in the formulation. 
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fxiz\ ft, )//, (cy )//,(6y ) 
1 
z, A,y, cJ ,bj 
Figure 5-2. Fuzzy Set z , A , , and b . 
~ -2-1 By substituting B = \ — ~ {_-A b  , (5.17) may be restated as (5.30). 
Bx>0 
x > 0  (5.30) 
Since 5 is a matrix comprised of fiizzy elements, it can be represented by two matrices, one, a  , to 
represent the center and one, w , to represent the width. The membership function, //, (BX), , of (BX),. can be 
detemiined using the extension principle of fuzzy set theory. Equation (5.31) shows the resulting membership 
function. The proof is provided in [54]. 
^.P4]= 
I if X = 0.{BX\ = 0  
0 if X = 0.{BX\ ^ 0  
(5.31) 
^ (BX), is almost positive', denoted by Bx>0, is defined in (5.32). 
(FIJC),- >0 O (O) < / - A, (HOT), > 0 (5.32) 
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A stands for the degree of (BX), >0, or the degree of sadsfaction of criterion (BI), . The larger A is, 
the stronger the meaning of'almost positive' (see Figure 5-3). 
If the risk is inversely proportional to the degree of 'almost positive,' then, to reduce the risk, the 
minimum /Z, (BX = O), of all the criteria should be maximized. Equation (5.33) shows the mathematical 
representation. 
maxmin fi,\\Bx\ =0 ( = maxlmin 
XZO I Vi xiO Vi 
I - (<»), (5.33) 
(«x), ^Bx) 
Figure 5-3. The explanation of Bx>0. 
Equation (5.34) shows the mathematical representation after substituting (5.31) and (5.32) into (5.33). 
subject to: 
max A 
(M' , -Aa , )x>0 i  =  I  m  +  I  
x > 0  (5.34) 
Since the fiizzy mathematical programming model described in (5.34) is nonlinear, the following 
algorithm, shown in Figure 5-4, is used to solve for the optimal decision that will maximize the satisfaction of 
criteria (the technique is an alteration of the technique proposed in [54].) 
82 
STEP 1 Let A' = 0.5, iter = 1. 
STEP 2 if (w - XaY X > 0 feasible 
else 
/C = A' -0-5/ 
STEP 3 iter = iter +1. 
if ^ lol, GO TO STEP 2. 
Solve for optimal decision using (5.34). 
max 
subject to; 
(w,- A 'aJ'^x >  0  / = !  m +  I  
x>0 (5.35) 
Figure 5-4. Iterative procedure to solve (5.22). 
5.5.4 Discussions and Extension to the ESCO Operation 
In general, the approaches by both Zimmermann and Tanaka are considered as the max min approach, 
i.e., the minimum satisfaction of all criteria is maximized. The resulting decision shows what the decision 
making can do best when uncertainty is least desired. 
There are two key advantages in the Zimmermann approach. First, the fuzzy linear programming 
model can still be solved using linear programming techniques. In addition, the size of the problem is relatively 
unchanged. The number of variables is only increased by one, A , to explain the satisfaction of criteria. The 
number of constraints is also increased by only one, the aspiration level of the objective function. Second, the 
approach has been explored by Zimmermann et al at great length to include the duality theory, sensitivity 
analysis, and integer fuzzy programming. Unfortunately, the approach capmres only the effect of fuzziness in 
each of the constraints, rather than the coefficients , A , and b. As a result, the contribution of fuzziness in 
the coefficients can not be properly evaluated. The Zimmermann's approach on fuzzy linear programming has 
been used in various occasions within the power industry. 
The key advantage of Tanaka and Asai approach is its ability to consider the effect of fuzziness on 
every element of the matrix B . The approach captures the effect of fuzziness in the fuzzy coefficients , A , 
and b. However, the approach results in a nonlinear mathematical model. Fortunately, the iterative procedure 
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used to solve the nonlinear problem does not require extensive work. No publication about the technique by the 
authors can be found since 1984. The issues like duality and sensitivity analysis are not covered. 
Notably, the two approaches, Zimmermann and Tanaka, have the difficulties of interpreting the 
aspiration level z when applied to the scheduling customer demand model. The problem will not be clear 
without an example. However, future results will reveal, the aspiration level plays an important role in the 
feasibility of the constraining equations. 
An ESCO model is analyzed using the Zimmermann and the Tanaka approaches in Chapter 8. 
5.6. VALUE AT RISK 
Value at risk, VaR, is a risk assessment tool that has been used by financial institutions to evaluate the 
risk of holding a portfolio of assets. The VaR approach differs from all previously discussed approaches. The 
four approaches presented in section 5.2 through section 5.5 determine the set of actions to be taken (x and y,) 
while including the uncertain factors (such as A, b, ) in the decision making process. The only difference 
among the four approaches is how they are implemented. VaR, however, assiunes that certain actions have 
been decided (x and y are determined.) The goal is to determine the monetary risk of taking the actions. In 
section 5.6.1, the concept of VaR is reviewed. In section 5.6.2, the problems of utilizing VaR to the ESCO 
operation are discussed. The different components of VaR in the ESCO operation are presented. Section 5.6.3 
through 5.6.5 presents the techniques to evaluate the different components of VaR. Section 5.6.6 comments on 
the approach. 
5.6.1 Introduction to VaR 
VaR is the maximum amount of money that may be lost in a portfolio (given actions, x and y) over a 
given period of time, with a given level of confidence [55]. Figure 5-5 shows the graphical representation of 
VaR. 
There are three techniques that can be used to evaluate VaR. The first technique is the historical 
simulation. Historical simulation applies the historical data to evaluate the VaR. The second technique is the 
covariance technique. To apply the covariance technique, the correlation matrix, C, of the uncertain factors is 
assumed available. The third technique is the Monte Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo simulation involves 
artificially generating a very large set of events, correlated changes, from which VaR is derived [55]. 
The covariance technique is the easiest and fastest technique among the three. However, this 
technique assumes that the uncertain factors (such as A, b, c'^) are normally distributed. Since normal 
distribution is not necessarily applicable to all situations, the technique has its limitation. The historical 
simulation and the Monte Carlo simulation are designed to supplement the covariance technique in this 
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situation. Since historical simulation uses historical data to evaluate the VaR, there is no need to assume the 
probabilistic distribution flmction of the uncertain factors. However, when historical data is limited, solving the 
VaR using the historical simulation can be difficult. Even though the Monte Carlo simulation requires the 
assumption of the probabilistic distribution (usually normal distribution) of the uncertain factors, the technique 
is capable of handling uncertain factors that are not normally distributed. For instance, in valuing the VaR of 
holding the option contracts (whose price is not normally distributed), the option sensitivities (normally 
distributed) are used for the Monte Carlo simulation. Thus, the resulting VaR is able to consider the options 
contracts [55]. 
Return on investment 
Expected 95% confidence 
level 
Figure 5-5. VaR at given confidence level. 
5.6.2 Comments and Extension to ESCO Operation 
Best describes the VaR of holding a portfolio of assets [55]. He described the VaR resulting from the 
assets price changes, the diversity of the portfolio (the number of assets with correlated price changes,) and the 
holding position of the portfolio (the amount of money invested in a particular asset.) The evaluation process is 
sufficient in a financial instimtion where the risk is primary as a result of price changes. To an ESCO, however, 
evaluating the VaR of the price changes is not sufficient In addition to the risk of price fluctuation, there are 
two additional risks not described by Best. First, as the customer demand and the deliverability of energy are 
imcertain, there is a risk associated with the ESCO not being able to serve the customer with sufficient energy. 
In addition, since energy delivery can be a problem at times (such as transmission system failure, or generation 
failure) the ESCO suffers the risk of contract violations. Even after excluding the credit risk, the ESCO may 
still suffer monetary loss as a result of contract violations. This is due to insufficient energy to serve the 
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customers. Figure 5-6 shows the three components of VaR in holding a particular decision for an ESCO (such 
as amount of supplementary energy, number of contracts, or purchased ancillary services) 
In section 5.6.3, the VaR of market price fluctuation is presented. The covariance technique is used in 
the section. The historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation techniques can be found in [55]. In section 
5.6.4, the VaR of energy not served (ENS) is presented. In section 5.6.5, the VaR of contract violation is 
presented. Section 5.6.4 and 5.6.5 uses the Monte Carlo simulation technique to evaluate the VaR. 
Value at risk of energy not 
served with no 
contract violation 
Value at risk of cmtract 
violation 
Value at risk 
(VaR) of an 
ESCO 
Value at risk of hoiiiing 
tbe portfolio of conliacts 
Figure 5-6. VaR of an ESCO. 
5.6.3 VaR of Market Price Fluctuation 
To evaluate the VaR of market price fluctuation, the covariance matrix of the market price fluctuation 
is assumed available. Historical data may be used in determining the covariance matrix. Then, the VaR of 
market price fluctuation is evaluated using (5.36). 
= aVPCP^ (5.36) 
P is the proportion or position of the assets in monetary value. A represents the degree of volatility 
and determines the confidence level. For instance, when A = 1 , the confidence level is 95% [55]. Tiie 
correlation matrix, C, is determined using (5.16). 
5.6.4 VaR of Energy Not Served (ENS) 
In Chapters 2 and 4, the reliability of energy is presented. Since the power system cannot promise a 
100% deliverable energy supply, the ESCO will bear an inherent monetary risk from unreliable energy supply. 
The inherent monetary risk can be subdivided into two parts. The first part is the monetary risk (VaR of EWS) 
when the reliability level specified in the energy contract is met. The second part is the monetary risk (VaR of 
contract violation) when the reliability level specified in the energy contract is not met. The two VaRs measure 
the financial risk of the combinatorial effect of uncertainty in customer demand and supplementary energy for 
86 
contracted reliability level on the delivered energy. The VaR of ENS is emphasized in this section. VaR of 
contract violation is discussed to section 5.6.5. 
The VaR of ENS measures the financial risk of the delivery of energy and the uncertainty in customer 
demand and supplementary energy. Prior to evaluating the VaR of ENS, there are two issues that needed to be 
addressed. First, when purchased energy exceeds customer demand, what cost does the ESCO bear? Second, 
when the customer demand exceeds the purchased energy, how should the ESCO be penalized for not meeting 
the customer demand? To address the two issues, the following assiunptions are made. 
When there is an excess energy (purchased energy exceeds the customer demand,) the ESCO loses the 
opportunity to sell In this research, the average cost of energy will be used to evaluate the VaR of ENS when 
there is an excess energy. When there is an energy shortage (customer demand exceeds the purchased energy,) 
the ESCO suffers the opportunity cost to serve customer demand and the customers may refuse future services 
from the ESCO. The opportunity cost to serve customer demand is the rate that the customers will pay if there 
is no shortage of energy The opportimity cost that the customers may refuse future services is the expected 
cost of customers refusing the ESCO services. This oppormnity cost will be a monotonically increasing 
function of the increased shortage in energy served. 
With the opportimity cost of excess energy and shortage energy presented, the VaR of ENS can be 
evaluated in five steps. Figure 5-7 shows the steps in evaluating the VaR of ENS. Figure 5-8 shows the 
graphical representation of the VaR of ENS. An ESCO model is analyzed using this approach in Chapter 8. 
5.6.S VaR of Contract Violation 
The VaR of contract violation measiu-es the financial risk when the auction market is capable of 
deliverying the energy as specified in the contracts. Prior to evaluating the VaR of contract violation, there are 
two issues that need to be addressed. First, will the auction market compensate the ESCO when the contract 
specifications are not met? Second, how should the ESCO evaluate the cost of ENS when contract 
specifications are not met? 
To address the first issue, it is assumed that the auction market will specify the compensation based on 
the percentage of reliability level below the contracted reliability level. The compensation to the ESCO, CPST, 
is shown in (5.37). 
" The opportunity to sell can be measured in various ways. First is the average cost of energy when there is an excess 
energy. Second is the opportunity cost of excess energy, assuming that the ESCO could have sold the excess energy at 
discount The opportunity cost of excess comes in two fomis, one is the average rate that the ESCO may receive, the other 
one is the decreasing function of excess rate (assuming that the ESCO will sell the excess energy first to buyers offering the 
highest discount rate.) 
The rate can come in two forms. First is a monotonically increasing fiinction, assuming that customers paying higher rate 
will be served first Second is an average of what customers pay, assuming that any additional energy will be partitioned 
equally to serve the customers. 
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CPST = 2; n,pm, \al - a, | (5.37) 
Vk 
pm,^ is the contracted payment to be made to the ESCO for each lowered rel-ability level on delivered energy 
for contract type k. is the number of contracts purchased for contract type k. a'^ is the delivered reliability 
level and is the contracted reliability level. To address the second issue, it is assumed that the cost of ENS 
when contract specifications are met is the expected cost of ENS. 
There are seven steps in evaluating the VaR of contract violation, as shown in Figure 5-9. Figure 5-10 
shows the graphical representation of the VaR of contract violation. An ESCO model is analyzed using this 
approach in Chapter 8. 
STEP 1 Form the probabilistic mass fiinction '^(pmf) of purchased energy, assuming no 
contract violation. The technique to be used in the formation is the convolution 
technique 
STEP 2 Form the pmf of the customer demand after including the effect of supplementary 
energy. 
STEP 3 Form the pmf of ENS by the convolution of pmf of purchased energy (described in 
1) and pmf of the customer demand (described in 2.) 
STEP 4 Determine the cost of ENS and its probability. This is accomplished by multiplying 
the ENS and with the opportimity cost of excess energy and shortage energy. The 
result is the pmf of the cost of ENS. 
STEP 5 Based on the pmf of the cost of ENS, determine the VaR of ENS by assuming a 
desired confidence level. 
Figure 5-7. VaR of ENS. 
The probabilistic function for discrete variables is called probabilistic mass function (pmf) while the probabilistic function 
for continuous variable is called probabilistic distribution toction (pdf). Since the reliability level described in the energy 
contract and the number of contracts purchased are discrete (refer to Chapter 2,) pmf is used in this research. However, the 
described approaches can also be used for pdf. 
14 ' The convolution of two contracts can be solved with the following equations: y[k]  =  ' ^ f [m]h[k-m]  where f [ ' ]  and 
x-Q 
h[*] are the probability of contract 1 and 2 delivering • amoimt of energy while y[*] is the probability of the • amount 
energy delivered to the ESCO. 
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STEP 1 
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STEP 2 
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Figure 5-8. VaR of ENS. 
STEP 1 
STEP 2 
STEP 3 
STEP 4 
STEPS 
STEP 6 
STEP? 
Determine the eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the estimated correlation matrix of the 
reliability level delivered by the auction markeL 
Generate correlated random changes in the reliability level delivered using the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors in STEP 1 and (5.15). For each set of correlated random changes, go through 
STEP 3 through STEP 5. 
Determine the expected cost of ENS (refer to STEP 4 of section 5.6.4.) 
Determine the compensation based on the simulated reliability level in STEP 2. 
Determine the cost of contract violation by subtracting the compensation found in STEP 4 
with the expected cost of ENS found in STEP 3. 
Form the pmf of the cost of the contract violation using the simulated correlated changes in the 
delivered reliability level. 
Based on the pmf of the cost of the contract violation, determine the VaR of contract violation 
by assuming a desired confidence level. 
Figure 5-9. VaR of contract violation. 
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For each coirelated change series 
STEP? 
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contract violation 
STEPS 
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STEP 3 
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STEPS 
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STEP 4 
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STEP 2 
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STEPl 
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matrix of the factors influencing the 
ESCO operation 
Figure 5-10. VaR of contract violation. 
5.7. REMARKS 
Sections 5.2 through section 5.6 present the various approaches that can be used to manage and assess 
the uncertainty. Each of these approaches has strengths and weaknesses. In this section, a perspective will be 
presented on these approaches in light of the following aspects: (1) applicability, (2) technical requirement, and 
(3) time requirement. Finally, section 5.7.4 provides additional discussions on uncertainty, risk, and cost of 
risk. 
5.7.1 Applicability 
Applicability refers to how easy the uncertainty may be addressed by the various approaches. The 
mean-variance, sensitivity analysis, and parametric analysis allow studies on the correlated changes in either the 
cost coefficient, c, or the right-hand-side vector, b, only. Even though the sensitivity analysis evaluates the 
perturbation in c. A, and b, it evaluates the perturbation one at a time. It would be easier to resolve the linear 
programming problem if too many perturbations are needed in the sensitivity analysis. The stochastic linear 
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programming approach studies the uncertainties in c. A, and b simultaneously. Part of the model (A , c and b, 
in section 5.2) can be deterministic while the rest are stochastic (B(ia), D((i)), and d(aj) in section 5.2). 
The fuzzy linear programming approach utilizes a broad range of techniques. The approach, in general, smdies 
the changes in c. A, and b simultaneously. However, to use fuzzy linear programming, either all parameters 
within a constraining equation are considered fiizzy (i.e., being perturbed) or none are considered fiizzy. The 
VaR approach is capable of including risk factors that are hard to model. For example, in this research, the 
financial risks associated with ENS and contract violation are nonlinear relationships. To evaluate such 
financial risk using approaches other than VaR, linearizing the risk factors are needed. However, the VaR 
approach can determine such nonlinear financial risk without any prior simplification. Unfortunately, to 
evaluate the VaR, a decision choice must be made. This means that some other approaches must be used in 
addition to the VaR approach to provide a basis of valuation. 
5.7.2 Technical Requirement 
Technical requirement refers to the degree of knowledge needed in analyzing the uncertainty using the 
different approaches. Mean-variance, sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis, and fiizzy linear 
programming approaches are based on the linear programming technique. Understanding the concept of linear 
programming is sufficient to model an uncertain operational problem using these approaches. The fiizzy linear 
programming approach requires additional technical expertise as the approach borrows its concepts from fiizzy 
set extension theory. The approach is, nevertheless, similar to the sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis. 
The only exceptions are on how A is interpreted and how applicable the approaches are (refer to section 5.7.1). 
To use the stochastic linear programming approach requires knowledge of Bender decomposition and Monte 
Carlo simulation techniques. As a result, the stochastic approach is more math-oriented than the rest. 
Fortunately, there are software packages available (for instance, the DECIS used in this research,) reducing the 
requirements to understand the techniques at great length. Understanding the Monte Carlo simulation technique 
is sufficient in the VaR approach. 
5.7.3 Time Requirement 
Time requirement refers to the time needed to analyze the model using the different approaches. The 
mean-variance, sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis, and fiizzy linear programming approaches are 
based on the linear programming technique. Sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis are the easiest 
approaches, since solving the linear programming model presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 has already 
provided information needed to use these approaches. Mean-variance and fuzzy linear programming 
approaches require remodeling the models presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. However, since the linear 
programming technique can still be used to solve the model derived from the two approaches, the time 
91 
requirement is considered moderate. The stochastic linear programming and VaR approaches require the Monte 
Carlo simulation to obtain the random changes. The time requirements for the two approaches are considerably 
higher. Since the stochastic linear programming approach requires solving the model iteratively, the time 
requirement for this approach is the highest. 
5.7.4 Uncertainty, Risk, and Cost of Risk 
At the beginning of Chapter 6, uncertainty is defined as the condition in which the possibility of error 
exists, because we have less than the total information about our environment. Risk arises when decision­
makers and analysts attempt to make a decision based on uncertain information. There are various ways to 
represent a risk. For example, in statistics, the risk is represented by probabilistic fimction, and in fuzzy set 
theory, the risk is represented by fiizzy membership function. In addition, risk can take various forms. In this 
research, two types of risk are considered, physical and financial. When an ESCO purchases energy contracts 
from the auction market, for example, it bears the financial risk of paying at prices higher than what it could 
have been offered. However, when the customer demand is uncertain, for example, an ESCO bears the risk of 
not serving the customers with sufficient electricity. While the ESCO still has faced the financial consequences 
of not meeting the customer demand, the risk is physical. In this example, the ESCO faces the physical risk of 
not serving the customers the requested energy demand. 
The cost of risk measures the financial burden of the uncertainty. Since the financial risk is measured 
in monetary term, there is no difficulty in measuring the cost of financial risk. However, to measure the cost of 
a physical risk, the financial implication of ±e physical risk must first be determined. To measure the cost of 
ENS in section 5.6.4, for example, the opportunity cost of not serving customer energy is assumed. With the 
physical risk measured in terms of cost, the cost of the physical risk can be measured. In section 5.6.4, the term 
inherent monetary risk is used to reflect the financial implication of physical risk. 
While the costs of the physical risk and the financial risk are measurable, the measurement takes 
various forms. One form is to use the expected financial losses resulted fi-om the uncertainty to measure the 
cost of risk. It is commonly found in the field of engineering. However, in the field of economics, an expected 
financial loss is not a risk because it is expected. To economists, the cost of risk is usually measured using the 
variance or standard deviation of the financial risk and inherent monetaiy risk. In the presented risk 
management tools, the cost of risk has been measured using various forms. For examples, variance is used in 
mean-variance analysis, satisfaction of criteria is used in fuzzy linear programming, and confidence level is 
used in VaR analysis. 
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CHAPTER 6 ECONOMICS UNDERLYING ESCO OPERATION 
This chapter presents several examples about the economics of scheduling customer demand and the 
interaction between scheduling customer demand and purchasing market contracts. All information is 
deterministic. Section 6.1 provides some underlying assumptions to be used throughout this chapter. Section 
6.2 minimizes the cost of production using load management programs in the regulated electric industry. 
Section 6.3 uses the marginal costs solved in section 6.2 as the market prices to solve the different economic 
models of scheduling customer demand in an ESCO operation. Section 6.4 relates how scheduling customer 
demand may be related with the energy purchased from the auction market. Appendix A provides the data used 
and detailed results determined throughout this chapter. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following assumptions are used throughout this chapter: 
• There are six months of data available for the customer demand. This data is shown in Appendix A. It is 
further assumed that there are six periods in each day and one day in each month. 
• There are two groups of customers participating in the DLC program. Their contract specifications, 
controllable energy data, and pay back ratio on the controllable demand are shown in Appendix A. 
• There is one ESS type I systems and one ESS type II system available in the ESS program. Their physical 
constraints and capabilities are shown in Appendix A. 
The following assumptions are used in section 6.2 to determine the cost of production and marginal 
cost in the regulated electric industry: 
• There are three generation units running during peak periods and two generation units running during off-
peak periods. Their physical constraints and production cost functions are described in Appendix A. The 
allocation of the generation units has assumed the impact of the load management programs. 
• The marginal cost functions during on-peak and off-peak periods are determined in Appendix A. Graphical 
technique is used in Appendix A to determine the marginal cost functions. 
• The transmission cost and constraints are ignored in the process. 
The following assumptions are used in section 6.3 to solve the various economic models for an ESCO 
in the re-regulated electric industry. 
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• The customer demand is assumed to be two tenth of the customer demand presented in Appendix A. The 
DLC demand is twenty four percent of that presented in Appendix A. The ESCO described in section 6.3 
does not own any energy storage system. 
• The market price for the electric energy is assumed to be the marginal cost solved in section 6.2. 
Additional assimiptions on the energy contract with the sellers will be presented in section 6.4 when an 
ESCO tries to purchase contracts to meet its customer requirement. 
6.2 SCHEDULING CUSTOMER DEMAND IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY 
This section serves two purposes. The first is to show how the load management models presented in 
Chapter 3 may be used in the regulated power industry to reduce the production cost The second is to use the 
solution reached in this section to determine market prices in future presentation. 
In the tested system, the maximum controllable demand, 24.5 MW, is available during the 33"* period 
(or the 3"* period on the 1" day of the 6"" month). The maximum controllable demand as a percentage of the 
total demand during that period, 8.00% of the total demand or 16 MW, is found in the period (or the 6"' 
period on the 1" day of the I" month). The system has the highest total customer demand, 385 MW, and the 
highest marginal cost of production, S81.70/MW, at the 33"^ period. Load management demand is comprised 
approximately 70 % of DLC demand, 19% of ESS type I energy, and 11% of ESS type II energy. The customer 
demand data, load management data, and generation cost function can be found in Appendix A. 
Since there are two to three generation units that may be used for scheduling in this example, the 
marginal cost functions are first obtained using graphical techniques shown in Appendix A. To schedule the 
load management demand and generation units at the lowest production cost, an iterative procedure as shown in 
Appendix A is used. 
Table 6-1 shows the optimal scheduling after minimizing the cost of production. The total energy 
produced before and after the load management scheduling are 9750 MW and 9749.02 MW respectively. The 
energy generated after scheduling is lower, by 0.98 MW, because the chosen DLC control sequences have a 
smaller paid back energy than the deferred energy, despite some inefficient energy storage systems being used. 
At the lO"* period (or the 4"' period on the 1" day of the 2"'' month), the system experiences the highest level of 
energy being stored, 21 MW, through the load management programs. The amount of energy stored is 91.30% 
of the total controllable demand during that period. The highest level of energy stored as a percentage of the 
total load management demand, 72.73% or 12.00 MW, happens during the 5"" period (or the 5"* period on the 1" 
day of the I" month). The maximum amount of energy is released, 21 MW, during the lO"" period (or the 4"' 
period on the 1" day of the 2"'' month). The highest level of energy released as a percentage of the total load 
management demand, 92.56% or 19.90 MW, happens during the 3"* period (or the 3"* period on the 1" day of 
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the l®* month). The marginal cost experiences the largest drop during the 33"^ period, 4.85%, and the largest 
increase during the 6"* period, -4.82%. 
Table 6-2 shows the contributions in the increased and decreased production contributions from the 
three components of the load nranagement programs, i.e., the DLC program, the ESS type I system, and the ESS 
type n system. Roughly 87% oof the controlled demand is DLC demand, while 7.5 % and 5.5% of the controlled 
demands are ESS type I demand and ESS type II demand respectively. Only 97.62% of the deferred DLC 
demand are paid back. DLC «iemand contributes toward 87% of the total controlled demand. The aimiber is 
higher than the DLC program's share in the load management programs because the ESS type I system and the 
ESS type II system are not as effective as the DLC program. The ESS type n system is operating at 83.59% 
efficiency while the ESS type II system is operating at 84.09% efficiency. The higher operational efficiency of 
the ESS type I system contribuites toward better a utilization ratio, which is 7.5%. Detailed load management 
demand schedule is presented ian Appendix A. 
The production cost before implementing the load management programs is approximately 483 
thousand dollars. The production cost after implementing the load management programs is approximately 480 
thousand dollars. The producrtion cost savings is approximately three thousand dollars or 0.65% of the total 
production cost. Two major r-easons contribute toward the relatively lower cost saving. First, the inefficient 
energy storage system requires that additional energy be generated to compromise for the energy lost during 
energy conversion. The ESS tlype I system is operating at 84.09% efficiency while the ESS type II system is 
operating at 83.59% efficiencjo'. Second, the difference between the off-peak and on-peak marginal costs is 
relatively small, which is less tihan 20%. Load management programs are less attractive when the difference is 
small because the savings fronn deferring the on-peak demand, or storing energy during off-peak periods, will 
also be small. Table 6-1 show"s that the largest reduction in the marginal cost happens during the 33"^ period, 
which is a 4.85% reduction in t3ie marginal cost when the energy produced is dropped by 3.95%. 
In the tested system, tBie changes in the marginal costs are relatively small. Three factors contribute to 
the small change in the marginal costs. First, the rate of change of the marginal costs per MW energy generated 
is relatively small. Second, the= load management demand capacity is relatively small compared to the customer 
demand. Finally, since there are two on-peak periods in every six periods in this tested system, the deferred 
customer demand, or released storage energy, are spread throughout the two periods, lowering the potential 
controllable demand during the two on-peak periods. 
Begirming in the next section, the tested system is assumed re-regulated where energy is purchased and 
sold through an auction marke*. Assuming that competition is fierce in the energy market such that energy is 
priced according to the margimal cost, the marginal cost shown in Table 6-1 may then be used as the market 
price. This would assume that: generation companies know their cost of production and production level (and 
competitors' as well); market demand for energy is perfectly forecasted; and no transmission losses and 
congestion are happening. Even though the marginal costs before and after the load management scheduling 
are about the same, the marginasl costs after the load management scheduling will be used as the market prices. 
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Table 6-1. Results from optimal scheduling. 
Generation Generation Change in % change Marginal Marginal Change in % change 
before LM in after LM generation in cost cost after marginal in 
periodical order (MW) level generation before LM LM cost marginal 
(MW) (MW) level ($/MW) ($/MW) (S/MW) cost 
200 203.2000 3.2224 1.61 57.00 57.77 0.77 1.35 
210 212.6047 3.2000 1.52 59.40 60.03 0.63 1.05 
340 321.1000 -19.90 -5.85 76.12 73.42 -2.70 -3.54 
340 320.2000 -20.49 -6.03 76.12 73.30 -2.82 -3.71 
210 220.5129 12.00 5.71 59.40 61.92 2.52 4.25 
200 211.4500 11.45 5.73 57.00 59.75 2.75 4.82 
210 219.0001 9.36 4.46 59.40 61.56 2.16 3.64 
220 227.2600 8.26 3.75 61.80 63.54 1.74 2.82 
340 324.9997 -15.00 -4.41 76.12 73.98 -2.14 -2.81 
350 331.1457 -21.00 -6.00 77.54 74.86 -2.68 -3.46 
215 224.2852 11.12 5.17 60.60 62.83 2.23 3.68 
210 220.1290 11.71 5.58 59.40 61.83 2.43 4.09 
220 228.0196 7.02 3.19 61.80 63.72 1.92 3.11 
225 230.9996 6.00 2.67 63.00 64.44 1.44 2.29 
350 333.1738 -15.00 -4.29 77.54 75.14 -2.40 -3.09 
360 342.0000 -19.00 -5.28 78.96 76.40 -2.56 -3.24 
230 238.9996 9.47 4.12 64.20 66.36 2.16 3.36 
220 229.6894 9.80 4.45 61.80 64.13 2.33 3.76 
225 233.0422 7.58 3.37 63.00 64.93 1-93 3.06 
230 236.8238 6.54 2.84 64.20 65.84 1.64 2.55 
370 353.2253 -17.77 -4.80 80.39 78.00 -2.39 -2.97 
360 342.0000 -19.66 -5.46 78.96 76.40 -2.56 -3.24 
235 244.2449 10.24 4.36 65.40 67.62 2.22 3.39 
220 229.9761 9.98 4.54 61.80 64.19 2.39 3.87 
230 239.0000 9.00 3.91 64.20 66.36 2.16 3.36 
240 246.9350 7.93 3.30 66.60 68.26 1.66 2.50 
370 358.0000 -12.91 -3.49 80.39 78.68 -1.71 -2.13 
380 362.0000 -19.85 -5.22 82.99 79.25 -3.74 -4.51 
245 253.4154 9.36 3.82 67.80 69.82 2.02 2.98 
250 259.0005 9.45 3.78 69.00 71.16 2.16 3.13 
240 246.5684 6.48 2.70 66.60 68.18 1.58 2.37 
255 259.5084 5.38 2.11 70.20 71.28 1.08 1.54 
380 371.7000 -15.00 -3.95 84.74 80.63 -4.11 -4.85 
380 374.1760 -6.49 -1.71 82.99 80.98 -2.01 -2.42 
250 257.6000 8.60 3.44 69.00 70.82 1.82 2.64 
235 243.0300 8.03 3.42 65.40 67.33 1.93 2.95 
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Table 6-2. The load management demands in period order during the scheduled duration. 
DLC DLC demand as ESS type I ESS type I demand ESS type 11 ESS type II demand 
demand % of the total demand as % of the total demand as % of the total 
(MW) controlled (MW) controlled demand (MW) controlled demand 
demand 
0 0 2.20 68.75 LOO 31.25 
0 0 2.20 84.46 0.40 15.54 
-16.00 84.66 -1.90 10.05 -1.00 5.29 
-17.00 85.86 -1.80 9.09 -1.00 5.05 
8.91 84.75 1.60 15.25 0 0 
8.25 72.05 2.20 19.21 1.00 8.73 
8.25 91.67 0.60 6.63 0.15 1.70 
7.26 100.00 0 0 0 0 
-13.63 90.84 -0.37 2.49 -1.00 6.67 
-17.50 92.82 -0.35 1.88 -1.00 5.30 
8.62 92.86 0.43 4.66 0.23 2.47 
8.70 85.85 0.43 4.28 1.00 9.87 
7.02 87.53 0 0 1.00 12.47 
6.00 100.00 0 0 0 0 
-15.95 94.77 0 0 -0.88 5.23 
-17.00 94.44 0 0 -1.00 5-56 
9.00 100.00 0 0 0 0 
8.69 89.68 0 0 1.00 10.32 
7.86 97.72 0 0 0.18 2.28 
6.82 100.00 0 0 0 0 
-15.77 94.04 0 0 -1.00 5.96 
-18.00 100.00 0 0 0 0 
9.25 100.00 0 0 0 0 
8.98 89.98 0 0 1.00 10.02 
8.00 88.89 0 0 1.00 11.11 
6.94 100.00 0 0 0 0 
-11.48 95.63 0 0 -0.52 4.37 
-17.48 97.13 0 0 -0.52 2.87 
8.42 100.00 0 0 0 0 
9.00 100.00 0 0 0 0 
5.57 84.78 0 0 1.00 15.22 
4.51 100.00 0 0 0 0 
-11.40 85.71 -1.90 14.29 0 0 
-3.61 61.98 -1.80 30.91 -0.41 7.11 
7.60 100.00 0 0 0 0 
7.03 87.55 0 0 1.00 12.45 
6.3 ECONOMIC VALUATION OF LOAD MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
This section is intended to provide an economic valuation of the load management programs. Even 
though the load management programs are used to minimize the cost of production in section 6.2 for the 
regulated energy market, the purpose may not serve well for an ESCO intending to profit from the auction 
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market Thus, the various objectives of load management scheduling presented in Chapter 4 are evaluated in 
this section to provide fiirther insights into how the different objectives may influence the ESCO operation. In 
section 6.3.1, the ESCO is described. In section 6.3.-2, the four major objectives for load management 
scheduling are compared. In section 6.3.3, the conflicts of maintaining system reliability and making profit 
using load management are discussed. In particular, the roles of ESCOs and regulated companies (ISOs and 
DlSTCOs) in the load management programs are proposed. In section 6.3.4, the gap between a cost-based load 
management scheduling and a profit-based scheduling is closed, using various penalty factors formulated in 
section 3.4. A similar presentation was made in [12]. 
6.3.1 Customer Demand and Load Management Demand to an ESCO 
An ESCO serves 20% of customer demand as shown in Appendix A. It also has 24% of controllable 
customer demand as shown in Appendix A. Additional information is shown in Appendix A, including the rate 
charged on the customer demand and controllable customer demand. The rebate structure given to customers 
participating in the DLC program is also described in Appendix A.2.2.2. In this example, the non-energy cash 
outlay is assumed to be zero, i.e., NOY^) = 0 for all D. There is no cash held by the ESCO at the beginning 
period, i.e., the ESCO has to decide on how much to borrow to pay for the cost of energy to serve the customers 
at the earlier periods. The annual percentage rate of borrowing and the annual percentage of investing are also 
presented in Appendix A. 
6.3.2 Comparing the Various Economic Forces Behind Load Management Programs 
Table 6-3 compares the results of scheduling customer demand using the load management programs 
with the various approaches shown in Chapter 4. Since the ESCO has to borrow to pay for the energy cost at 
the end of each day, while waiting for the customers to pay the cost of services at the beginning of the next 
month, the cash buildup is in general lower than the profit. All approaches result in a lower cost for energy and 
a higher profit of serving customer energy. Since the rate offered to customers is higher during peak periods 
and some customer demand is deferred during peak periods, the load management programs result in lower 
revenue. 
Under the load-based approach, even though the peak demand is the lowest after scheduling, the peak 
demands during the various months are not always the lowest. For example, in the I" month, the peak demand 
is the lowest under the cost-based approach at 65.70MW. However, during the same duration, the peak demand 
is higher at 68MW under the load-based approach. This is because the objective of a load-based approach 
minimizes the highest peak demand during the 6 months duration, which has a peak demand of 77MW in the 6* 
month. With this peak demand minimized to 74.9 IMW, the load-based approach has achieved its goal. Thus, 
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the formulated load-based approach should be modified when there is multiple peak demand during the 
schedule duration. 
Since a cost-based approach does not consider the impact of lowered revenue when the controllable 
demand during peak periods is deferred to off-peak periods, and when the paid back energy is lower than the 
deferred energy, the collected revenue under this approach is the lowest among all. Thus, even though the load-
based approach results in the lowest cost of energy, this approach does not guarantee the highest profit. 
A profit-based approach results in the highest profit, even when the cost of energy is not the lowest. 
By considering the impact of lowered revenue, this approach makes sure that only when the cost savings exceed 
the lowered revenue will energy deferment be conducted. In section 6.3.4, the cost-based approach and profit-
based approach are further investigated. 
Table 6-3. Results of scheduling customer demand using various objectives. 
Without load With load management programs 
management load-based cost-based profit-based cash 
programs management 
overall 77MW 74.908 IMW 77.0000MW 76.0000MW 75.8480MW 
1"' month 70MW 68.0000MW 65.6960MW 66.4640MW 66.9440MW 
2"'' month 72MW 70.0000MW 67.8800MW 66.4160MW 67.8880MW 
Maximum 3"* month 74MW 72.0000MW 67.9200MW 70.0000MW 70.0000MW 
demand 4"^ month 76MW 74.0000MW 71.4800MW 74.6960MW 74.6600MW 
5"" month 77MW 73.4080MW 73.8400MW 76.0000MW 74.0000MW 
6"* month 77MW 74.908 IMW 77.0000MW 75.1336MW 75.8480MW 
Cost of energy 5137,449.71 5137,343.71 5137,015.96 5137,234.64 5137,182.95 
(including cost of rebate) 
Cost saving 0 5146.80 5474.55 5255.87 5307.56 
Revenue 5186,820.00 5186,732.14 5186,480.74 5186,736.72 5186,753.95 
Increase revenue 0 -587.86 -5339.26 -583.28 -$66.05 
Profit (excluding interest 549,370.49 549,365.51 549,387.70 549,435.18 $49,433.88 
rate factors) 
Increased profit SO.OO 536.02 S58.2I 5105.69 $104.39 
Cash buildup 549,283.92 549,279.33 S 49,302.96 549,350.04 $49,487.00 
Increased cash buildup SO.OO 59.75 561.54 563.24 5245.58 
DLC customers benefit SO.OO 522.93 577.07 566.90 571.70 
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Even though the profit reached is the highest, the profit-based approach does not guarantee the highest 
cash flows. In this example, the ESCO will receive the revenue at the beginning of the 3"* month after the 
energy is served. However, the ESCO has to pay the energy cost at the end of each day. Any cost saving made 
today has a higher impact than the lowered revenue. Thus, the cash management approach that includes the 
impact of interest payment results in higher cash flows than the profit-based approach. 
In this example, there is only six periods in each day, and one day in each month. Therefore, the cost 
savings, increased profits, and customer benefits are relatively small. In addition, in this example, the impact of 
congestion cost is not considered. Thus, the market prices during peak periods are not significantly higher than 
during off-peak periods (less than 20%). As a result, the benefits of the load management programs are not yet 
fully realized. 
6.3.3 Minimizing Customer Demand and Maximiung Profit: Looking into the Future 
The load-based approach that minimizes peak demand is an important tool to ensure system reliability. 
However, as the results in Table 6-3 suggest, the load-based approach (Equation (4.2)) does not guarantee the 
highest profit and would not be in the best interest of an ESCO trying to maximize its profits. Given the benefit 
of the load management programs in maintaining a reliable system, should load management be controlled by 
the ESCO? 
To answer that, the following issues should first be investigated. First, why would customers 
participate in the load management programs? Second, will market price always reflect the cost of unreliable 
power supply? Third, will the load-based approach that minimizes customer demand ensure a sufficient profit 
margin to companies investing in the load management programs? 
If the power industry was re-regulated, and companies serving customer energy were allowed to make 
a profit, undoubtedly, customers should also be allowed to benefit fi-om their own flexible and controllable 
demand. Assuming that customers were interested only in the economic benefit of their controllable demand, it 
is clear that they would find companies that can provide the best return for their controllable demand. 
In the long run, market prices should reflect all costs and risks of an unreliable power supply in a 
perfectly competitive market. However, in the short run, it may not always be true in practice, even if the 
market is perfectly competitive. The market price may over or under reflect the cost of an unreliable power 
supply. Then, given the objective of the load-based approach that does not account for the cost of energy, the 
load-based approach definitely will not offer a company holding the load management programs as assets the 
best earning opportunity. Then, if a company is rational in its business practices, there is no reason why it 
would not choose to adopt a profit-based or cash management approach. Even if the market price reflects all 
costs and risks, such relationship may not always be linear. If the relationship is not linear, the load-based 
approach will again not perform as well as other approaches in maximizing profit. In addition, the profit margin 
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of the load management programs may suffer from adopting the load-based approach. For an ESCO adopting 
the load-based approach, it is riskier to maintain a sufficient profit margin. 
Since only companies that benefit most from the load management programs can provide the best 
return to the customers rendering their controllable demand, ESCOs that adopt the profit-based and cash 
management approaches are usually those who will serve the controllable demand. Certainly, that would also 
mean that ESCOs are willing to share the benefits of the controllable demand with the customers. Without 
considering the system reliability issue, it is then fair to suggest that ESCO controlled load management 
programs should be encouraged, or at least not prohibited. A profit-oriented ESCO will provide the customers 
±e best return on the controllable demand while still profiting from the customer demand flexibility. 
Will the nature of customers, maximizing his/her benefits, and ESCO, maximizing the return on the 
load management programs still guard against system instability? Undoubtedly, any rational load management 
programs in a rational market will improve system reliability to some degree. However, since the primary 
concern of a load-based approach is Just to minimize peak demand, it is usually the most effective. Even 
though the load-based approach is the most effective approach, it is definitely not in the best interest of both an 
ESCO and its customers. So, to maintain the most reliable system, should regulated companies (DISTCOs and 
ISOs), instead of ESCOs, handle the controllable demand? Prior to addressing this question, a more 
fundamental question is — is practical to have regulated companies controlling the load management demand? 
Load management programs require the communication facilities to facilitate the control of customer demand, 
particularly the DLC program. When customers are free to choose any company to serve their controllable 
demand, the communication facilities will need to be separable so that any company can control any customer 
demand. If new technology becomes available, so that customer demand is easily controllable, this requirement 
is not a problem. However, the existing utility practice has communication facilities that usually are embedded 
in the distribution management system, that would be costly if they were to be separated. Thus, it is practical at 
the present time to have a regulated company handling the communication systems that governs the controllable 
demand. 
If it is practical to have regulated companies handling the communications, should these regulated 
companies utilize the load-based approach in minimizing the risk of power supply? There is no single answer 
that can address this issue. It is fair to say that it will largely depend on how government regulations are 
established and how ISOs will interpret these regulations. If government regulations agree that the market 
forces are sufficient to maintain a reliable system, then, these regulated companies should practice according to 
what the ESCOs have requested. That means that the ESCOs will approach the customers for more flexible 
demand and decide on how the controllable customer demand should be scheduled, while the regulated 
companies, DISTCOs or ISOs, carry out the decisions made by the ESCOs. 
If government regulations believe that ISOs should take additional actions, other than letting market 
forces determine the system reliability level, and that ISOs decide to hold some load management demand to 
maintain system reliability, the relationships among customers, ESCOs, and regulated companies can be 
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complicated. One approach is for the ISOs to have ESCOs render some load management demands under ISOs 
discretion. In this approach, all ESCOs must have some load management demands, at least sufficient to meet 
the ISOs requirements. This definitely will complicate the operations of ESCOs not interested in offering losd 
management programs to the customers. Another approach is for ISOs to establish an auction market for both 
customers offering load management demand and ESCOs bidding for the controllable demand. Shown in 
Figure 6-1, it consists of the bids from the ESCOs requiring controllable energy services at given rates and 
offers from the customers rendering their controllable demand at given costs. The ISOs would match the bids 
from the ESCOs and offers from the customers. No bids from the ESCOs should be accepted if the ESCOs bids 
are lower than the offers from the customers. The amoimt accepted for both customer offers and ESCOs bids 
will be controlled by the ESCO decision. To obtain the desired load management demand, ISOs will accept 
additional customer offers. These costs will be subsidized using the auction surplus and the monthly charges 
that each customer has to pay the DISTCOs for maintaining the distribution system. However, this approach 
has some practical difficulties. First, this approach would require every customer wishing to benefit from the 
flexible demand to bid in the market. Is it practical to implement? Second, given that each customer offers 
different load management demand, how should the controllable demand be graded and auctioned? Finally, 
should auction surpluses be used to compensate for the cost used to acquire additional customers? 
Price per unit energy 
A Amomt of energy to be 
controlled mder prcfit-based or 
ene Am out^ of energy to be No additional ESCOs 
fl un o codrollediaiderload' 
cash management approaches by based approach under ISO u. 
N o additional ESCO s 
'ustom er offers and ESCO bii 
accepted 
o additional ESCO bids 
will be accepted 
Figure 6-1. Relationships among ESCOs, ISOs, and customers using auction mechanism. 
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6.3.4 Minimizing Cost and Maximizing Profit: Closing the Gap 
The differences between cost-based approach and profit-based approach are the results of energy 
difference between paid back energy and deferred energy and rate difference between paid back duration and 
deferred duration. The differences between the two approaches can be reduced by adding (3.6) and (3.7) to the 
profit-based approach and adding (3.8) and (3.9) to the cost-based approach. Table 6-4 shows the results after 
including the different remedies to the two approaches. A similar comparison has been made using different 
data [12]. In this example, including the penalty for any revenue increase, (3.7), does not affect the ultimate 
solution. This is because the deferred energy of all chosen controlling sequences of the customer demand is 
higher than the paid back energy. 
Table 6-4. Results of scheduling customer demand using various objectives. 
Cost-based Profit-based 
-(3.8) -(3.8) and (3.9) -(3.6) and (3.7) - (3.6) 
Cost of energy 5137,049.89 $137,149.36 $137,149.36 $137,211.48 
(including cost of rebate) 
Revenue $186,548.70 $186,641.44 $186,641.44 $186,699-62 
Profit $49,411.20 $49,428.18 $49,428.18 $49,429.99 
DLC customers benefit $87.62 $63.90 $63.90 $58.14 
6.4 MARKET CONTRACTS AND LOAD MANAGEMENT SCHEDULING 
Examples in section 6.3 show the economics of scheduling customer demand. In this section, the 
specifications of market contracts are assumed. The ESCO presented in section 6.3 will be buying energy 
contracts to satisfy the customer demand while profiting from the energy service. Appendix A.3.2 shows the 
contract specifications and prices. Additional customers contract specifications are also presented in Appendix 
A.2.2.2. 
Table 6-5 and Table 6-6 shows the results of contract purchasing schemes, when no load management 
programs are available and when the load management programs shown in section 6.3 are available, of the 
ESCO in section 6.3. 
Even though the reliability level provided is higher and the volatility level allowed is higher, no 
contract type D is purchased. To meet the reliability level requested by the customers, additional contract type 
C is purchased. For instance, during the 5"" period in Table 6-5, the customer demand is only 42MW, however, 
the purchased amount is 42.4421 MW (42.4421 number of contracts with each delivering IMW). The ESCO 
purchase an additional 1.4981 MW of energy to meet the reliability requirement. 
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Similarly, contract type A and B are not favored because their prices are relatively higher than the 
prices for contract type C and D. Table 6-7 shows an additional case where the market price for contract type B 
during the 31" period is changed from $78.81/MW to S58.81/MW.-With the changed price for contract type B, 
this contract is eventually purchased to serve customer energy. 
Table 6-8 compares the results shown in Table 6-5 through Table 6-7. The increased profit is much 
higher for results in Table 6-7 because of the price drop for contract type B during the 31" period. 
Table 6-5. Contract purchasing schemes of the ESCO when no load management programs are available. 
Period Demand Contract type 
A B C D 
1 40 0 0 40.4211 0 
2 42 - — 42.4421 0 
3 68 - — 68.7158 0 
4 68 - - 68.7158 0 
5 42 - — 42.4421 0 
6 40 — 40.4211 0^ 
7 42 0 0 42-4421 0 
8 44 - — 44.4632 0 
9 68 - — 68.7158 0 
10 70 - — 70.7368 0 
11 43 - — 43.4526 0 
1 2 42 - 42.4421 0^ 
13 44 0 0 44.4632 0 
14 45 - — 45.4737 0 
15 70 - - 70.7368 0 
16 72 - - 72.7579 0 
17 46 — — 46.4842 0 
1 8 44 ::: ^ 44.4632 0_ 
19 45 0 0 45.4737 0 
20 46 - — 46.4842 0 
21 74 - — 74.7789 0 
22 72 — — 72.7579 0 
23 47 - — 47.4947 0 
2 4 44 ^ 44.4632 0_ 
25 46 0 0 46.4842 0 
26 48 - — 48.5053 0 
27 74 - - 74.7789 0 
28 76 — - 76.8000 0 
29 49 - - 49.5158 0 
3 0 50 - - 50.5263 g_ 
31 48 0 0 48.5053 0 
32 51 - - 51.5368 0 
33 77 - - 77.8105 0 
34 76 — — 76.8000 0 
35 50 - - 50.5263 0 
36 47 - — 47.4947 0 
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Table 6-6. Contract purchasing schemes of the ESCO when load management programs are available. 
Period Demand after Contract type 
scheduling A B C D 
I 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 
2 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 
3 66.4640 — — 67.0989 0 
4 63.9200 — — 64.4211 0 
5 43.8072 — — 44.3444 0 
6 41.7712 — — 42.2855 0 
7 43.4040 0 0 43.9200 0 
8 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 
9 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 
10 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 
11 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 
12 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 
13 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 
14 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 
15 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 
16 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 
17 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 
18 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 
19 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 
20 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 
21 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 
22 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 
23 48.9296 — — 49.5259 0 
24 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 
25 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 
26 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 
27 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 
28 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 
29 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 
30 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 
31 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 
32 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 
33 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 
34 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 
35 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 
36 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 
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Table 6-7. Control purchasing schemes when market price for contract type B at 31° period changed. 
Period Demand after Contract type 
scheduling A B C D 
1 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 
2 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 
3 66.4640 — — 67.0989 0 
4 63.9200 — — 64.4211 0 
5 43.8072 — — 44.3444 0 
6 41.7712 — — 42.2855 0 
7 43.4040 0 0 43.9200 0 
8 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 
9 68.0000 — — 68.7158 0 
10 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 
11 44.5540 — — 45.0884 0 
12 43.9320 — — 44.4758 0 
13 44.6300 0 0 45.1263 0 
14 45.0000 — — 45.4737 0 
15 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 
16 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 
17 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 
18 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 
19 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 
20 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 
21 73.4400 — — 74.1895 0 
22 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 
23 48.7088 — — 49.2935 0 
24 45.9544 — — 46.5204 0 
25 46.9320 0 0 47.4653 0 
26 48.2840 — — 48.8042 0 
27 69.5600 — — 70.1053 0 
28 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 
29 51.3652 — — 52.0055 0 
30 52.1900 — — 52.8316 0 
31 50.1900 0 50.2120 0 0 
32 52.9272 — — 2.2963 0 
33 74.2640 — — 23.6614 0 
34 75.1336 — — 24.6189 0 
35 51.8240 — — 1.1772 0 
36 48.6872 — — 0 0 
Table 6-8. Results of scheduling customer demand before and after using load management programs. 
Before load After load management programs 
management programs No price change contract type B prices are changed 
Cost of energy $131,989.61 $131,634.42 $128,131.55 
Revenue $186,820.00 $186,653.73 $186,605.92 
Profit $54,830.39 $54,946.05 $58,394.13 
Increased profit 0 $115.66 $356.37 
DLC customer benefits 0 $73.26 $80.24 
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CHAPTER 7 ESCO OPERATIONAL PLANNING ISSUES 
The examples presented in Chapter 6 illustrated the economic benefits of load management programs 
in an ESCO operation, and showed how market contracts may be selected to meet customer demand. These 
examples are important in establishing the fundamental operational structure of an ESCO, i.e., maximizing 
ESCO profit/cash flows. How the models and results described in Chapter 6 may be applied towards several 
ESCO operations and management is presented in this chapter. In section 7.1, various issues that an ESCO is 
interested in are presented. Section 7.2 through section 7.6 shows how the models and results described in 
Chapter 6 may be applied to address these various issues. Section 7.7 concludes this chapter by examining the 
limitations of using the scheduling customer demand model for decision making. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In section 2.4, an ESCO operation and management of an ESCO was classified into various stages. 
Each stage defines what an ESCO had to decide, along with the characteristics of various components that 
influence an ESCO decision. In this chapter, the operational conditions described in Chapter 6 are applied to an 
ESCO operating in a re-regulated environment. Consequently, various issues that the ESCO need to address by 
the ESCO. They include: 
• How should the ESCO react towards the changes in customer demand and market prices in the near term? 
This is a reactive scheduling/control issue as described in section 2.4.5. The changes in operating 
conditions and the ESCO's reactions are fiirther described in section 7.2. 
• Given the benefits of the DLC program, should the ESCO expand it? If yes, how should the ESCO expand 
the program? When the customer contracts are not alterable, this is a scheduling issue as described in 
section 2.4.4. The changes in operating conditions and the ESCO's reactions are further described in 
section 7.3. When the rebate schemes used to attract additional customers into the DLC program are 
alterable, this is short-range planning as described in section 2.4.3. The changes in operating conditions 
and the ESCO's reactions are further described in section 7.4. 
• Does the ESCO gain market shares and earn sufficient profits under existing rate structure? This is middle-
range planning as described in section 2.4.2. The changes in operating conditions and the ESCO reactions 
are further described in section 7.4. 
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• Should the ESCO utilize any energy storage system? Given the higher investment cost, this is long-range 
planning as described in section 2.4.1. The changes in operating conditions and the ESCO reactions are 
further described in section 7.5. 
The analysis described in this chapter assumes that all factors influencing the ESCO operation and 
management are deterministic. 
7.2 REACTIVE SCHEDULING/CONTROL 
The following changes in the market conditions will be investigated: 
• Prior to the beginning of the 1" period, the market prices for contract type C for the 3"^, 4"*, and S"* periods 
increase by 20% to S84.71, S84.72, and S69.76 per MW respectively. The ESCO's reactions are described 
in section 7.2.1. 
• Prior to the beginning of the I" period, customer demand during the 3"*, 4"*, and S"** periods increases by 
20% to 82.6 MW, 81.6 MW, and 50.4 MW respectively. The ESCO's reactions are described in section 
7.2.2. 
• Prior to the beginning of the 1" period, controllable demand type 2 during the 3"*, 4"', and 5"* periods 
increases by 20% to 0.1152 MW, 0.1224 MW, and 0.0792 MW respectively. The ESCO's reactions are 
described in section 7.2.3. 
7.2.1 Changes in the Market Prices 
Table 7-1 shows the changes in contract purchasing scheme given the changes in the customer 
demand. Table 7-2 shows the economic implications given the changes in the customer demand. Table 7-3 
shows the changes in the controllable demand control scheme given the changes in the customer demand. 
Due to the increases in market prices on contract type C from the 3"* period to the 5"* period, the 
combination of market contracts type A, C and D is preferred during the first 6 periods. The purchasing scheme 
for the I", 2"'*, and 6"" periods is affected because contract type A delivers energy for a duration of 6 periods, 
beginning with the 1" period. Even though only the market prices in the 1" month have changed, the changes in 
the purchasing scheme extend into the 2"'^ month. The energy contracts purchased to serve customer energy 
during the 7"' and 8"' period have decreased by 0.6063 and 1.0004 respectively. The change in the purchasing 
scheme is due to a change in the load management schedule. The market price increase in the three periods 
makes shifting the controllable demand at the beginning of the 3"* more desirable than shifting the controllable 
demand at the beginning of the 4"" period. Even though the total controlled duration is similar in both cases, the 
total rebate received by the customers, rendering controllable demand to the ESCO, increases when the market 
price changes because the total deferred controllable demand is higher when the market prices increase. 
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Table 7-1. Purchasing market contracts before and after changes in market prices. 
Period Before changes in the market prices After changes in the market prices 
Demand Contract type Demand Contract type 
after A B c D after A B c D 
scheduling scheduling 
1 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 40.0000 40.4211 0 0 0 
2 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 42.0000 — — 2.0211 0 
3 66.4640 — — 67.0989 0 64.1600 — — 0 23.7526 
4 63.9200 — — 64.4211 0 63.9200 — — 0 23.5052 
5 43.8072 — — 44.3444 0 44.1384 — — 0 4.1839 
6 41.7712 — — 42.2855 0 41.9800 — — 2.0842 0 
7 43.4040 0 0 43.9200 0 43.9800 0 0 44.5263 0 
8 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 45.7424 — — 46.2973 0 
9 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 
10 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 
11 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 
12 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 
13 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 
14 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 
15 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 
16 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 
17 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 
IS 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 
19 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 
20 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 
21 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 
22 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 
23 48.9296 — — 49.5259 0 48.9296 2— — 49.5259 0 
24 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 
25 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 
26 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 
27 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 
28 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 
29 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 
30 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 
31 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 
32 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 
33 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 
34 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 
35 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 
36 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 
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Table 7-2. Economic implications of the changes on the market prices. 
Before market price changes After market price changes 
Cost of energy $131,634.42 $132,343.56 
Revenue $186,653.73 $186,611.39 
Profit $54,946.05 $54,188.82 
Decreased profit 0 $757.23 
DLC customer benefits $73.26 $79.02 
Table 7-3. Controllable customer demand control scheme before and after changes in market prices. 
Controllable customer demand Number of customers scheduled 
Type Beginning Deferment Before changes After changes Net changes in 
control at period duration in market prices in market prices market prices 
1 3 2 24 24 0 
1 9 2 8 8 0 
1 10 1 16 16 0 
1 16 1 24 24 0 
1 21 2 24 24 0 
1 28 1 24 24 0 
1 34 1 24 24 0 
2 3 2 0 24 24 
2 4 1 24 0 -24 
2 10 1 24 24 0 
2 16 1 24 24 0 
2 22 1 24 24 0 
2 28 1 24 24 0 
2 33 1 24 24 0 
7.2.2 Changes in the Customer Demand 
Table 7-4 shows the changes in contract purchasing scheme given the changes in the customer 
demand. Table 7-5 shows the economic implications given the changes in the customer demand. Table 7-6 
shows the changes in the controllable demand control scheme given the changes in the customer demand. 
Due to the increase in the customer demand, additional energy contracts type C are purchased for the 
increased demand in the 3"*, 4"*, and 5"" period. Contracts type C purchased for the 3"*, 4"*", and 5"* period 
increases by 13.7432, 13.7432, and 8.4884 respectively. Since the market prices do not change, the ESCO does 
not change the type of contracts it purchases. The control scheme for controllable demand does not change for 
two reasons. First, the market prices do not change during the scheduling duration. Second, only contracts type 
C with 1 period of delivery duration are purchased in this example, a demand change in the 3"", 4"", and S"" 
period does not affect the purchasing scheme in other periods. Since serving customer demand at any period is 
always profitable in this example, an increase in customer demand increases the profit of serving the customer. 
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Table 7-4. Purchasing market contracts before and after changes in customer demand. 
Period Before changes in the market prices After changes in the market prices 
Demand Contract type Demand Contract type 
after A B c D after A B c D 
scheduling scheduling 
1 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 
2 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 
3 66.4640 — — 67.0989 0 80.0640 — — 80.8421 0 
4 63.9200 — — 64.4211 0 77.5200 — — 78.1642 0 
5 43.8072 — — 44.3444 0 52.2072 — — 52.8328 0 
6 41.7712 — — 42.2855 0 41.7712 — — 42.2855 0 
7 43.4040 0 0 43.9200 0 43.4040 0 0 43.9200 0 
8 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 
9 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 
10 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 
11 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 
12 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 
13 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 
14 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 
15 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 
16 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 
17 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 
18 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 
19 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 
20 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 
21 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 
22 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 
23 48.9296 — — 49.5259 0 48.9296 — — 49.5259 0 
24 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 
25 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 
26 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 
27 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 
28 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 
29 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 
30 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 
31 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 
32 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 
33 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 
34 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 
35 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 
36 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 
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Table 7-5. Economic implications of the changes in customer demand. 
Before market price changes After market price changes 
Cost of energy S131,634.42 $ 134,234.66 
Revenue $186,653.73 $ 190,207.92 
Profit $54,946.05 $ 55,934.34 
Increased profit 0 $ 1042.17 
DLC customer benefits $73.26 $38.92 
Table 7-6. Controllable customer demand control scheme before and after changes in customer demand. 
Controllable customer demand Number of customers scheduled 
Type Beginning control Deferment Before changes After changes in Net changes in 
at period duration in market prices market prices market prices 
1 3 2 24 24 0 
1 9 2 8 8 0 
1 10 1 16 16 0 
1 16 1 24 24 0 
1 21 24 24 0 
1 28 1 24 24 0 
1 34 1 24 24 0 
2 4 1 24 24 0 
2 10 1 24 24 0 
2 16 1 24 24 0 
2 22 1 24 24 0 
2 28 1 24 24 0 
2 33 1 24 24 0 
7.2.3 Changes in the controllable demand 
Table 7-7 shows the changes in the contract purchasing schemes given the changes in the controllable 
demand. Table 7-8 shows the economic implications given the changes in the controllable demand. Table 7-9 
shows the changes in the controllable demand control scheme given the changes in the controllable demand. 
In this example, increases in the controllable demand reduce the number of contracts type C purchased 
for the 4"* period by 0.5154 units, but increase the number of contracts type C purchased for the 5"", 6"*, and 7"' 
period by 0.1804, 0.2061, and 0.1288 units respectively. The changes in the purchasing scheme is due to the 
selected controlling scheme for the controllable customer demand type 2. Shown in Table 7-9, the selected 
control scheme defers 24 customers demand type 2 at the 4"* period for 1 period, and have these deferred 
demands paid back at 5"*, 6"*, 7*, and 8"* period. This control scheme, which does not vary with the 
modification in the controllable demand, results in the change in the purchasing scheme. 
Since the rebate system is proportionate to the amount of energy deferred, changes in the controllable 
demand increases the customer benefits for participating in the DLC prognmi. 
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Table 7-7. Purchasing market contracts before and after changes in controllable custonner demand. 
Period Before changes in market prices After changes in nnarket prices 
Demand Contract type Demand Contract type 
after A B c D after A B C D 
scheduling scheduling 
1 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 40.0000 0 0 40.4211 0 
2 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 42.0000 — — 42.4421 0 
3 66.4640 — — 67.0989 0 66.4640 — — 67.0989 0 
4 63.9200 — — 64.4211 0 63.4304 — — 63.9057 0 
5 43.8072 — — 44.3444 0 43.9786 — — 44.5248 0 
6 41.7712 — — 42.2855 0 41.9670 — — 42.4916 0 
7 43.4040 0 0 43.9200 0 43.5264 0 0 44.0488 0 
8 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 44.7920 — — 45.2968 0 
9 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 67.4720 — — 68.1600 0 
10 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 65.8000 — — 66.3158 0 
11 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 44.6564 — — 45.1962 0 
12 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 43.8960 — — 44.4379 0 
13 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 44.9020 0 0 45.4126 0 
14 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 45.2720 — — 45.7600 0 
15 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 70.0000 — — 70.7368 0 
16 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 67.9200 — — 68.4632 0 
17 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 47.5096 — — 48.0733 0 
18 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 45.8768 — — 46.4387 0 
19 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 45.6120 0 0 46.1179 0 
20 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 46.0000 — — 46.4842 0 
21 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 72.3200 — — 73.0105 0 
22 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 67.6800 — — 68.2105 0 
23 48.9296 — — 49.5259 0 48.9296 — — 49.5259 0 
24 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 45.8888 — — 46.4514 0 
25 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 47.5000 0 0 48.0632 0 
26 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 48.8520 — — 49.4021 0 
27 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 74.0000 — — 74.7789 0 
28 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 71.6800 — — 72.2526 0 
29 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 50.5984 — — 51.1983 0 
30 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 51.9872 — — 52.6181 0 
31 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 48.6480 0 0 49.1874 0 
32 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 51.0000 — — 51.5368 0 
33 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 74.2640 — — 74.9305 0 
34 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 75.1336 — — 75.8880 0 
35 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 51.8240 — — 52.4463 0 
36 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 48.6872 — — 49.2707 0 
Table 7-8. Economic imph'cations of the changes in controllable customer demand. 
Before market price changes After market pric«e changes 
Cost of energy 5131,634.42 5 132,308.'08 
Revenue $186,653.73 5 187,251-88 
Profit 554,946.05 5 54,948.82 
Increased profit 0 $2.77 
DLC customer benefits 573.26 574.48 
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Table 7-9. Controllable customer demand control scheme before and after changes in controllable demand. 
Controllable customer demand Number of customers scheduled 
Type Beginning control Deferment Before changes After changes in Net changes in 
at period duration in market prices market prices market prices 
1 3 2 24 24 0 
1 9 2 8 8 0 
1 10 1 16 16 0 
1 16 1 24 24 0 
1 21 24 24 0 
1 28 1 24 24 0 
1 34 1 24 24 0 
2 4 1 24 24 0 
2 10 1 24 24 0 
2 16 1 24 24 0 
2 22 1 24 24 0 
2 28 1 24 24 0 
2 33 1 24 24 0 
7.2.4 Remarks 
The scheduling models used in the analyses in section 7.2.1 through 7.2.3 use six months of data. 
However, the interested issue in section 7.2.1 through 7.2.3 is only the responses of an ESCO in a short period 
of time (less than a day), given the changes in the operating conditions. The purpose of using six months of 
data that is to show that purchasing and control schemes in the immediate days may be affected, as section 7.2.1 
shows, even when changes in the operating conditions occur only at the reactive scheduling/control level. It is 
also clear, from these examples, that the impact of changed operating conditions on the purchasing and control 
schemes in the future declines gradually. 
At the reactive scheduling/control level, knowing how to react promptly to the changes in operating 
conditions is important. In scheduling models, similar to those proposed in this research, the fewer variables 
there are in the models the faster one will be able to find an optimal decision. This corresponds to reducing the 
scheduling duration. However, the failure to consider operating conditions in the immediate future can prevent 
one from making a better decision. Unfortunately, finding an optimal scheduling duration can be difficult. For 
example, in section 7.2.1, the optimal scheduling duration would be 2 months, but, in section 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, 
the optimal scheduling duration would be only 1 month. 
7.3 SCHEDULING 
In the long run, an ESCO may not be certain if the DLC program can be profitable, as the market may 
react to lower the profitability of load management programs. However, the example presented shows that the 
DLC program is profitable, at least in the near future. In the scheduling level, the ESCO is assumed not to 
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change the variable rebate system. Instead, the ESCO is interested to know how much rebate should be given to 
the customers to encourage their participation in the DLC program for only one month. The general approach 
used to determine the optimal rebate is shown in Figure 7-1. 
STEP 1 Determine the marginal benefits of increasing the number of customers participating in 
the DLC program. 
STEP 2 Determine the marginal costs of offering fixed rebates to attract an additional number of 
customers to participate in the DLC program. 
STEP 3 Determine the marginal profits of acquiring additional controllable customer demand into 
the DLC program at the scheduling level. 
STEP 4 Determine the return on investment of acquiring additional controllable customer demand 
into the DLC program at the scheduling level. 
STEP 5 Select an optimal fixed rebate that provides the best return on investment or marginal 
profits to the ESCO. 
Figure 7-1. Determining an optimal fixed rebate for an ESCO. 
In section 7.3.1, the scheduling model is used to trace the marginal benefit of acquiring an additional 
customer to participate in the DLC program. In section 7.3.2, the ESCO uses the results in section 7.3.1 and 
studies on how customers respond to a given rebate to select an optimal rebate to attract the desired 
participation. Section 7.3.3 comments on the results. 
7.3.1 Tracing the Marginal Benefit of Acquiring Additional Customers 
In order to evaluate the optimal rebate to attract the desired customer participation in the DLC 
program, an ESCO needs to realize the marginal benefit of acquiring additional customers. The ESCO in this 
example has two types of customers participating in the DLC program. Using the original customer size in the 
DLC program as the base. Table 7-10 shows the marginal benefits of acquiring additional customers into the 
DLC program for the 1" month only. 
Even though the marginal benefits in Table 7-10 are obtained by solving the linear programming 
model, similar results can be obtained using parametric analysis. To use parametric analysis, g^ and g^ in 
(3.5), , Vy= 1:6, are changed to 24 + ^ 5 and 24+ >12 5 respectively. 
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Table 7-10. Marginal benefits of acquiring additional customers into the DLC program. 
Marginal benefits 
Additional number of customers type 2 acquired 
0 (A,=0) 5 (A,=l) 10 (A, =2) 15 (A, =3) 
Additional 0 (A, = 0) $0.00 $1.50 S3.01 $4.51 
number of 5 (A, = 1) $2.25 $3.75 $5.26 S6.76 
customers type 
10 (A, = 2) $4.50 $6.00 $7.51 $9.01 
1 acquired 
15 (A, = 3) $6.75 $8.25 $9.76 $11.26 
7.3.2 Finding an Optimal Rebate at the Scheduling Level 
Suppose that the ESCO has gathered information on the rebates the customers desire in order to 
participate in the DLC program under the terms described in Appendix A. This information is shown in Table 
7-11. Then, Table 7-12 shows the marginal cost of acquiring additional customers for the DLC program. Table 
7-13 shows the marginal profit of acquiring additional customers into the DLC program. Table 7-13 is the 
results of subtracting the marginal costs in Table 7-12 fi-om the marginal benefits in Table 7-10. Table 7-14 
shows the return on investment of acquiring additional customers into the DLC program. Table 7-14 is the 
result of dividing the marginal profits in Table 7-13 by the marginal costs in Table 7-12. 
Table 7-11. Rebates desired by customers in order to participate in the DLC program. 
Additional customers Per customer rebate desired Additional customers Per customer rebate 
type 1 desired by customer type 1 type 2 desired desired by customer type 2 
5 $0.10 5 $0.11 
10 $0.12 10 $0.14 
15 $0.24 15 $0.25 
Table 7-12. Marginal costs of acquiring additional customers into the DLC program. 
Marginal costs 
Additional number of customers type 2 acquired 
0 5 10 15 
Additional 0 $0.00 $0.55 $1.40 $3.75 
number of 5 $0.50 $1.05 $1.90 $4.25 
customers type 10 $1.20 $1.75 $2.60 $4.95 
1 acquired 15 $3.60 $4.15 $5.00 $7.35 
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Table 7-13. Marginal profits of acquiring additional customers into the DLC program. 
Additional number of customers type 2 acquired 
Marginal profits 0 5 10 15 
Additional 0 $0.00 S0.95 $1.61 $0.76 
number of 5 SI.75 S2.70 $3.36 S2.51 
customers type 10 S3.30 S4.25 $4.91 $4.06 
1 acquired 15 S3.15 S4.10 $4.76 $3.91 
Table 7-14. Return on investment of acquiring additional customers into the DLC program. 
Additional number of customers type 2 acquired 
Marginal profits 0 5 10 15 
Additional 0 
-
173.45% 114.86% 20.32% 
number of 5 350.01% 257.53% 176.74% 59.10% 
customers type 10 275.01% 243.09% 188.77% 82.06% 
1 acquired 15 87.50% 98.89% 95.16% 53.23% 
From Table 7-13, the maximiun profit that the ESCO can gain from acquiring additional customers 
into the DLC program for 1 month (l" month) is S4.91. If the ESCO has excess capital and does not have 
investment opportunities that provide a return on investment greater than 188.77%, to maximize profit at the 
scheduling level, the ESCO should attract an additional 10 customers type 1 and 10 customers type 2. 
However, if the ESCO has other investment opportunities or limited capital to invest, it should select one that is 
within the company budget and yet provides the best return on investment. This is an issue of capital budgeting 
and has been addressed in various financial management books like [59]. In this example, the main concern is 
to utilize the presented scheduling models to derive the desired information. Capital budgeting will be 
introduced in section 7.6. 
7.3.3 Remarks 
Assuming that the ESCO has decided to maximize marginal profit at the scheduling level. Table 7-15 
shows the contract purchasing schemes of the selected strategy. In this example, the market prices do not 
change when there is a change in the number of contracts purchased, i.e., the market prices do not react to the 
changes in the market conditions. For example, at the 3"* period, the number of contracts purchased has been 
reduced from 67.0989 contracts in the base to 65.28 contracts with the new addition of controllable demand. 
However, the market price for contract type C for the 3"* period remains at S70.59 per contract. 
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In reality, changes in the contract purchasing schemes of an ESCO may affect the market prices. This 
is especially true if more than one ESCO is simultaneously using the same strategy of acquiring additional 
customers to participate in the DLC program. Thus, to take into account of the possible change in market 
prices, an ESCO should discoimt the marginal profit in Table 7-13. 
Table 7-15. Contract purchasing schemes for different number of customers participating in the DLC program. 
Period 
Purchased contract type C 
Base case (24 customer type 1, 
24 customer type 2) 
Strategy 1 (34 customer type 1, 
34 customer type 2) 
I 40.4211 40.4211 
2 42.4421 42.4421 
3 67.0989 65.2800 
4 63.9057 63.8265 
5 44.5248 45.5387 
6 42.4916 43.3400 
7.4 SHORT-RANGE PLANNING 
At the short-range planning level, the process of determining an optimal rebate scheme to offer the 
customers participating in the DLC program is similar to the one presented in section 7.3. There are only three 
differences between the two processes. 
First, at the scheduling level, only a temporary rebate is considered; however, at the short-range 
planning level, the whole rebate scheme needs to be evaluated. For example, the impact of a temporary rebate 
is considered in section 7.3. However, at the short-range planning level, to determine an optimal rebate scheme, 
an ESCO should consider how the combination of fixed and variable rebates affect customer participation and 
profits of acquiring these controllable customers demands. 
Second, at the scheduling level, the customers who had participated in the DLC program will not 
receive any temporary rebate. However, at the short-range planning level, unless an ESCO can price 
discriminate customers offering the same controllable demand, any changes in the fixed and variable rebates 
will change the offering received by all customers of similar controllable demand pattern and contractual terms. 
Finally, at the scheduling level, the contract specifications most likely are not to be evaluated. 
However, at the short-range planning level, all contract specifications should be evaluated. For example, in the 
ESCO presented, the deferred duration of per controllable customer type 1 is 200 periods, but the deferred 
duration of controllable customer type 2 is only 144 periods, far less than the 200 periods agreed upon in the 
contracts. If the ESCO could have changed the contracted deferred duration of controllable customer type 2 
from 200 periods to 144 periods, the ESCO might have been able to lower the offered rebate scheme to the 
controllable customer type 2. Also, the ESCO may also determine if the contracted deferred duration of 
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controllable customer type 1 should be lengthened. In addition, the ESCO may also consider if the maximum 
deferred duration of 2 periods can be changed, and evaluate the cost-benefit of such changes. 
Since there are many evaluation choices, from the impact of fixed and variable rebate schemes to the 
impact of contract specifications, the time devoted to the analysis can be lengthy. For this reason, examples are 
not provided. Instead, Figure 7-2 shows the general approach to determining an optimal rebate schedule to 
attract customer participation in the DLC program. 
7.5 MIDDLE-RANGE PLANNING 
At the middle-range planning level, one of the ESCO's objectives is to determine an optimal tariff to 
offer customers under its service. The decision includes the detemiination of the fixed tariff, variable tariff, and 
offered ancillary services. The approaches shown in section 7.4 may be used to determine the optimal tariff to 
be offered to the customers. 
STEP 1 Determine the factors influencing customer participation in the DLC program that an 
ESCO may decide on. These include (1) fixed rebate (2) variable rebate and (3) 
contractual terms. Select the potential variations (different rebate schemes or contractual 
terms) that the ESCO wish to analyze. 
STEP 2 For each of these variations, use the scheduling model to determine the benefits of such 
variations. 
STEP 3 Determine the costs of offering the rebate scheme. 
STEP 4 Determine the profits for each of these variation. 
STEP 5 Determine the return on investment for each of these variations. 
STEP 6 Select an optimal rebate scheme that provides the best return on investment or profits to 
the ESCO, depending on the restrictions on investment choices and capital expendimre. 
Figure 7-2. Determining an optimal rebate scheme for an ESCO. 
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7.6 LONG-RANGE PLANNING 
The ESCO, shown in chapter 6, does not own any energy storage systems. Since the capital 
requirements for energy storage systems are higher than the capital requirements for the DLC programs, 
decision-making on the installation of energy storage system is considered as a long-range planning. There are 
numerous energy storage systems that an ESCO can select to serve its purpose. 
To evaluate the benefit of installing an energy storage system, the concepts of capital budgeting are 
used. Capital budgeting is a process of planning expenditures on assets whose cash flows are expected to 
extend beyond one year [59]. The cash flows impacts of installing an energy storage system can evaluated 
using: (1) net present value (NPV), which evaluates the present value of future net cash flows, and (2) internal 
rate of return (IRR), which evaluates the discount rate that equates the present value of future cash inflows to 
the project cost. Other evaluation techniques for capital budgeting can be found in [59]. 
In this research, the full impact (including the cost of installation, cost of interest, salvage value, etc.) 
of installing ESS is not evaluated. Instead, the scheduling customer demand model is used to evaluate the 
operating cash flows impact of the pump-hydro storage system (PHSS). Section 7.6.1 shows the impact on the 
revenue flow and cost of energy flow of installing PHSS. Section 7.6.2 comments on the result. 
7.6.1 The Impact on the Revenue and Cost of Energy Flow 
Since PHSS does not change the customer demand profile, there is no revenue flow impact fj-om the 
installation of PHSS. However, the utilization of PHSS changes the contract purchasing scheme. As a result, 
there is impact on the cost of energy flow. Table 7-16 shows the cost of purchasing energy contracts before and 
after scheduling the PHSS. The cost of energy impact is the difference between the cost of energy before and 
after the installation of the PHSS. 
7.6.2 Remarks 
The scheduling model has been used to estimate the impact on the operating cash flows. However, the 
impact on the operating cash flows is only one of the few to be considered in capital budgeting. To name a few, 
the cost of installing PHSS and the interest payments, if capital is raised to install PHSS. 
To decide if the ESCO should invest in the PHSS, other long-range investment opportunities should be 
evaluated as well. These include other energy storage systems such as battery energy storage systems. In 
addition, the risk of these investments should be considered, including the stand-alone risk and corporate risk. 
Stand-alone risk is measured by the variability of an investment's expected return. Corporate risk is measured 
by the investment's effect on uncertainty about the ESCO's future earnings [59]. 
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Table 7-16. The cost of energy flow resulted from installing the PHSS. 
Period Before installing PHSS After installing PHSS Impact of PHSS 
I 2,222.35 2,280.22 57.87 
2 2,425.99 2,449.16 23. w 
3 4,736.51 4,587.90 -148.61 
4 4,511.74 4,437.43 -74.32 
5 2,588.23 2,611.04 22.81 
6 2,374.86 2,433.69 58.83 
7 2,546.02 2,606.87 60.84 
8 2,710.56 2,710.56 0 
9 4,814.14 4,739.79 -74.35 
10 4,772.08 4,696.34 -75.75 
11 2,684.65 2,707.97 23.31 
12 2,584.51 2,645.73 61.22 
13 2,722.49 2,785.59 63.11 
14 2,790.44 2,790.44 0 
15 5,095.88 5,020.05 -75.83 
16 5,022.46 4,945.24 -77.22 
17 2,995.93 2,995.93 0 
18 2,802.11 2,865.63 63.52 
19 2,835.33 2,900.04 64.72 
20 2,887.60 2,903.11 15.51 
21 5,445.86 5,367.34 -78.52 
22 4,999.83 4,946.36 -53.47 
23 3,145.39 3,145.39 0 
24 2,809.84 2,873.52 63.67 
25 3,016.92 3,083.00 66.07 
26 3,183.47 3,183.47 0 
27 5,633.10 5,563.26 -69.84 
28 5,525.16 5,444.66 -80.49 
29 3,360.15 3,360.15 0 
30 3,484.90 3,484.90 0 
31 3,158.32 3,225.91 67.59 
32 3,483.89 3,483.89 0 
33 5,815.36 5,746.03 -69.33 
34 5,830.48 5,830.48 0 
35 3,495.55 3,515.13 19.59 
36 3,115.39 3,248.50 133.12 
7.7 ADDITIONAL REMARKS 
The main purpose of this chapter is to show how the scheduling model can be used in the ESCO 
operation and management. The examples presented have been simplified to show the focus at each operational 
level. 
There are limitations on using the techniques presented to assist the ESCO decision-making. First, 
assumptions are needed to simplify the problems so as to make the stated problems solvable. These 
assumptions may result in decisions that do not optimally achieve the goals of the stated problems. Second, at 
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most planning levels, there are many ways that the ESCO can have think of to maximize its goal. The 
scheduling model only evaluates the benefits of the given strategies. To maximize its goals, an ESCO would 
still need to be creative and efficient in bringing in new ideas. Third, the scheduling model presented so far has 
used linear programming and assumed all information is deterministic. The model is not able to capture the 
effects of uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, the presented technical analyses provide valuable information that an ESCO may use in 
decision-making. 
CHAPTER 8 RISK MANAGEMENT AND ESCO 
In Chapter 6 and 7, deterministic information is assumed in the analysis. However, Chapter 2 suggests 
that factors influencing ESCO operation can be uncertain. To provide a better analysis, the uncertain 
characteristic should be included in the analyses. Throughout this chapter, the risk management tools presented 
in Chapter 5 are used to complement the analyses presented so far. Section 8.1 shows the basic scheduling 
model where risk management tools will be applied. Section 8.2 through section 8.6 applies the risk 
management tools to analyze the model presented in section 8.1. Section 8.8 concludes this chapter by 
discussion the results in general. 
8.1 BASIC ESCO SCHEDULING MODEL 
There are three periods in the scheduling model. The expected values of the information are similar to 
those shown in Chapters 6 and 7 from the 5"* period to the 7"* period. There are several exceptions that 
differentiate this model from those presented in Chapters 6 and 7. First, instead of considering 36 periods as in 
Chapters 6 and 7, this model only considers 3 periods in the analyses to provide better insight into the 
differences among the risk management tools. Second, any load management choices that do not defer or pay 
back demand completely during the three periods are not considered in the analysis. For example, demand 
deferment choice that is initiated in the 6"* period and paid back in the 7"* and 8"" periods will not be considered. 
Third, energy contracts that deliver energj' for 1 month are not considered in the analysis. Only energy 
contracts that deliver energy for 1 period will be considered. 
The profit-based model, presented using expected value, is shown in (8.1). It is derived using 
equations in Chapter 3 and 4. The objective function in (8.1) is derived using (4.7). The first 3 constraints are 
derived using (4.20). The 4"" through 6* constraints are derived using (4.23). The 7"* through constraints are 
derived using (4.24). Since the contract duration is only 1 period for all contracts traded, (4.25) is not used in 
this example. The lO"" through 12"' constraints are derived using (4.26). Since contract duration is only 1 
period for all contracts traded, EX^,i is set to 0 for all j. The 13"' through 15"' constraints are derived using 
(4.26). The 7"" through 12"* constraints can be simplified with 3 constraints by requiring the right-side equations 
of the 7"* through 9* constraints to be smaller than or equal to 0. These changes are reflected in (8.2). The last 
constraint is derived using (3.5). 
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max 
subject to: 
'Z'-jTEj -r, 
TE, -x,_s,Ed,_, + 
its! 
TE, + < t(l + Pt' 
*«I 
r£, + X,^,< t (1 + PV h'"*-"' 
r£3 -t(i-=^ 5^  - A" 
ifcsl 
•TE, +x,^,A,^.u^^u =-^6^ - A" 
k^\ 
TE, +x.,,A,^.,,£tf,^ -i(n-^;-'h'"'''' =^7^ 
EXl, - £^ 5- = re, - x,^ ,£c/.^  + -Ps" - i 
it>{ 
EXl, -EXl, =TE, + X ,^,A,^,,.£^.4 +/'6" 
fc»l 
2 
£^- -£X;, =r£, +X,^,A,^.,,£^/,^ +/r 
= 0  
Ex;,=o 
Ex;^ =0 
r£s(l-a^)-x,3,£rf,^(l-af°)^ t(l-«f' h'"*''' 
r£, (l - af)+ x,^, A,^,, £i/,^ (1 - af) < t (l - or,® ' K'"' 
r£, (1 - af)+ X, J, ;i,^.,, £tf(1 - af )< t (1 - a]' h'"*'''* 
x,^,<100 (8.1) 
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max Y.^jTEj -r, j-s y«5*=i 
subject to: 
TE, - < t (l + Pi' 
ifc-1 
k=\ 
kMl 
TE,-x,_,,Ed,^ =Pi-Pf 
k'l 
TE, =P:-P,-
k^\ 
TE, + -1 (l + PV - Pi 
k^i 
TE, +P,--tPs'''-'' ^0 
fcsl 
k^\ 
k^\ 
TE,[\-al')-x,,,Ed,_,(\-al^)<±(\-al'y--'^ 
k^\ 
r£,{l -af )+x,j,A,^,,£rf,^(l -af )< t(l -a'-'h'"'-''* 
k^\ 
TE, (l - af )+ x,^,X,^,.Ed,^ (l - af )< t (l - al' h'""''* 
k=\ 
x^Js^ ^ 100 (8.2) 
Since there is only one control choice in this example, the only control, jc,^,, should be smaller than or 
equal to the maximum controllable units. 
Table 8-1 shows the values of all parameters in (8.2). These values are similar to those in Chapter 6 
and Appendix A. They are re-posted here for clarity. The standard deviations and correlation of all uncertain 
parameters are shown in Appendix B. Section 8.1.1 shows the results of solving (8.2) using the expected values 
of the uncertain parameters. 
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Table 8-1. Parameters used in (8.2). 
Factor Description Variable name Value Remark 
variable tariff rjJ = 5, 6,7 S90/ MW-period determinisnc 
fixed tariff — — — 
TE^ 42 MW uncertain 
Customer 
demand 
Ot 
( 
40 MW uncertain 
TEj • 42 MW uncertain 
reliability af ,/ = 5. 6,7 0.04 deterministic 
decision — — — 
variables 
S59.40/MW-period uncertain 
S66.28/MW-period uncertain 
$58.16/MW-period uncertain 
price of energy $64.89/MW-period uncertain 
$59.95/MW-period uncertain 
$66.89/MW-period uncertain 
Market reliability a, ,  a(  \ j  = 5,  6, 7 0.05 uncertain 
^2. ' .y= 5, 6, 7 0.03 uncertain 
variability A. A'-'J = 5, 6, 7 0.05 deterministic 
A., yS/'J = 5,6,7 0.10 deterministic 
contract duration — 1 period — 
decision 
variables 
pM j = s ,6,l 
k= 1,2 
to be 
determined 
variable rebate r;,y = 5, 6,7 $2.50/MW deferred deterministic 
fixed rebate — 0 — 
Supplementar 
deferrable 
demand 
Ed,, 0.044 MW/unit uncertain 
y 
energy reliability 
decision variable 
af ,7 = 5, 6,7 
^ij.i 
0.03 deterministic 
to be 
determined 
8.1.1 Solving (8.2) using the Expected Values 
Even though the expected values used in this chapter are similar to those used in the ESCO analysis in 
Chapter 6 and 7, the size of the problem and the number of decision variables are different. Table 8-2 shows 
the results of solving (8.2) and compares to the results in section 6.4. 
The expected profit of serving customer demand during the 3 periods is $3,743.65. The cost of 
purchasing energy contracts is $7,416.35 and the revenue of serving customer demands is $11,160.00. Contract 
type C is purchased to meet customer demand. In both cases, scheduling 3 periods or 36 periods, no contract 
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type D is purchased because it is not cost effective. Even though no demand is deferred at the 5'*' period in both 
cases, the contracts purchased during the three periods, fix)m the 5"" to the 7"" period, are higher in section 6.4. 
More contracts are purchased in section 6.4 because some controllable customer demands during the 3"* and 4'*' 
period have been deferred to the 5"", e"*, and 1^ period. 
Table 8-2. Results from solving (8.2) using expected values. 
Variable Solving (8.2) Results from section 6.4 
42.4421 44.3444 
p\az.h 0 0 
40.4211 42.2855 
0 0 
plMl.fll 42.4421 43.9200 
0 0 
0 0 
Before proceeding to analyzing (8.2) using risk management tools presented in Chapter 5, there are 
two important results that should be emphasized. 
• No controllable customer demand is deferred during the 5"" period. 
• No contract type D is purchased to serve customer demand. 
Controllable customer demand and contract type D are not scheduled in this example because they are not cost 
effective. 
8.1.2 Remarks 
The time horizon in (8.2) is approximately I month in the future. Based on the discussion in Chapter 
2, the analysis can either be considered as a short-range planning level or scheduling level of an ESCO 
operation. Since I have assumed the rate structure and rebate strucmre to load management programs to be 
parametric and deterministic, (8.2) is analyzed as a scheduling level problem to reduce the size of uncertain 
parameters. Even though only a scheduling level problem is considered in this chapter, the presented examples 
may be extended to analyze other ESCO operational plaiming level problems. 
The reliability level requested by the customers is 97%. However, the purchased contracts have 
reliability level of 95%. To provide the desired reliability level to the customers, results recommend additional 
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purchased of energy contracts. However, will purchasing additional contracts of lower reliability level 
sufficient in compensating contracts of higher reliability level? 
For example, assuming that there is a request for 90% reliability for a customer demand of 5 MW. 
Two contract choices, with X of 90% and Y of 80% reliability, are available. Using (4.26), the minimum 
contracts to be purchased using contract X is contracts and using contract Y is 5.625^=^^'^)^ J 
contracts. The probabilistic mass fiinctions and cumulative mass fimcnons, determining using convolution 
technique, of either purchasing contract X or contract Y are shown in Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2 respectively. 
Clearly, the probabilistic mass fimctions or cumulative mass functions of purchasing 5.0 MW of contract X and 
purchasing 5.625 MW of contract Y are dififerent. However, at 90% confidence level, approximately 4.2 MW 
of energy will be delivered under contract X or contract Y. Therefore, (4.26) does approximate the required 
reliability level needed to serve the customer demand. 
0.2 
0.18 
Purchasing contract X 
Purchasing contract Y 0.1B 
0.14 
0.12 
CQ 0.1 
o 
CL 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0 2 3 1 5 6 4 
Energy served 
Figure 8-1. Probabilistic mass functions of purchasing contract X and contract Y. 
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1.4 
1.2 
•e 0.8 
<D 
S 0.6 3 
E 
3 
o 
0.4 
0.2 
1 1 I 1 1 
Purchasing contract X 
Purchasing contract Y \\ 
\\ 
* 
- V 
» 1 vv 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Energy served 
Figure 8-2. Cumulative probabilistic mass functions of purchasing contract X and contract Y. 
8.1.3 Prelude to utilizing Risk Management Tools 
In section 8.1.1, (8.2) is solved by assuming that the parameters are all deterministic so that the 
expected value of the uncertain parameters can be used in the analysis. Because all parameters are 
deterministic, three important costs associated with uncertainty are not considered. First is the cost of not 
serving the customer demand (ENS). Second is the cost of not purchasing sufficient reliability from the market 
to meet customer request. Third is the cost of demand exceeding the contract variability level. 
The cost of ENS and cost of not purchasing sufficient reliability is shown in (8.3). 
CMS,=r^ TEj (l - af )- ED J (l - af)+ EPj (l - af)+ESj (l - af)- ER, (l - af )- £ S. (l" 
(8.3) 
r" is the per unit energy penalty cost when the customer demand is not equivalent to the purchased 
energy. Ideally, r' should be a nonlinear fimction of the difference between the purchased energy and the 
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customer demand. Prior to determining r', there are two two issues that need to be addressed. First, when the 
purchased energy exceeds the customer demand, what cost does the ESCO bear? Second, when the customer 
demand exceeds the purchased energy, how should the ESCO be penalized? To address the two issues, the 
following assumptions are made. 
When there is an excess energy (purchased energy exceeds the customer demand,) the ESCO loses the 
opportunity to sell that energy. When there is a shortage energy (customer demand exceeds the purchased 
energy), the ESCO suffers the opportimity cost to serve customer demand and that the customers may refuse 
fumre services from the ESCO. The opportimity cost to serve customer demand is the rate that the customers 
will pay if there is no shortage in energy.The opportunity cost that the customers may refuse fiimre services 
is the expected cost of customers refusing the ESCO services. This opportunity cost will be a monotonically 
increasing function of the increased shortage in energy served. 
To preserve the linearity of the objective function, r * is assumed to be S30/MW-period, the average 
profit margin of serving customer demand during off-peak periods. This deterministic and constant r' is used 
in sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis, mean-variance analysis, fuzzy linear programming, and 
stochastic linear programming. However, when VaR analysis is conducted, the linearity of r* is relaxed 
because VaR analysis provides greater flexibility when the financial risks are evaluated. The relaxation on r" 
will be presented in section 8.6 when VaR analysis is conducted. 
Equation (8.4) shows the modified objective function after including (8.3) into the objective function 
of (8.2). The addition of r" in (8.4) does not affect the solution. Similar results as shown in Table 8-2 are 
found when (8.4) is used as the objective function. 
y=5 
-ttipr'r-'' (8-4) 
" This opportunity cost can be measured in various ways. First is the average cost of energy when there is an excess 
energy. Second is the opportunity cost of excess energy, assuming that the ESCO could have sold the excess energy at 
discount. The opportunity cost of excess comes in two forms, one is the average rate that the ESCO may receive, the other 
one is a decreasing function of the excess rate (assuming that the ESCO will sell the excess energy first to buyers offering 
the highest discount rate.) 
The rate can come in two forms. First is a monotonically increasing function, assuming that the customers paying higher 
rate will be served first. Second is an average of what the customer pay for the energy services, assuming that any 
additional energy will be partitioned equally to serve the customers. 
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The cost of demand exceeding the contract variability level is not considered in this research except 
when FaR analysis is conducted. Additional comments will be presented in section 8.6 when FaJt analysis is 
applied. 
When risk management tools are used for analysis, (8.4) is assumed to be the objective function. 
8.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis is presented in section 8.2.1. Parametric analysis is presented in section 8.2.2. 
Section 8.2.3 comments on the applicability of sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis in the stated 
problem. 
S.2.J Sensitivity Analysis 
There are several sensitivity analyses that can be conducted on (8.2). In this section, sensitivity 
analysis is used to analyze when should the ESCO in this example should purchase contract type D instead of 
contract type C. Table 8-3 shows how much should the price of contract type D drop before they will be 
considered. For example, to favor contract type D at the 5"" period, the price of contract type D at that period 
should drop from S66.28/MW-period to S60.65/MW-period. Since contract type D has a higher quality, 
providing higher reliability and allowing higher volatility in demsuid, there is still a price difference between 
contract type C and D. For example, the desired price of contract type D at the 5"* period is still S1.25/MW-
period higher than that of contract type C. 
Table 8-3. Desired price drop in contract type D. 
Period Contract type C Contract type D Desired price drop Desired price of 
Variable Original Variable Original in contract type D contract type D 
name price name price before purchase should be lower than 
5 $59.40/MW- pXjXj.Pz S66.28/MW- S5.63/MW-period S60.65/MW-period 
period period 
6 $58.16/MW- pU'l-Pl S64.89/MW- S5.51/MW-period S59.38/MW-period 
period period 
7 
^6 S59.95/MW- S66.89/MW- S5.68/MW-period S61.21/MW-period 
period period 
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8.2.2 Parametric Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis provides only the desired price change in contract type D at a particular period. 
The effect of a simultaneous change in the market price is not considered. To consider simultaneous change in 
the market price, parametric analysis is used. To analyze the changes in the market prices, the direction of 
perturbation needs first to be determined. 
In this section, two directions of perturbation are considered. First, the standard deviations of the 
market prices are used as the direction of perturbation. Equation (8.5) shows the market prices after including 
±e direction of perturbation. Table 8-5 shows the results of using the standard deviations as the direction of 
perturbation. As A increases, the purchasing scheme changes. When A > 3.3565, DLC program becomes 
desirable and all controllable customer demand at the 5"' period is deferred. 
^^1^1 .fix 
"59.40" '3' 
66.28 2 
p\xt\.p\ 
^6 
= 
58.16 
64.89 
+ A 
2 
3 
59.95 2 
.7 66.89 3_ 
However, using the standard deviations as the direction of perturbation ignores the effect of correlation 
between the market prices. To consider the correlation effect, (5.15) is used to derive the uncertain market 
prices. Equation (8.6) shows the uncertain market prices as a function of a set of unifomily distributed 
probabilistic numbers using (5.15). /j, through are randomly generated numbers from a uniformly 
distributed probabilistic function with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Replacing these random 
numbers by , the degree of perturbation, (8.7) shows the changes. Table 8-5 shows the results of using (8.7) 
as the direction of perturbation. 
'59.40' '-0.9314 0.1788 0.1904 -0.7329 -2.1565 1.7059' 
66.28 0.6125 -0.0265 -0.1370 -0.5445 -1.3510 1.2181 
58.16 -0.1571 -0.7986 -0.1462 1.2713 0.0300 1.3035 
64.89 
-f-
0.3257 0.8967 0.3707 1.6712 0.5236 2.2103 "4 
59.95 -0.2040 0.4974 -0.2883 -0.5883 1.1385 1.4091 "s 
66.89 0.1640 -0.8912 0.3531 -1.7309 1.5537 1.6261 
-"6 
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•59.40" -0.9314 0.1788 0.1904 -0.7329 -2.1565 1.7059' 'k 
66.28 0.6125 -0.0265 -0.1370 -0.5445 -1.3510 1.2181 X 
58.16 -0.1571 -0.7986 -0.1462 1.2713 0.0300 1.3035 k 
64.89 0.3257 0.8967 0.3707 1.6712 0.5236 2.2103 A 
59.95 -0.2040 0.4974 -0.2883 -0-5883 1.1385 1.4091 k 
66.89 0.1640 -0.8912 0.3531 -1.7309 1.5537 1.6261 k 
59.40 -l.llll 
66.28 -0.2283 
58.16 
64.89 
+ A 1.5030 
5.9982 
59.95 1.9643 
66.89 1.0748 
8.2.3 Remarks to Sensitivity Analysis and Parametric Analysis 
The uncertain customer demand, controllable customer demand, and delivered reliability level are not 
considered in sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis. The two approaches do not accommodate these 
uncertainties well. For example, to consider the uncertain delivered reliability level, simultaneous changes in 
the objective fimction and the constraint matrix are required. Parametric analysis is not applicable when 
changes in the constraint matrix are required. Sensitivity analysis is not effective because the numbers of 
changes required is considerable high (six in the objective function and six in the constraint matrix). 
Table 8-4. Using the standard deviation of market prices as the direction of perturbation. 
X 
Variable 0<A<3.3565 3.3565 < A <5.295 5.295 < A <6.28 A >6.28 
-fix 42.4421 41.3639 21.0000 0 
pi-"! -fil 0 0 19.9440 40.9440 
p^-"^ -A 40.4211 40.8523 40.8523 40.8523 
0 0 0 0 
pi-") -A 42.4421 43.0351 43.0351 43.0351 
p\ji2-h 0 0 0 0 
0 24.0000 24.0000 24.0000 
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Table 8-5. Using (8.7) as the direction of perturbation. 
A 
Variable 0<A<6.1 6.1<A<6.9 6.9</l<7.1 7.1<A<9.5 9.5<A<17.9 
42.4421 42.4421 42.4421 42.4421 42.4421 
pl-ai.fiz 
•Ts 0 0 0 0 0 
40.4211 40.4211 40.0000 40.0000 40.4211 
0 0 0.4124 0.4124 0 
pljzi.Px 42.4421 21.0000 1.0000 0 0 
plju.p. 0 21.0000 40.5876 41.5876 42.0000 
•'•1.5.1 0 0 0 0 0 
8.3 FUZZY LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
Section 8.3.1 applies the approach developed by Zimmerman et al. Section 8.3.2 applies the approach 
developed by Tanaka et al. Section 8.3.3 comments on the applicability of both approaches in the stated 
problem. 
8.3.1 Approach 1 to Fuzzy Linear Programming [53] 
Instead of trying to consider the impact of the uncertain parameters, the ESCO has leamt that buying 
additional 10% of energy and using only 90% of the controllable demand are the safest ways to guard against 
not buying sufficient energy to serve the customers. However, the word, safest, is fuzzy. The flizziness in the 
operating conditions can be described using (5.21). The flizziness changes the 1" through the 3"* constraints and 
the 1'^ through the 13"" constraints in (8.2). For example, the flizziness in the 1" constraint is shown in (8.8), the 
flizziness in the T"* constraint is shown in (8.9), and the flizziness in the 13"' constraint is shown in (8.10). 
The objective function (8.4) is assumed crisp. The fuzzy set of the crisp objective function is 
determined using (5.26), (5.27), and (5.28). The fuzzy set of the objective function (8.4) is shown in (8.11) 
using (5.26), where the sup f and inf f are determined in (8.13) and (8.14) respectively using (5.27) and 
S(Rj S(R) 
(5.28). Using (8.13) and (8.14), sup f is 3743.65 and inf f is 2705.47. 
S(R) S(RJ 
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kM 
I — 
i f T E , - i ( l + A ' ' h ' " " ' ' '  ^ - ^ - 2  
k*\ 
TE, -x,^,Ed,_, -i(l + A''h'-""''* +4.2 
4.2 
i f -A .2<TE,  +  < 0  
ifcsl 
i f  TE ,  - x ^ j  iEd^ j  - X (l + A' ' > 0 
(8.8) 
fil *1^.1 •A k^l 
I — 
if 7^5(1 -af )-x,^.,£-J,^(l -^5^)- i (1 -flrl-'H'-"*^ 0 
k^\ 
r£5(l-a|^)-x,^.,£rf,^(l-a3^)-|;(l-a5.')p5'-«'-A+4.20 
4.2 
if 0 < r55(l-a|^)-x,j.,£^,^(l-as^)-1 (1 +4.2 < 4.2 
*=i 
c r  £ 5 ( l 1  ( l  - c r l - ' H ' " " * - ' ' *  >  4 . 2  
j_^L3J__22. 
10 
'/ •^ ij.i-90<0 
i/0<x,j ,-90<10 
if x,jj -90 > 10 
(8.9) 
(8.10) 
where 
-"cW= 
c fx - in f  f  
if cf x> sup f 
S ( R t  
1 -
S ( R )  f . f . if inf f<c^x<supf 
s u p  f  —  m f  f  s f s j  s f R j  
S ( R )  S ( R )  
if c x< inf f 
S ( R )  
c^x 
j-s y=5*.i 
(8.11) 
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~^6 ))"'"'^u.u('7 'vll )) '5 •^'5*(^~'^3^)~'rs] (8-12) 
-^u.l 
With the transformed objective function, the fuzzy linear programming model of (8.4) using (5.29) is 
shown in (8.15). Table 8-6 shows the results of solving (8.15). 
supf = max t(r,-r;(l-af))rr, 
S(R)  j^S  
subject to: 
km\ 
TE, + <  t  (1 +  Pt' 
i f c « l  
k^\ 
TE,-x,^,Ed,^-t^-PVYs"'-'' =P:-Pf 
k^l 
TE, -t(i-A'-'h'""''* -p: -Pi 
k^l 
+ I'? =^7 — Pj 
k-l 
TE,-x,_,,Ed,^+Pi-tPs^'-^' ^0 
k^l 
U.M Ed^^ +  A "  - t ^ 6 S O  
TE, +x,_, , X , _ , , . E d , _ ,  + P i  - f  < 0  
i=I 
7^ 5 (1 - af ) - x,^ , Ed,_, (1 - af) < t (1 - af' h'"'''' 
ifc«l 
r£,(l-af)+x,^,A.^,,Erf,^(l-af)<t(l-a^'>'r''' 
x,^., <100 (8.13) 
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inff = max £(r. -r;(l-af )>"£, 
S<R) J=s y-5*-l 
TE, -x,^,Ed,, -4.2 
ifc»t 
TE, < i ( l  +  / ? f ' - 4 . 0  
— X —4.2 i=l 
- i (l - A'-' h'- Pf k'*l 
TE^ +X|j|A,j|,£(i,j — X(^—•''7 —•^7 
*=i 
TE, -x,^,Ed,^ +P- -XPs"""' ^-4.2 
t=i 
U.I.I + A' -1 6^"* ''* ^-4.0 
r£, +p; <-4.2 
iksi 
r£,(l-af)-x.^,£rf,^(l-af)<t(l-afh'-"'-^' -4.2 
k^\ 
(l - af ) + X,J, A,J,, £•</, J (l - af) < X (l - «*' K*'"' - 4-0 
ifcsl 
lOA+jr,j, <100 (8.14) 
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max A 
subject to: 
sup f - inf f +c^x< sup f 
yS(Rl  S(I t )  y  S(R)  
4.2A + r£s + 
k'\ 
4.0A + r£, <t^ + 
k^l 
4.2A + TE, + x,^,A,^.,^£-^/,^ < t (l + Pi' 
k'^X 
TE, -x,,,Ed,^ =Ps -Pf 
k'l 
TE, -t(l-A'-'h'""''' =P: -P.~ 
k^\ 
TE, +x,^,A,3.,,£t/,^ + =-^7^ -/V 
A.2X + TE, -x,^,Ed,^ +Pj- ^0 
4.0A + 7-E, +x,^,A,^,,£rf,^ + P^'" t ^ 6^0 
T 
4.2A + TE^ + ,A,^ + P,' " £ ^ 0 
4.2A + TE, (l -af)- x,^,Ed,^ (l - af )< t (l - al' h'"' 
4.0A + TE, (l - af )+x,^,A,^,,Ed,^ (l - )^ I (l - orf h'"' 
ik-1 
4.2A + TE, (l -af)+x,^,,A,^,^£^/,^(l -af )< i(l -ctj"' 
x,j., <100 
0 < A < I  ( 8 . 1 5 )  
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Table 8-6. Results after solving (8.15). 
Variable Value 
^'•"1 -A 8.40 
37.80 
-A 8.00 
pUxz.Pz 36.00 
pijii.Pi 8.40 
pljai.02. 37.80 
0 
I 
The contract purchasing scheme in Table 8-6 results in an expected profit of S2705.47 when evaluated 
using the objective function of (8.1). Compared to the expected profit resulted from the contract purchasing 
scheme in Table 8-2, $3743.65, the profit has dropped 27.73%. The drop in expected profit, however, 
guarantees the highest satisfaction of criteria, safest in this example. 
The formulation in (8.15) implicitly accounts for the uncertainties in the customer demand, 
controllable demand, and contract reliability. The uncertainties in the market prices for energy are not included 
in the analysis. The trade off between the profit of serving customer demand and risk (the uncertainties in the 
operating conditions) is formulated in the first constraining equation in (8.15). However, since the objective 
function of (8.15) is to determine the highest possible satisfaction of criteria, solution reached in this example 
does not guarantee the desired trade off between profit and risk. The only restriction on A. in (8.15) is the last 
constraining equation. If the last constraining equation in (8.15) is removed, the solution will be unbounded and 
suggests unlimited purchase of energy contracts. 
8.3.2 Approach 2 to Fuzzy Linear Programming [54] 
In the approach by Tanaka et al, the uncertainties in meirket prices, contract reliability, customer 
demand and controllable customer demand are described by triangle-shaped fiizzy numbers. The centers of the 
fiizzy numbers, in this example, are described by the expected values of the uncertain parameters while the 
widths are described by the standard deviation of the uncertain parameters multiplied by 1.65. The reason for 
multiplying the standard deviation by 1.65 is that the number provides 95% confidence level when the uncertain 
parameter is described by a normally distributed probabilistic distribution function. For example, shown in 
Figure 8-3 is the fuzzy number that describes TE^ (42,3.3). 
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Table 8-7 shows the fuzzy numbers of all uncertain parameters. Equation (8.16) shows the fiizzy 
linear programming model of (8.4) using (5.35). To solve (8.16), the TOL is set to be 0.01. The scheduling of 
customer demand and the contracts purchasing scheme under various aspiration levels, z, are evaluated and 
shown in Table 8-8. 
Membership function 
33 
Figure 8-3. Fuzzy number, TE^. 
Table 8-7. The fuzzy nimibers of uncertain parameters. 
Factors Parameter Fuzzy number 
TE^ (42, 3.30) 
Customer TE, (40, 4.95) 
TE^ (42, 3.30) 
(59.40,4.95) 
prl'-h (66.28, 3.30) 
(58.16, 3.30) 
(64.89,4.95) 
(59.95, 3.30) 
Market (66.89, 4.95) 
(0.05,0.004125) 
af- (0.05, 0.004125) 
a.'-' (0.05, 0.004125) 
(0.03,0.000165) 
(0.03,0.000165) 
(0.03,0.000165) 
Supplementary energy Ed,^ (0.044, 0.000759) 
Aspiration level z (3000,500) 
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max 7466.40-SO.Wj-""^ -37.I8Pj'-°^-^ -25.19Pl"--^- -^XASP^"'-^ 
- 37.79P;-"^-^^ +1.18096x,^., 
subject to: 
LOSPj-"-^' +1.10^5'"="^- -(42 + 3.3A) + (0.044-0.00759/l)r,j, >0 
LOS/'fi'-"'-'^' +1.10P5'"^-^ -(40+4.95A)-(0.0176 + 0.003036/l>:,j, >0 
l.OSPj-"'-^' +1.10P7'"^-^- - (42+3.3X)-(0.0242+0.0041745/l)x,J, >0 
(42 + 3.3A)-(0.044 + 0.00759/l)x,j , - LOSPs'-"'"®" -l.lOPj'-"--^^ =P^ -P5 
(40 + 4.95A)+(0.0176-0.003036A)x,j, -l.OSPg'-"'"®' -LlOPs'-"'-^' =P; -P^ 
(42+ 3.3A)+(0.00242-0.004I745A)r,J, -l.OSP/-"'-^' -I.IO/V-"'"^- = P^-Pi 
p^^ iA  - (42  +  3 .3A)+(0 .044-0 .00759A)x , j , -P f>0  
pix.,.fi, _(40+4.95A)-(0.0176+0.003036A)x,^, -P-  >0 
+p^-"2.A2 -(42+3.3A)-(0.0242+0.0041745A)r,^, -Pf >0 
(0.95-0.004I25A)P5''""^' +(0.97-0.000 165A)P5'''--^- -(40.32 + 3.168A) + (0.04268-0.0G73623A)X,j, >0 
(0.95-0.004125A)pJ-"''®' +(0.97-0.000165A)Ps'-"^-^= -(38.4+4.752A)-(0.017072 + 0.00294492A)X,5, >0 
(0.95 - 0.004125A)P,'-"'-^' + (0.97 - 0.000 165A)/V-"2'^^ - (40.32 +3. 168A) - (0.023474 + 0.004049265A)x, 5, > 0 
JT,^, <100 
(4896 - 605.88A) + (2570.4 - 201.96A)- (30.9 + 4.82625)P5 - (37.18 + 3.29505A.)P^-"-- '^ 
- (29.66 + 3. 17625A)/>'-"" '^ - (35.79 + 4.94505A)P5'-"^ '®= - (31.45 + 3. 17625A)P7'-"' '®' - (37.79 + 4.82625A)P7'-"^ '®-
+ (l.l8096-0.2037156A)r,j, - z>0 
(8.16) 
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Table 8-8. Solving (8.16) at various aspiration levels. 
Aspiration level, z 
Variable 2000 2500 3000 3500 
A 0.9531 0.6719 0.3906 0.0781 
-A 45.8101 44.4559 42.6464 42.4301 
p\.a2.Pz 0 0 0 0 
p\JZ\ .fix 
* 5 45.3765 44.0904 42.9081 40.9437 
pl^2'^2 0 0 0 0 
45.8101 45.0615 44.4531 42.8793 
0 0 0 0 
0 8.9744 24.0000 6.4746 
The aspiration levels are the expected profits that the objective fiinction of (8.16) must meet. When 
the desired aspiration level, is highest, the satisfaction of criteria, A, is the lowest, and vice-versa. When the 
desired aspiration level is high, the controllable customer demand, ,, is scheduled to improve ?.. However, 
when the desired aspiration level is low, additional contracts can be purchased to improve X . The controllable 
customer demand , is not scheduled because the additional contracts purchased are more effective in 
improving A. 
8.3.3 Remarks to Fuzzy Linear Programming 
The two approaches to fuzzy linear programming consider the uncertain customer demand, 
controllable customer demand, and delivered reliability level at different degree. In the presented examples, the 
second approach, Tanaka's approach, to fiizzy linear programming is significantly better than first approach. 
By evaluating the scheduling of customer demand and contract purchasing scheme at various aspiration levels, 
the second approach provides alternatives to the decision-maker. 
As a final remark, to adopt either one of the two fuzzy linear programming approaches, interpreting 
uncertainty in terms of fuzziness is required. Unfortunately, the interpretation of fuzziness is still not well 
recognized. For instance, in the presented examples, the standard deviations of the uncertain parameters are 
used as the basis of fiizziness. However, whether the standard deviation may be used as the basis to interpret 
fuzziness is debatable. In section 8.6, VaR is used to compare the financial risks of the decisions reached under 
various risk management tools. 
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8.4 MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, mean-variance analytical model described in (5.6) is used to evaluate the scheduling of 
customer demand and contract purchasing scheme shown in (8.4). In section 8.4.1, the variance of (8.4) is 
modeled. In section 8.4.2, mean-variance analysis is used to evaluate (8.4). Section 8.4.3 comments on the 
applicability of mean-variance analysis in the stated problem. 
8.4.1 Modeling the Variance of (8.4) 
The uncertain parameters include the market prices, the customer demand, the controllable customer 
demand, and the delivered reliability level. To facilitate the modeling process, the following vectors, (8.17) 
through (8.30), are introduced. 
p^-^\-P\ p^-''i-Pz (8.17) 
b,  =[l 1 1 1 1 l] (8.18) 
p\xti,px 
=-b , -P  (8.19) 
b:=[-r5' -r/ -r,' -<] (8.20) 
(8.21) 
b3=[l 1 l] (8.22) 
(8.23) 
(8.24) 
^4 =hj.u('-6 (8.25) 
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— (•^u.i.i{'6 ^6 •^ij.iairy 'vl^ ^7 )) "^s ) rsVij.! 
= b4 -x 
= ['•5' r,- r,' r: r,' <] 
(8.26) 
(8.27) 
pr = 
pr'r'^-
pr^-^ih 
(8.28) 
a = 
ar 
a!' 
a, 
a 6.1 
7.1 
7.1 
(8.29) 
TE = 
T£s 
TE, 
TE^ 
(8.30) 
ED=£rf, (8.31) 
The variance of (8.4) is shown in (8.32). Equation (8.33) shows the variance of (8.4) after substituting 
(8.17) through (8.31) into (8.32). 
VAR{Equation{^A^ = P'^(a,pr + a^or + EJTE + a^ED + ajpr) 
= J^i?(a,pr + 820: ^-ajTE + a4ED) (8.32) 
VAR{Equation{^.Aj) = ]A^ 83 a^ 
cov(pr,pr) covipr.a) cov(pr,TE) cov(pr,ED) 
cov{a.pr) cov{a,a) cov(a:, TE) covfa. ED) 
cov(TE,pr) COV(TE,Q:) COV{TE,TE) COV{TE,ED) 
cov(ED,pr) cov(ED,a) COV(ED,TE) COV(ED,ED) 
ar 
_r 
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= [(-b,-P) (b . ^P)  (aj-bJ (b^xj 
= [P B3 
cov, cov. 
cov-2.1 cov 
cov 
=[p 
L^OVj, 
3.1 
cov. 
cov-
u 
cov. 3J 
cov{pr,pr) cov{pr.a) cov{pr,TE) cov{pr,ED) 
cov{ar,pr) cov{fz,a) cov{a,TE) cov{a,ED) 
cov(TE,pr) cov(TE,a) COV{TE,TE) COV(TE.ED) 
cov(ED.pr) cov(ED,a) COV(ED,'^E) COV(ED,ED) 
(-b,-Pf 
{b ,»pY  
bj 
(b.xf 
(sj • 
1.2 cov, IJ 
2.2 COV 2J 
1.2 COV 3_3 
br 
+ (bj )covjj (bj + 2Pcov,^(bj )'^ + 2b^ ^^v^j (8.33) 
where 
cov,, =cov(pr,pr)+2(-b,'^b2)*cov(pr,ar) + (brb,)cov(a,Gr) (8.34) 
^0^1.2 -'^'^^2.1 =(-bfa3)*cov{pr,TE) + (b2a3)*cov(a,TE) (8.35) 
cov,J =coVj j  =(-bfb4)*cov(pr,ED) + (bjb4)»cov(a,ED) (8.36) 
covjj =(a^a3)*cov(TE.TE) (8.37) 
C0V2J =cov3'^2 =(a3b4)*cov(TE,ED) (8.38) 
covjj = (b^b^ )• OV(ED,ED) (8.39) 
8.4.2 Solving the uncertain model using mean-variance analysis 
Equation (8.40) shows the mean-variance analytical mode of (8.4) using (5.6). The scheduling of 
customer demand and the contracts purchasing scheme under various expected profit levels, A, are evaluated 
and shown in Table 8-9. 
145 
mm 
fp cov,jrp^' 
\COVy^ COV3jJ|_x''_ + b, covjj bf + 2Pcov,J bf + Ixcov^j bf 
subject to: 
r^-(l a J j + r5(l 
-it(f"v"*'' -r;(i-a;'])p;'-" 
y=5i=i 
T£, - x,_,,£d,^ < t (l + A'-' h'"""' 
ikst 
TE, <t(l + 
7-£, =^ 5^  -A" 
ifcsl 
TE, ^x,^,^,s.uEd,^ -S(l-A'-'h'-"*-''' =^6^ - A" 
kM 
TEf  +  ~  X  (^  •*"  =  -^7  ~  
t - l  
r£, +p^ - <0 
*=i 
rfj + Ar,^,A U.I.I 
+P,- - fp,'-'-''* <0 
rEj (l - af)-x,,,Ed,^ (l - af )< t (l - af' 
r£, (l - af)+ A:,^ ,A,^ .,,£rf,^  (l - orf )< J (l - aj' ''' 
j:,j , <100 (8.40) 
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Table 8-9. Solving (8.40) at various aspiration levels. 
Minimum expected profit level, /. 
Variable 2000 2400 2800 3200 
Acmal expected profit S3225.19 S3225.19 $3225.19 S3225.19 
var 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 
-Jvar S291.70 S291.70 $291.70 $291.70 
'A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
pl.a2.02 42.0000 42.0000 42.0000 42.0000 
p\jx\ .p\ 35.4647 35.4647 35.4647 35.4647 
^6 4.8541 4.8541 4.8541 4.8541 
-A 21.0005 21.0005 21.0005 21.0005 
p^-O2'02 20.9995 20.9995 20.9995 20.9995 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
In this example, even though the nunimum requirement on the expected profit, A, is lowered, the 
variance can never be lower than 85,088. The contract purchasing scheme and scheduling customer demand 
scheme does not change with the changes in A. The expected profit from solving (8.40) is S3225.19 with the 
lowest standard deviation of $291.19. The result shows a diversified pattern in the purchased contracts. Some 
contracts of each contract type are purchasing to diversify away the risk, with the exception that contract type 1 
at the 5"* period, , and controllable customer demand, ,, not being utilized to minimize the risk. 
8.4.3 Remarks to Mean-variance Analysis 
In the example presented, the simultaneous impact of uncertain customer demands, controllable 
customer demands, market prices, and delivered contract reliabilities is considered. The recommendations 
using mean-variance analysis are different from the recommendations using other approaches, fuzzy h'near 
programming in particular. For example, mean-variance analysis has recommended the ESCO not to purchase 
additional energy contracts from the auction market or not to utilize any controllable customer demand. 
Instead, using mean-variance analysis, the ESCO is recommended to purchase a mix of contracts providing 
different reliability levels and volatility levels. Other approaches, fiizzy linear programming for instance, have 
recommended different strategies to lower the impact of uncertain customer demand and controllable demand. 
Aside from purchasing a mixture of contracts providing different reliability levels and volatility levels, fuzzy 
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linear programming has recommended the purchase of additional energy contracts. Second, mean-variance 
analysis has recommended that the ESCO's financial risk can not be reduced at the expense of lower expected 
profit through additional purchase of energy contracts. Fuzzy linear programming (Tanaka's approach in 
particular) has shown that by purchasing additional energy contracts, the risk is lowered. 
Even though mean-variance analysis has recommended no additional purchase of energy contracts in 
this example, the recommendation is specific only to the given example. In previous research [60], it is shown 
that, at the presence of uncertain market price, customer demand, and controllable demand, mean-variance 
analysis may also recommend the purchase of additional energy contracts. 
8.5 STOCHASTIC LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
To apply the two-stage stochastic linear programming approach, there should be some decisions that 
need to be determined now while some decisions to be determined in the Juture. In the presented example, the 
combination of contract purchasing scheme and scheduling customer demand scheme is to be determined now. 
Thus, the example should be considered as a single-stage model and is not appropriate not be modeled as a two-
stage stochastic linear programming model described in (5.3) and (5.4). 
8.6 PRIOR TO VaR ANALYSIS 
In section 8.2, the impacts of uncertain customer demand and market price are analyzed using 
sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis. In section 8.3, the impacts of uncertain customer demand, 
controllable customer demand, market price, and delivered contract reliability are analyzed using fuzzy linear 
programming. In section 8.4, the impacts of all uncertain parameters are analyzed using mean-variance 
analysis. Since the presented example is not suitable for stochastic linear programming analysis, no result is 
presented in section 8.6. The recommended scheduling customer demand scheme and contract purchasing 
scheme under the various approaches vary. Two factors contribute toward the differences. First, the number of 
uncertain parameters considered varies from one approach to another. For instance, in parametric analysis, only 
the impact of uncertain market prices is considered while, in fiizzy linear programming, the impact of all 
uncertain parameters is considered. Second and most importantly, how the uncertainty is modeled under the 
various approaches. On one hand, in fiizzy linear programming for instance, the uncertain parameters 
embedded in the constraining equations are reflected in the constraining equations by using the lower estimates. 
On the other hand, in mean-variance analysis for instance, the uncertain parameters embedded in the 
constraining equations are reflected through the objective function, i.e., lower estimates are not used in the 
constraining equations. 
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In addition to recommending different responses, there are limitations that the approaches presented. 
First, the mathematical model prior to risk management analysis using the approaches presented so far has to be 
linear. Any nonlinearity in the original mathematical model may results in the inapplicability of the risk 
management tools. A non-linear market price, for instance, results in a nonlinear objective fimction. This 
nonlinearity renders the sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis inapplicable. Second, there are limitations 
on the number of uncertain parameters that can be considered using the approaches presented so far. For 
example, when the controllable customer demand, Edj, and the variable tariff, , are uncertain, the resulting 
variance can no longer be expressed as a quadratic fimction and complicates the applicability of mean-variance 
analysis using quadratic programming. Third, in some approaches, the uncertain parameters need to be 
symmetric. For instance, the uncertain parameters in fiizzy linear programming (Tanaka's appraoch) are 
described as symmetrical triangle fiizzy numbers while the uncertain parameters in mean-variance analysis are 
described as normally distributed probabilistic fimctions. 
To provide a usefiil comparison to the recommendations offered by these various approaches and to 
improve the limitations of the approaches, VaR analysis is presented in the following section. 
8.7 VaR ANALYSIS 
VaR analysis, presented in section 5.6, analyzes the financial risks of carrying out a particular 
scheduling customer demand scheme and contract purchasing scheme, assuming that the decision has been 
made. In this section, various decisions made under the risk management tools will be evaluated using VaR 
analysis. Table 8-10 shows the list of scheduling customer demand schemes and contract purchasing schemes 
to be evaluated using VaR analysis. Section 8.7.1 shows how the VaR analysis is used to compare the various 
decisions. Section 8.7.2 shows the results of using the VaR analysis. Section 8.7.3 comments on the 
applicability of VaR analysis in this example. To provide comparable analysis, the ESCO will not receive any 
compensation for any contract reliability not delivered, i.e, in (5.37) is assumed to be 0. 
8.7.1 Comparing the decisions using the VaR Analysis 
To provide a meaningfiil comparison among various decision choices presented in Table 8-10, VaR of 
these decision choices are first evaluated. Then, the combinations of expected profit and VaR of these decision 
choices are compared. To compute the expected profits of the decision choices in Table 8-10, (8.4) is used. 
The expected profits of these decision choices are computed and presented in Table 8-II. To compute the cost 
of risk, VaR at 95% confidence level is used. 
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Table 8-10. Decisions to be evaluated using VaR analysis. 
Soiurce Decision variables 
Selection Approach Table ^••"1 -A pUzi.P^ p^-^i -Pi pljaz-Pl 
•''U.l 
1 linear programming 8.1 42.4 0 40.4 0 42.4 0 0 
2 parametric analysis 8.4 41.4 0 40.8 0 43.0 0 24 
3 parametric analysis 8.4 21.0 19.94 40.9 0 43.0 0 24 
4 parametric analysis 8.5 42.4 0 40.4 0 21.0 21.0 0 
5 fuzzy LP 8.6 8.4 37.8 8 36.0 8.4 37.8 0 
6 fiizzy LP 8.8 45.8 0 45.4 0 45.8 0 0 
7 fiizzy LP 8.8 44.5 0 44.1 0 45.1 0 9.0 
8 fuzzy LP 8.8 42.6 0 42.9 0 44.5 0 24.0 
9 fiizzy LP 8.8 42.4 0 40.9 0 42.9 0 6.5 
10 mean-variance analysis 8.9 0 42.0 35.5 4.9 21.0 21.0 0 
Table 8-11. Calculating the expected profit of the decision choices in Table 8-10 using (8.4). 
Selection Expected profit 
1 $3,746.90 
2 53,741.21 
3 53,627.23 
4 53,626.34 
5 52,705.47 
6 53,386.61 
7 53,485.15 
8 53,594.67 
9 53,714.76 
10 53,344.90 
Section 8.2 through section 8.4 assume rj to be $30/MW-period to preserve the linearity of the 
objective function. However, as pointed out, a more realistic r' should be a nonlinear function of the 
difference between the purchased energy and the customer demand. To evaluate the financial risk using VaR 
analysis, two set of r' is used. The first, with results presented in section 8.7.2.1, assumes r' to be S30/MW-
period. The results will be used primarily to compare the various approaches. The second, with results 
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presented in section 8.7.2.2, assumes r' to be a nonlinear flmction shown in Table 8-12. The results will be 
used primarily to compare the impacts of linearizing rj. 
Table 8-12. The nonlinear rj, used in section 8.7.2.2. 
Condition rJ 
TEj  -ED J +EPj  +  ES j -ERj  S30.00/MW-period 
TEj  -EDj+EP.  + 1 <1,1, Pa 
Vft 
-S3 0/MW-period 
8.7.2 Results 
Section 8.7.2.1 shows the VaR of the decision choices in Table 8-10 using the linear rj. Section 
87.2.2 shows the VaR of the decision choices in Table 8-10 using the nonlinaer rj presented in Table 8-12. 
8.7.2.1 Linear rj 
Table 8-13 shows the VaR of the decisions shown in Table 8-10. The last column in Table 8-13 shows 
the expected profit of the various decision choices and is duplicated from Table 8-11. 2500 randomly generated 
data for each uncertain parameter are collected for the analysis using MATLAB. Figure 8-4 shows the plot of 
the expected profit versus the total VaR of each decision in Table 8-11. Of all, the decision, selection 10, under 
mean-variance analysis results in the lowest VaR in market price fluctuation due to the diversification of the 
purchased energy contracts. However, since no additional energy contracts are purchased to guard against 
potential increase in the customer demand, mean-variance analysis results in one of the highest VaR of ENS. 
Fuzzy linear programming (Zimmerman's approach) recommends the highest increase in the energy contracts. 
Thus, the decision, selection 5, results in the highest VaR in market price fluctuation, but the lowest VaR in 
ENS. In this example, VaR of contract violation is insignificant compared to the other components of the 
ESCO VaR. From Figure 8-4, the decisions that provide the best combination of risk, VaR, and expected profit 
include selections 1,2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
8.7.2.2 Nonlinear rj as Shown in Table 8-12 
In this section, the impact of nonlinear rj is considered. Table 8-14 shows the VaR of the decisions 
shown in Table 8-10. The last column in Table 8-14 shows the expected profit of the various decision choices 
and is duplicated from Table 8-11. 2500 randomly generated data for each uncertain parameter are collected for 
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the analysis using MATLAB. Figure 8-5 shows the plot of the expected profit versus the total VaR of each 
decision in Table 8-11. 
When r' is nonlinear and the decisions in Table 8-11 are evaluated, it is obvious that the VaR of ENS 
does not decrease because of the additional purchase of energy contracts. Instead, because of the additional 
purchase, the potential of buying too much energy cost the ESCO. In Table 8-14, selection 5 under fuzzy linear 
programming (Zimmermaim's approach) results in the highest VaR because of the additional purchase. 
Selection 10, under mean-variance analysis, that does not encourage additional purchase of energy contracts 
does not result in a lower VaR either. The potential of energy not delivered according to contract specifications 
can cost the ESCO as well. From Figure 8-5, selections I, 2, 8, and 9 prevail in providing the best combinations 
of risk, VaR, and return, expected profit. 
8.7.3 Remarks to VaR Analysis 
The results in sections 8.7.2.1 suggest that, when r' is linear, additional purchase of energy contracts 
increases the VaR of market price fluctuations, but lowers the VaR of ENS. The results in section 8.7.2.2 
suggest that, when r' is dependent on the absolute difference between the delivered energy and the customer 
demand (Table 8-12 for example), additional purchase of energy contracts increases the VaR of market price 
fluctuation and ENS, but lowers the VaR of contract violation. 
Table 8-13. VaR analysis using a linear r'. 
VaR 
Market price ENS Contract Total Expected 
Selection fluctuation violation profit 
I S325.47 $480.00 $6.00 $811.47 $3,746.90 
2 S323.66 $477.00 $6.00 $806.66 $3,741.21 
3 S293.39 $475.80 $7.20 $776.39 $3,627.23 
4 S333.15 $477.00 S3.00 $813.15 53,626.34 
5 $377.69 $ 93.00 -S6.00 $464.69 $2,705.47 
6 $355.22 $144.00 $3.00 $502.22 $3,386.61 
7 $346.26 $237.00 $6.00 $589.26 $3,485.15 
8 $335.45 $342.00 $3.00 $680.45 $3,594.67 
9 $327.45 $453.00 $3.00 $783.45 $3,714.76 
10 $293.03 $462.00 $12.00 $767.03 $3,344.90 
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Figure 8-4. Expected profit versus value at risk when r* is linear. 
Table 8-14. VaR analysis using a nonlinear rj as shown in Table 8-12. 
VaR 
Market price ENS Contract Total Expected 
Selection fluctuation violation profit 
1 S325.47 S495.00 S90.00 $910.47 $3,746.90 
2 S323.66 $492.00 $93.00 $908.66 $3,741.21 
3 S293.39 S490.80 $94.20 $878.39 $3,627.23 
4 $333.15 $495.00 $99.00 $927.15 $3,626.34 
5 S377.69 $555.00 $75.00 $1007.69 $2,705.47 
6 $355.22 $513.00 $132.00 $1000.22 $3,386.61 
7 $346.26 $441.00 $120.00 $907.26 $3,485.15 
8 $335.45 $411.00 $102.00 $848.45 $3,594.67 
9 $327.45 $468.00 $90.00 $885.45 $3,714.76 
10 $293.03 $480.00 $111.00 $884.03 $3,344.90 
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Figure 8-5. Expected profit versus value at risk when r* is nonlinear. 
8.8 REMARKS TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
Section 8.2 through section 8.7 provides risk analysis to the scheduling customer demand model using 
various risk management tools. First, linear programming, parametric analysis, mean-variance analysis and 
fiizzy linear programming are used to derive recommendations. Then, VaR analyses are used to evaluate the 
cost of risks of the recommendations proposed by the various tools. The combinations of expected profit, return 
of investment, and cost of risk, VaR, are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of each approach. 
In this example, the simplest approach, a deterministic model solved using linear programming, 
provides among the best combination of risk and return that the ESCO can choose (Figure 8-4 and Figure 8-5). 
However, it is important to recognize that, by ignoring the impact of uncertainties, the deterministic model may 
not always results in the best recommendation. More importantly, by using the risk management tools, options 
that also provide the best combinations of risk and return can be found. 
8.8.1 Choosing the Right Risk Management and Assessment Tool for Analytical Purpose 
From sensitivity analysis to mean-variance analysis, each of the presented risk management tools has 
recommended different scheduling customer demand scheme and contract purchasing scheme. So, when 
decision-making is needed, what tool should a decision-maker adopt? 
Prior to answering that, it should be noted that most of the decision choices recommended by the 
various risk management tools result in efficient combinations of expected profit and VaR, as shown in Figure 
8-4 ( rJ is linear). More decision choices do not result in efficient combinations of expected profit and VaR in 
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Figure 8-5 because r' is assumed nonlinear in evaluating the VaR while the models recommending the 
decision choices use linear r' in the analytical process. When decision choices result in efficient combinations 
of expected profit and VaR, the selection process depends on the cost of risk, VaR in this instance, that an 
ESCO is willing to assume. When the ESCO is willing to assume a higher VaR, it can expect a higher expect 
profit, and vice versa. However, when decision choices do not result in efficient combinations of expected 
profit and VaR, an ESCO should adopt one that provides the best combination of expected profit and VaR. 
To decide if one risk management tool should prevail over another, there are various factors that 
should be considered. In section, the risk management tools are compared on their applicability, computational 
time requirement, and technical requirement. These factors influence when and why a particular tool should be 
adopted. For instance, when decision is to be made in a short time period, sensitivity analysis and parametric 
analysis can be more handful than VaR analysis or stochastic linear programming. Also, when a developed 
ESCO model is nonlinear, there could be a problem of utilizing mean-variance analysis to address uncertainties 
in the ESCO model. 
In addition to the time requirement, technical requirement and applicability described in section 5.7, 
the data available to analyze the uncertainty is also an important factor to decide if one risk management tool 
should prevail in the decision-making process. Depending on the data available to characterize the uncertain 
parameters, one risk management tool can provide better recommendation than another tool. In general, 
sensitivity analysis and parametric analysis require the least information on the uncertainty; mean-variance 
analysis, stochastic linear programming and VaR require the most information on the uncertainty; while fiizzy 
linear programming falls in between. When insufficient data is available to describe the uncertainties, some risk 
management tools are not applicable, mean-variance analysis, stochastic linear programming, and VaR analysis 
in particular. When sufficient data is available, depending on the applicability, time requirement, and technical 
requirement described in section 5.7, the decision-maker may select the risk management tool that best fit 
his/her profile. For example, when ample time is provided, VaR analysis results in the most thorough analysis 
on the decision choices. However, when time is restricted but data is ample, mean-variance analysis may be 
adopted. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter summarizes this research; presents major conclusions reached in Chapter 6 through 
Chapter 8; and proposes extensions to this research. 
9.1 RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This research is an extension to my thesis work for Master of Science in Electrical Engineering. The 
load management models developed during my Master's program, presented in Chapter 3, are enhanced and 
used to develop the scheduling customer demand model in this research. To extend this research, a 
heterogeneous auction market, presented in Chapter 4, for electric energy is assumed. The assumed auction 
market trades energy contracts characterized by: (I) delivery duration, (2) delivered reliability, and (3) allowed 
variability. The scheduling customer demand model, presented in Chapter 4, is then developed for an energy 
service company (ESCO), assuming that all energy contracts are purchased from the auction market. The 
ESCO model, presented in Chapter 2, uses the scheduling customer demand model to decide an optimal 
contract purchasing scheme and scheduling customer demand scheme at various operational planning levels. 
Finally, risk management and assessment tools, presented in Chapter 5, are reviewed and adopted to consider 
uncertainties in the ESCO model. 
Three chapters of results are presented for an assumed ESCO model. Chapter 6 evaluates the 
scheduling customer demand model under various economics objectives, and presents the interaction between 
scheduling customer demand scheme and contract purchasing scheme. Chapter 7 analyzes the ESCO operation 
at various operational planning levels and discusses the limitations of the scheduling customer demand model. 
Finally, Chapter 8 applies the risk management and assessment tools to complement the shortfall of the 
scheduling customer demand model. The tools used in Chapter 8 include sensitivity analysis, parametric 
analysis, fiizzy linear programming, mean-variance analysis, and VaR analysis. The example presented in 
Chapter 8 is not suitable for stochastic linear programming analysis because the example is a one-stage 
problem. 
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9.2 CONCLUSIONS 
This research primarily provides technical development on how an ESCO may utilize load 
management programs and energy contracts optimsally to provide customers err.rgy services and earn profit. In 
this section, the benefits of load management pro::grams, economics of an ESCO operation and management; 
and the role of risk management and assessment tools in an ESCO operation are presented to emphasize the key 
findings in this research. 
In this research, the load management pro^igrams have assisted an ESCO to improve the profitability of 
serving customer energy, lower the cost of energy, and enhance the cash flow of the company. In addition, the 
load management programs have also improved th»e flexibility of customer demand. A more flexible customer 
demand has allowed the ESCO more flexibility orm how energy contracts may be purchased to serve customer 
demand and on the services it can provide the custcnmer. The load management programs have also lowered the 
ESCO reliance on purchasing energy contracts tto meet the contractual requirements with the customers. 
Finally, this research has also shown that the load nnanagement programs can be used as an asset to diversify the 
risks of ESCO operation. 
With the load management programs, all four economic objectives (load-based, cost-beised, profit-
based, and cash management-based) evaluated in ttne ESCO scheduling customer demand model show lowered 
cost of energy, increased profit, enhanced cash fHow, and improved reliability of serving customer energy. 
However, due to the differences in their emphases-, the four economic objectives vary on how much they can 
lower the cost of energy, increase the profit, enhiance the cash flow, and improve the reliability. In a re-
regulated power industry, the profit-based objective and the cash management-based objective have shown to 
better serve an ESCO — profiting from the business- However, this research has emphasized that the cost-based 
objective can be used to evaluate the ESCO's perfowmance in the long run. Finally, this research has shown that 
the cost-based objective and the profit-based objesctive differ only on how the changes in the revenue are 
reflected in the economic objectives. Two ways that the revenue could change are identified. First, when DLC 
energy is deferred to a low-rate period from a Biigh-rate period (or vice-versa,) the ESCO experiences a 
reduction (increase) in the revenue due to a differ-ence in the rate over time. Second, when paid back DLC 
energy is lower (higher) than the deferred energy, ®he ESCO experiences a reduction (increase) in the revenue 
due to changes in the customer demand or energy loiss. 
Various risk management and assessmemt tools are reviewed in this research to assist an ESCO 
operation and management. Even though differing 'on their recommendations on how an ESCO should respond 
to imcertainty, these tools have recommended decisaons that are mostly efficient. The efficiencies are evaluated 
based on the combination of expected profit and VaJi that these decisions have resulted. This research suggests 
that each of these risk management tools has pros and cons. To decide if one risk management tool should 
prevail over another, this research has recommeanded four factors consideration. The four factors to be 
considered in selecting an appropriate tool include: tlhe applicability, how easy the uncertainty may be addressed 
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by these tools; the technical requirement, the degree of knowledge needed in analyzing the uncertainty using the 
different tools; the time requirement, the time available to analyze an operational problem using these tools; and 
the data, the availability of information to describe the uncertainty. In addition, this research indicates that 
when decision choices result in efficient combinations of expected profit and VaR, the selection process 
depends on the cost of risk, VaR in this instance, that an ESCO is willing to assume. When the ESCO is willing 
to assume a higher VaR, it can expect a higher expect profit, and vice versa. However, when decision choices 
do not result in efficient combinations of expected profit and VaR, an ESCO should adopt one that provides the 
best combination of expected profit and VaR. 
Finally, this research cautions the limitations of using the technical analysis in the business operation, 
particularly the models presented in this dissertation. First, certain assumptions are needed to simplify an 
ESCO operational problem in order to make the stated problem solvable using existing operations research 
techniques. These assimiptions may result in decisions that do not optimally achieve the goals of the stated 
problems. Second, at most operational planning levels, there are many ways that an ESCO can think of to 
maximize its goal. The developed mathematical models can only evaluate what has been included in ±e 
analysis. Thus, in business practice, creativity and efficiency shown by decision-makers are as well important. 
Furthermore, creativity and efficiency, often than not, bring in new ideas to assist an ESCO operation. 
Despite the limitations, the technical development presented in this research has no doubt provided 
valuable information that an ESCO may use in decision-making. 
9.3 FUTURE WORK 
In this research, energy contracts traded in an auction market are tied to the scheduling of customer 
demand. In addition to economic analysis, the uncertainties in an ESCO operation have also been considered. 
However, there are still more that can be extended to complement this research. They include: 
• Present scheduling customer demand model considers only the real power. In a re-regulated business 
environment, the reactive power will probably be priced and traded. To account for the cost of reactive 
power, the customer demand for reactive power should also be modeled. 
• The scheduling customer demand scheme and contract purchasing scheme only provide one-side story of 
energy trading in the auction market. In an auction market where market participants have to submit bids 
and offers for the energy traded, the ability to bid and offer the right price and right amount is important. 
Thus, strategies to bid and offer in an auction market should be researched. 
• In this research, the options contracts are not included. With options contracts prospering in other 
industries, there is little doubt about the future of options contracts for electric energy. Thus, option theoty 
should be investigated on its applicability in the energy market. 
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• The risk management tools developed in this research evaluate the cost of risks of holding a combination 
of scheduling customer demand scheme and contract purchasing scheme. These tools, however, are 
different from the options theories that have been developed in the financial industry. To justify the merits 
of the risk management and assessment tools, they should be compared to the options theories. In addition, 
in this research, example using stochastic linear programming is not presented. Additional examples may 
be developed to compare and contrast the impact of various risk management tools. 
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APPENDIX A. INFORMATION AND RESULT PERTINENT TO 
CHAPTER 6 AND CHAPTER 7 
This appendix contains information, data used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and detailed results from 
solving various models in chapter 6. Appendix A.1 provides the data on the customer factors. Appendix A.2 
provides the information on the supplementary energy factors. Appendix A.3 provides the information on the 
market factors. Appendix A.4 shows the marginal cost flmctions of the generation units and how graphical 
techniques can be used to determine the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of electric energy. 
Appendix A.5 shows the iterative procedure to solve a nonlinear objective function containing monotonically 
increasing nonlinear cost functions. Appendix A.6 provides detailed results for section 6.2. 
A.1 CUSTOMER FACTORS 
Appendix A. 1.1 shows the details about the customer demand factors in a regulated power industry. 
Appendix A. 1.2 shows the detailed customer demand factors in a re-regulated power industry. 
A. 1.1 Customer Demand in Regulated Power Industry 
Table A-1 shows the customer demand and the corresponding variable tariff (dollar per MW period) 
for a six months duration, assuming six periods in each day, and one day in each month. In addition, the 
corresponding customer demand is rated 'on-peak' or 'off-peak' to be used for generation scheduling in 
Appendix A.4 and A.5. There is no fixed tariff charged to the customers. 
A.1.2 Customer Demand of an ESCO in a Re-regulated Power Industry 
Table A-2 shows the customer demand and the corresponding variable tariff (dollar per MW period) 
for a six months duration, assuming six periods in each day, and one day in each month. There is no fixed tariff 
chjirged to the ESCO customers. In addition, the reliability requirement is 96% at all time, i.e., 
a f  =0.04,  VJ .  
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Table A-1. Customer demand and corresponding tariff in a regulated power industry. 
Month Day Period variable tariff Customer Demand 0n-peak/0£f-peak 
(S/MW period) (MW) 
1 1 1 90 200 Off-peak 
2 90 210 Off-peak 
3 100 340 On-peak 
4 100 340 On-peak 
5 90 210 Off-peak 
6 90 200 Off-peak 
2 1 1 90 210 Off-peak 
2 90 220 Off-peak 
3 100 340 On-peak 
4 100 350 On-peak 
5 90 215 Off-peak 
6 90 210 Off-peak 
3 1 1 90 220 Off-peak 
2 90 225 Off-peak 
3 100 350 On-peak 
4 100 360 On-peak 
5 90 230 Off-peak 
6 90 220 Off-peak 
4 I I 90 225 Off-peak 
2 90 230 Off-peak 
3 100 370 On-peak 
4 100 360 On-peak 
5 90 235 Off-peak 
6 90 220 Off-peak 
5 1 I 90 230 Off-peak 
2 90 240 Off-peak 
3 100 370 On-peak 
4 100 380 On-peak 
5 90 245 Off-peak 
6 90 250 Off-peak 
6 1 I 90 240 Off-peak 
2 90 255 Off-peak 
3 100 385 On-peak 
4 100 380 On-peak 
5 90 250 Off-peak 
6 90 235 Off-peak 
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Table A-2. Customer demand and corresponding tariff of an ESCO. 
Month Day Period variable tariff (S/MW period) Customer Demand (MW) 
1 1 1 90 40 
2 90 42 
3 100 68 
4 100 68 
5 90 42 
6 90 40 
2 I I 90 42 
2 90 44 
3 100 68 
4 100 70 
5 90 43 
6 90 42 
3 1 1 90 44 
2 90 45 
3 100 70 
4 100 72 
5 90 46 
6 90 44 
4 1 1 90 45 
2 90 46 
3 100 74 
4 100 72 
5 90 47 
6 90 44 
5 I 1 90 46 
2 90 48 
3 100 74 
4 100 76 
5 90 49 
6 90 50 
6 1 1 90 48 
2 90 51 
3 100 77 
4 100 76 
5 90 50 
6 90 47 
A.2 SUPPLEMENTARY ENERGY FACTORS 
In this section, the information regarding the supplementary energy factors used in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 are presented. Appendix A.2.1 provides detailed information about the DLC program. Appendix 
A.2.2 provides detailed information about the ESS type 1 system, which is a battery system. Appendix A.2.3 
provides detailed infomiation about the ESS type II system, which is a pump-hydro system. 
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A.2.1 DLC Program 
There are two types of customers participating in the DLC program. Appendix A.2.2.1 provides the 
information needed in solving a cost-based customer demand scheduling in a regulated power industry. 
Appendix A.2.2.2 provides the detailed information about the DLC program owned by an ESCO in a re-
regulated power industry. 
A.2.2.1 DLC Program in a Regulated Power Industry 
Table A-3 shows the details about the controllability of the customer demand in a regulated power 
industry. Table A-4 shows the per customer deferrable demand in the DLC program. When solving for a cost-
based demand scheduling in section 6.2, the incentives offered to the customers are ignored and not shown in 
here. 
A.2.2.2 DLC Program of an ESCO in a Re-regulated Power Industry 
In this section, the data used in analyzing the problem in section 6.Table A-5 shows the deferrable 
customer demand and the variable tariff (per kW period) of an ESCO for a six-month duration. Table A-6 
shows the contract specifications with the customers in the DLC program and the pay back ratio at the end of 
controlled duration. 
Table A-3. Controllability of the customer demand in a regulated power industry. 
Item Customer type 
I 2 
Size of customers participating in DLC program 100 100 
Minimum/Maximum control duration 1/2 1/2 
Pay back ratio for 1 1" period 40% of total deferred 35% of total deferred 
period of control after 2"'' period 55% of total deferred 40% of total deferred 
energy deferment 3"* period 0% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
Pay back ratio for 2 1" period 30% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
periods of control after 2"'* period 25% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
energy deferment 3"* period 25% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
4"' period 25% of total deferred 20% of total deferred 
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Table A-4. Per customer deferrable demand in a regulated power industry. 
Month Day Period Controllable demand type (kW) 
I 2 
1 I 1 40 60 
2 44 66 
3 64 96 
4 68 102 
5 44 66 
6 42 63 
2 I 1 40 60 
2 44 66 
3 66 99 
4 70 105 
5 46 69 
6 44 66 
3 1 I 44 66 
2 46 69 
3 70 105 
4 68 102 
5 48 72 
6 46 69 
4 1 1 44 66 
2 48 72 
3 70 105 
4 72 108 
5 48 72 
6 46 69 
5 I 1 46 69 
2 48 72 
3 74 111 
4 72 108 
5 48 72 
6 46 69 
6 1 I 46 69 
2 48 72 
3 76 114 
4 76 114 
5 50 75 
6 48 72 
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Table A-5. Per customer deferrable demand and corresponding tariff offered by an ESCO. 
Month Day Period DLC program 
Customer type I Customer type n 
deferrable Rate deferrable demand Rate 
demand (kW) (S/kW) (kW) (S/kW) 
I I 1 40 0.09 60 0.09 
2 44 0.09 66 0.09 
3 64 O.IO 96 0.10 
4 68 0.09 102 0.09 
5 44 0.09 66 0.09 
6 42 0.09 63 0.09 
2 1 1 40 0.09 60 0.09 
2 44 0.09 66 0.09 
3 66 O.IO 99 0-10 
4 70 0.09 105 0.09 
5 46 0.09 69 0.09 
6 44 0.09 66 0.09 
3 I 1 44 0.09 66 0.09 
2 46 0.09 69 0.09 
3 70 0.10 105 O.IO 
4 68 0.09 102 0.09 
5 48 0.09 72 0.09 
6 46 0.09 69 0.09 
4 1 1 44 0.09 66 0.09 
2 48 0.09 72 0.09 
3 70 O.IO 105 0.10 
4 72 0.09 108 0.09 
5 48 0.09 72 0.09 
6 46 0.09 69 0.09 
5 1 1 46 0.09 69 0.09 
2 48 0.09 72 0.09 
3 74 O.IO HI 0.10 
4 72 0.09 108 0.09 
5 48 0.09 72 0.09 
6 46 0.09 69 0.09 
6 1 1 46 0.09 69 0.09 
2 48 0.09 72 0.09 
3 76 0.10 114 0.10 
4 76 0.09 114 0.09 
5 50 0.09 75 0.09 
6 48 0.09 72 0.09 
165 
Table A-6. Contract with the customers participating in the DLC program. 
Item Customer type 
I 2 
Size of customers participating in DLC program 24 24 
Minimum/Maximum control duration 1/2 1/2 
Maximum control during six month duration (periods) 8 1/3 8 1/3 
Reliability of the vy 0.03 0.03 
controlling devices. 
c c f ,  vy 0.03 0.03 
Rebate scheme fixed part SO.OO/month SO.OO/month 
variable part S2.50/MW deferred S2.50/MW deferred 
Pay back ratio for 1 l®* period 40% of total deferred 35% of total deferred 
period of control after 2"'' period 55% of total deferred 40% of total deferred 
energy deferment 3"* period 0% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
Pay back ratio for 2 1" period 30% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
periods of control after 2"^ period 25% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
energy deferment 3"* period 25% of total deferred 25% of total deferred 
4"* period 25% of total deferred 20% of total deferred 
A.2.3 ESS Program 
Only the utility in a re-regulated power industry owns the ESS programs. Appendix A.2.3.1 shows the 
ESS type I system, a battery energy storage system, and Appendix A.2.3.2 shows the ESS type II system, a 
pump-hydro storage system. In Chapter 7, the ESS programs are evaluated to determine if such programs can 
benefit the ESCO operation and management. 
A.2.3.1 ESS Type I 
There is one ESS type I systems capable of consuming a maximum of 4.5 MW period of electric 
energy during storage stage and releasing a maximum of 3.5 MW period of electric energy during release stage. 
Table A-7 describes the physical constraints of the storage system. 
A.2.3.1 ESS Type II 
There is one energy-storing unit and one energy-releasing unit for the ESS type 11 system, with the 
ability to release a maximum of 2 MW of energy per period, with a storage capacity of 5000 units of potential 
energy. Table A-8 provides information on the storing and releasing characteristics of the system. 
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Table A-7. Physical constraints on the ESS type I system (battery energy storage system). 
Descriptions ESS type I unit 
Number of imits available 100 
Minimum/maximum storage duration (periods) 1/2 
Required energy to 1 period 45 kW 
charge 1 unit in (kW) 2 periods 22 kW in the 1" period 
22 kW in the 2"" period 
Minimum/maximum releasing duration (periods) Vz 
Released energy from 1 1 period 35 kW 
unit in (kW) 2 periods 19 kW in the 1" period 
18 kW in the 2^ period 
Leakage None 
Table A-8. Physical constraint on ESS type n system (Pumped hydro storage). 
k Energy losses during storage When releasing energy When storing energy 
y. sdt Prt e. Tsk 
1 1500 0.005 1000 kW 0.90 1000 kW 1.10 
2 1500 0.01 1000 kW 0.85 1500 kW 1.05 
3 2000 0.015 
A.3 MARKET FACTORS 
Appendix A.3.1 shows the market factors in a regulated power industry. Appendix A.3.2 shows the 
market factors in a re-regulated power industry. 
A.3.1 Market Factors in a Regulated Power Industry 
During off-peak periods (Table A-1), there are two generation units operating with the production cost 
functions as shown in Table A-9. During on-peak periods (Table A-1), a third generation unit is added, 
operating with the production cost function as shown in Table A-9. P denotes the MW generated by the units. 
Since the allocation of generation units during on-peak and off-peak periods has been determined, the fixed 
production cost of the three generating units will not affect the outcome of scheduling the units' generation 
levels. Thus, the fixed costs of the generating units are assumed to be zero in this research. 
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Table A-9. Production cost functions of the generating units. 
Operating Generation Minimum Maximum Production cost flmction (S) 
condition unit generation generation 
During off-peak 1 50 150 30P + 0.075P^ 
During off-peak 2 50 150 45.5/' + 0.12P* 
During on-peak 3 50 100 55P + 0.175P' 
A.S.2 Market Factors in a Re-regulated Power Industry 
In this section, the information regarding various market factors is presented. Appendix A.3.2.1 shows 
the market prices of energy in an auction market in a re-regulated power industry when the energy is priced 
according to the marginal cost of production. Appendix A.3.2.2 shows the market factors of an auction market 
in a re-regulated power industry when the energy contract entails reliability and volatility requirements. 
Appendix A.3.2.3 shows the capital market factors of an ESCO. 
A.3.2.1 Market Prices of Energy Based on Marginal Cost of Production 
In this section, the information regarding the market prices for energy is provided. Table A-10 shows 
the market prices for a six-month duration. The marginal costs are similar to those found in Table 6-1 after load 
management scheduling. 
A.3.2.2 Market Prices of Energy when Reliability and Volatility Requirements are Entailed 
In this section, the information regarding the market prices of heterogeneous energy contracts is 
provided. Table A-11 shows the market prices of these contracts for different delivery periods. Table A-12 
shows the various contracts that an ESCO may purchase and their corresponding contract specifications. 
A.3.2.3 Capital Market Factors of an ESCO 
In this section, the information regarding the capital market factors is provided. Table A-13 shows the 
annual percentage rate of borrowing at various periods when an ESCO needs to fund its operation. Table A-14 
shows the armual percentage rate of investment at various periods when an ESCO has excess capital to invest. 
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Table A-10. Market prices according to marginal cost of production. 
Month Day Period Market prices (S/MW period) 
1 1 1 57.77 
2 60.17 
3 73.28 
4 73.20 
5 62.28 
6 59.75 
2 I I 61.65 
2 63.78 
3 73.98 
4 74.55 
5 63.27 
6 62.21 
3 I 1 63.48 
2 64.44 
3 75.40 
4 76.26 
5 66.47 
6 64.15 
4 1 1 64.82 
2 65.77 
3 77.86 
4 76.16 
5 67.86 
6 64.19 
5 1 I 66.36 
2 68.50 
3 78.55 
4 78.98 
5 70.05 
6 71.27 
6 1 1 68.15 
2 71.49 
3 80.39 
4 80.89 
5 71.06 
6 67.33 
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Table A-11. Market prices for contracts in Table A-8. 
Contracts type 
Periods A(S/MW^ B fS/MW) C (S/MW)" D(S/M>^ 
1 (1" period of I'" month) 62.93 70.21 54.98 61.34 
2 — — 57.16 63.78 
3 — — 70.59 78.77 
4 — — 70.60 78.78 
5 — — 58.13 64.86 
6 — — 55.89 62.36 
7(1" period of 2"" month) 64.39 71.85 57.80 64.49 
8 — — 59.84 66.77 
9 — — 70.63 78.81 
10 — — 71.96 80-30 
11 — — 59.40 66.28 
12 — — 58.16 64.89 
13(1" period of 3"* month) 66.13 73.79 59.95 66.89 
14 — — 60.98 68.04 
15 — — 72.04 80.38 
16 — — 73.36 81.85 
17 — — 62.32 69.54 
18 — — 60.34 67.33 
19(1" period of 4'" month) 67.28 75.07 61.48 68.60 
20 — — 62.12 69.31 
21 — — 74.59 83.23 
22 — — 73.30 81.79 
23 — — 63.51 70.86 
24 — — 60.49 67.49 
25 (1" period of 5"" month) 69.66 77.73 62.77 70.03 
26 — — 64.44 71.90 
27 — — 75.33 84.06 
28 — — 76.47 85.32 
29 — — 65.63 73.22 
30 — — 66.23 73.90 
31(1" period of 6"" month) 70.63 78.81 64.21 71.65 
32 — — 67.60 75.43 
33 — — 77.61 86.60 
34 — — 76.83 85.72 
35 — — 66.65 74.37 
36 — — 63.23 70.55 
" Market prices for contract type C are approximately 95% of the market prices in Table A.7. Market prices for contract 
type D are approximately 106% of the market prices in Table A.7. Market prices for contract type A and B are weighted 
average of the contract type C and D respectively. 
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Table A-12. Specifications of contracts traded in an auction market. 
Descriptions Contract A Contract B Contract C Contract D 
energy per contract 1 MW/period 1 MW/period 1 MW/period 1 MW/period 
reliability level, (I — a) 95% 97% 95% 97% 
accepted volatility level, p 5% 10% 5% 10% 
delivery duration 1 month 1 month 1 period I period 
begirming period beginning of each beginning of each beginning of beginning of 
month month each period each period 
Table A-13. Interest for borrowing 
Borrow APR for borrowing at the beginning of 
duration 1" month 2"" month 3"* month 4'" month 5"" month 6"* month 
1 month 7.00% 7.20% 7.40% 7.60% 7.80% 8.00% 
2 months 7.10% 7.30% 7.50% 7.70% 7.90% — 
3 months 7.20% 7.40% 7.60% 7.80% — — 
4 months 7.40% 7.60% 7.80% — — — 
5 months 7.60% 7.80% — — — — 
6 months 7.80% — — — — — 
Table A-14. Interest for investment. 
Investment APR for investing at the beginning of the 
duration 1" month 2"" month S"' month 4"" month 5"* month 6*^ month 
1 month 5.00% 5.20% 5.40% 5.60% 5.80% 6.00% 
2 months 5.10% 5.30% 5.50% 5.70% 5.90% — 
3 months 5.20% 5.40% 5.60% 5.80% — — 
4 months 5.40% 5.60% 5.80% — — — 
5 months 5.60% 5.80% — — — — 
6 months 5.70% — — — — — 
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A.4 SYSTEM MARGINAL COST FUNCTION USING GRAPfflCAL 
TECHNIQUES 
The system marginal cost function is determined using graphical techniques for both off-peak and on-
peak periods. Table A-15 shows the marginal cost function of the three generating units. Figure A-1 and Table 
A-16 show the system marginal cost functions during off-peak periods. Figure A-2 and Table A-17 show the 
system marginal cost fxmctions during on-peak periods. 
Table A-15. Marginal cost flmctions of the generating units. 
Operating Generation Minimum Maximum Marginal cost function (S/MW) 
condition unit generation generation 
During off-peak I 50 150 30 + 0-15P 
During off-peak 2 50 150 45.5 + 0.24P 
During on-peak 3 50 100 55 + 0.35P 
Table A-16. System marginal cost fimctions during off-peak periods (demand must at least 100 MW)-
Minimum generation Maximum generation Marginal cost function (S/MW) 
100 200 22.5 +0.15P 
200 300 9 + 0.24P 
Marginal cost Marginal cost Marginal cost 
81.0 81:0 
52.5 52.5 
37.5 
300 • lOD 150 200 
System during off-peak 
150 
Generating unit 2 Generating unit 1 
Figure A-1. System marginal cost during off-peak periods. 
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Marginal cost Marginal cost Marginal cost 
90.0 
81.0 
72.5 
•72.'5' 12.5 
57.0. 
52.5 
57..P 
52.5. 
37.5 ,37.5 
150 200 250 314.58 100 150 200 254.58300 I 400 
374.29 
50 100 
Generating unit 3 System during off-peak System during on-pealc 
Figure A-2. System marginal cost during on-peak periods. 
Table A-17. System marginal cost fimctions during off-peak periods (demand must exceed 150 MW). 
Minimum generation Maximum generation Marginal cost function (S/MW) 
150 250 15 + 0.15/' 
250 314.58 -3-1-0.24/' 
314.58 374.29 27.70-t-0.1424P 
374.29 400 -50.01+ 0.35P 
A.5 ITERATIVE PROCEDURE TO SOLVE MONOTONICALLY INCREASING 
MARGINAL COST FUNCTIONS 
A generic iterative procedure is presented here. In this section, the average marginal cost of energy is 
determined firom the marginal cost functions. An alternative approach that uses the cost functions to derive the 
average marginal costs is presented in [12]. The marginal cost functions are used in this section because there 
are several generation units that are available for scheduling at each period, where each unit has a different cost 
function. Instead of using different variables to represent the generation level of the different units at different 
periods, by adopting the graphical technique outlined in A.4, the aggregated generation level may be used to 
reduce the number of variables needed in the scheduling model. 
Defining AP""" to be the increased generation level at period j, iteration iter, then, the relationship 
between the value of iter iteration increased generation level and the previous iteration increased generation 
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level is described in Equation (A.1). is the increased generation level at period j determined at iteration 
iter, and is the decreased generation level at period J determined at iteration iter. 
+A/'r -AP" J J ^ J ^ J (A.1) 
Define one variable to represent the integer part of AP""' divided by APy . APj is the maximum 
decreaseable or increaseable generation level at period/ at each iteration: 
Qj = quotient AP" 
AP, V. J J 
(A.2) 
and another variable for the remainder of APj"^ divided by APj : 
r, = remainder 
V J J 
(A.3) 
With the given Qj, the average marginal cost per unit cost for Qj -th increase in generation level is 
shown in Equation (A.4). MCj^) is the marginal cost of generation level • at period J. The piecewise-
linearized marginal cost function is determined in A.4 
/ ^ MC,-(P,+(e,-+l)^)+A/C,(p,+e,A^) 
prjiQjh ^ '  ' '  (A.4) 
When the objective is to minimize the cost of generation with constraints shown in Chapter 3, the 
problem of nonlinearity is linearizable with added constraints to restrict maximum increaseable or decreaseable 
generation level. Let the function g{x) represent the constraints of load management demand. (A.5) shows the 
linearized linear programming model, mj and m~ , respectively, represent the average marginal cost for an 
increase and decrease in generation level at period j. 
min m^AP* —m'.APJ 
xAP^APJ' 
subject to: 
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g{x)<b (A.5) 
An iterative procedure can then be carried out to achieve the final optimum objective function. 
STEPO 
Initialize all variables, where 
iter = 1 
AP/ =0 
STEP 1 
Determine the values of Qj and as defined in Equations (A.2) and (A.3). 
STEP 2 
Find/update the values for m* and m'j 
i f r .=0 
=p' ' j {Qj)  
m' j  =prj[Qj  - l )  
0<AP/ <A^ 
Q<AP~ <A^ 
else if Qj >0 
= pr j[q J- l )  
m' j  =  pr j iQj- \ )  
O^AP" <-r. J — 
0<APr <APj.  +rj  
else if rj >0 
r t j  = pr j iQj+l)  
mr=prj{Qj +l) 
0<AP/ <APj - r j  
0<A/7 <rj  
else 
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=prj{Qj  - l)  
mj = prj{qJ- l )  
0<A/7 <-rj  
0<APj' <'KPj+rj 
STEP 3 
Solve for linear program as defined in (A.5). 
STEP 4 
Update increased and decreased generation level as defined in (A.1). 
STEPS 
Check for optimality. 
if - APJT) is not equal to 0 
iter = iter + 1 
GO TO STEP 1 
else 
Optimal solutions are found 
A.6 DETAILED LOAD MANAGEMENT SCHEDULING FOR SECTION 6.2 
Table A.-18 shows the scheduled controllable customer demand in the DLC program. Table A-19 
shows the scheduled ESS type I unit and Table A-20 shows the scheduled ESS type II unit 
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Table A-18. Scheduled controllable customer demand in the DLC program. 
Controllable customer demand Number of customer 
Type Beginning control at period Deferment duration scheduled 
1 3 2 100.00 
1 9 2 56.45 
1 10 1 43.54 
I 15 2 77.79 
1 16 1 22.21 
1 21 2 75.34 
1 22 1 24.66 
1 27 1 5.076 
1 28 1 94.92 
I 30 1 5.08 
I 34 I 100.00 
2 3 2 100.0000 
2 9 2 100.0000 
2 15 2 100.0000 
2 21 2 100.0000 
2 27 2 100.0000 
2 33 1 100.0000 
Table A-19. Scheduled ESS type I unit. 
Storing energy Releasing energy 
Beginning period Storing duration Number of units Beginning 
period 
Storing duration Number of units 
I 2 100.0000 2 2 0 
2 2 0 3 2 100.0000 
5 2 72.8584 6 2 0 
6 2 27.1416 7 2 0 
8 2 0 9 2 19.6842 
11 2 19.6842 12 2 0 
32 2 0 33 2 100.0000 
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Table A-20. Scheduled ESS type n unit 
Period Energy used to store at Energy released at Stored amount at the end of 
1 1.00 0 2.90 
2 0.40 0 3.25 
3 0 1.00 2.17 
4 0 1.00 1.11 
5 0 0 l.ll 
6 1.00 0 2.00 
7 0.15 0 2.13 
8 0 0 2.12 
9 0 1.00 1.06 
10 0 1.00 0 
11 0.2295 0 0.21 
12 1.0000 0 1.11 
13 1.0000 0 2.00 
14 0 0 1.99 
15 0 0.88 1.06 
16 0 1.00 0 
17 0 0 0 
18 1.0000 0 0.90 
19 0.1834 0 1.06 
20 0 0 1.06 
21 0 1.00 0 
22 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 
24 1.0000 0 0.90 
25 1.0000 0 1.80 
26 0 0 1.79 
27 0 0.52 1.23 
28 0 0.52 0.68 
29 0 0 0.68 
30 0 0 0.67 
31 1.0000 0 1.57 
32 0 0 1.56 
33 0 0 1.55 
34 0 0.41 1.11 
35 0 0 1.11 
36 1.0000 0 2.00 
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APPENDIXB. INFORMA TIONPERTINENT TO CHAPTER 8 
This appendix contains information and data used in Chapter 8. Appendix B. 1 provides the standard 
deviation of all uncertain parameters in Chapter 8. Appendix B.2 provides the information on the correlation 
among all uncertain parameters in Chapter 8. 
B.l STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE UNCERTAIN FACTORS 
Table B-1 shows the standard deviations of all uncertain parameters used in the analysis in Chapter 8. 
Table B-1. The standard deviations of all uncertain parameters. 
Factors Parameter Standard deviation 
TE, a) 2 
Customer TE^ (II) 3 
TEj  (in) 2 
p r , ( I V )  3 
(V) 2 
(VI) 2 
(VII) 3 
pr^^ iA (Vm) 2 
pr^-"^-'^ (IX) 3 
af' (X) 0.0025 
af ' (XI) 0.0025 
a,'-' (XII) 0.0025 
(XIII) 0.0001 
Market af ' (XTV) 0.0001 
al' (XV) 0.0001 
Supplementary energy Ed,^ (XVI) 0.00046 
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B.2 CORRELATION AMONG UNCERTAIN FACTORS 
Table B-2 through Table B-4 shows the correlation among all uncertain parameters used in the analysis 
in Chapter 8. The following assumptions are made in generating the numbers for the correlation. 
• A higher/lower energy demand at a period will result in a higher/lower price at that period, i.e., TEj  is 
positively correlated to • 
• The total demands at different periods are positively correlated, but not as much as the correlation between 
the total demand and deferrable demand at a particular period. For example, TE^ has a 0.6 correlation with 
, but a 0.2 correlation with TE^. 
• Since load management programs are assumed insignificant in the industry at the begirming of Chapter 6, 
deferrable demand does not affect the price of energy much, i.e., the deferrable demand has an insignificant 
correlation with the price of energy and market contract reliability. 
• The power system is assumed not congested. Therefore, the correlation between the market contract 
reliability of any given period and the price of energy (or the ESCO total customer demand at the given 
period) is insignificant. For the similar reason, the correlation among the differently traded contract 
reliability is not highly correlated. 
• The correlation matrix is positive definite. The eigenvalues of the correlation matrix are positive. 
Table B-2. The correlation among market factors. 
(IV) (V) (VD (VII) (vni) (DC) (X) (XI) (XII) (xni) (XIV) (XV) 
(IV) 1 0.80 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 
(V) 0.80 1 0.20 0.20 O.IO 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 
(VI) 0.20 0.20 1 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
(VXD 0.15 0.20 0.70 1 0.50 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 
(vni) 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.50 1 0.75 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
(DC) 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.75 1 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 
(X) 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 1 0.50 0.40 0.70 0.40 0.30 
(XI) 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.50 1 0.30 0.30 0.80 0.30 
pai) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.40 0.30 1 0.20 0.40 0.50 
(xni) 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.70 0.30 0.20 1 0.30 0.70 
(XIV) 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.40 0.80 0.40 0.30 1 0.30 
(XV) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.30 1 
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Table B-3. The correlation between customer and supplementary energy factors. 
(D (H) (m) (XVD 
(D 1.0000 0.2000 0.3000 0.6000 
(H) 0.2000 1.0000 0.4000 0.1000 
m 0.3000 0.4000 1.0000 0.0500 
(XVD 0.6000 0.1000 0.0500 1.0000 
Table B-4. The correlation among market factors, customer factors and supplementary energy factors. 
(I) (H) (HI) PCVI) 
(IV) 0.40 0.07 0.05 0.02 
(V) 0.50 0.07 0.08 0.01 
(VI) 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.01 
(VII) 0.05 0.35 0.07 0.00 
(vni) 0.06 0.06 0.45 0.01 
(DC) 0.07 0.08 0.50 0.01 
(X) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(XI) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(xn) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(xni) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 
(XIV) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(XV) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
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